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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

BARRY M. BLECHMAN and STEPHEN S. KAPLAN analyze how the United States sought to further foreign policy objectives since World War II by what they call "the demonstrative use of the military." They conclude that such uses of the military were often effective political instruments in the short term, but that their impact eroded over time.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON suggests that the antipoverty programs of the 1960s in New York City rather than politicizing the black poor, actually produced a patron-recipient relationship that kept them depoliticized.

CHERYL BENARD and ZALMAY KHALILZAD examine the implications of recent developments in Iran for theories of political modernization. Benard and Khalilzad argue that the events in Iran and the surrounding region require the reassessment of some of the basic assumptions of mainstream modernization theories.

WILLIAM D. JACKSON discusses the controversy in the explanation of Moscow's behavior in strategic arms competition. He contends that Moscow has not consistently sought to achieve nuclear superiority and that Soviet interest in curbing the strategic competition has been substantial.

STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN describes the Central Intelligence Agency's intervention in the Third World through case studies of "covert action" in Zaire and Angola. Weissman shows that the varying degrees of success of covert action depended upon collateral use of overt diplomacy, the internal organization of targeted groups, and the nature of the Soviet and Chinese responses.

ERIC L. DAVIS examines the behavior of the White House and departmental legislative liaison staffs during the first years of the Carter administration and attempts to account for its relative lack of legislative success.

STEPHEN J. WAYNE, RICHARD L. COLE, and JAMES F. C. HYDE, JR., analyze presidential decisions to approve or veto enrolled bills during the Nixon and Ford years. The authors show that presidential action was closely related to advice from the agency most directly affected by the proposed legislation and especially the Office of Management and Budget.

JUDITH H. PARRIS describes the 1977 committee reorganization in the Senate, suggests why it was successful, and indicates ways in which committee reorganization matters in political, symbolic, and managerial terms.

PETER B. KENEN reviews W.W. Rostow's diagnosis and remedies for the problems of the U. S. economy. He has doubts about the diagnosis and reservations about the remedies, suggesting that democracies must come to grips with the politics of distribution if they are to solve their economic problems.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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U.S. Military Forces as a Political Instrument since World War II

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
STEPHEN S. KAPLAN

On November 11, 1944, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegün, died in Washington; not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were sweeping across France and Eastern Europe toward Germany, and Berlin and Tokyo were approaching *Götterdämmerung*. Sixteen months later, however, the ambassador's remains were the focus of world attention as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed forces as a political instrument. On March 6, 1946, the U.S. Department of State announced that the late Ambassador Ertegün's remains would be sent home to Turkey aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*, visibly the most powerful warship in the U.S. Navy and the ship on board which General Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan's surrender.

Between the ambassador's death and this announcement, not only had World War II ended, the cold war—as yet untitled—had begun. In addition to conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union over Poland, Germany, Iran, and other areas, the Soviet Union had demanded from the Turkish government the concession of two of its provinces in the east and, in the west, a base in the area of the Dardanelles.

On March 22, the *Missouri* began a slow journey from New York harbor to Turkey. At Gibraltar the British governor had a wreath placed on board. Accompanied by the destroyer *Power*, the great battleship was met on April 3 in the eastern Mediterranean by the light cruiser *Providence*. Finally, on the

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morning of April 5, the *Missouri* and her escorts anchored in the harbor at Istanbul.[1]

The meaning of this event was missed by no one; Washington had not so subtly reminded the Soviet Union and others that the United States was a great military power and that it could project this power abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of the *Missouri*, or subsequent U.S. actions, deterred the Soviet Union from implementing any further planned or potential hostile acts toward Turkey will probably never be known. What is clear is that no forceful Soviet actions followed the visit. Moreover, as a symbol of American support for Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the visit of the *Missouri* was well received and deeply appreciated by the government of Turkey, the Turkish press, and presumably by the Turkish citizenry at large. The American ambassador stated that to the Turks the visit indicated that "the United States has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USSR to destroy Turk[ey's] independence and integrity."[2]

In this incident, as in hundreds of others since 1945, U.S. military forces were used without significant violence to underscore verbal and diplomatic expressions of American foreign policy. Recently we concluded a study concerned with some of these uses of the armed forces: those in which the various branches of the U.S. military were used in a discrete way for specific political objectives in a particular situation.[3] Historically, of course, the United States has not been the only nation to use its armed forces for political objectives; all the great powers have engaged in such activity, and in the last three decades the Soviet Union has been a frequent practitioner of the political use of the armed forces.

A principal objective of our study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. military as a political instrument, in the short term and over a longer period, by analyzing the consequences of such factors as: the size, type, and activity of military units involved in the incident; the nature of the situation at which they were directed; the character of U.S. objectives; the international and domestic context in which the incident occurred; and the extent and type of diplomatic activity that accompanied the use of the armed forces. We concluded, generally, that discrete demonstrative uses of the military were often effective political instruments in the short term, but that effectiveness declined when situations were reexamined after longer periods of time had elapsed. We also found that each of the variables mentioned above had important consequences for the effectiveness of these uses of the military.

[1] Log of the U.S.S. *Missouri*, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

[2] U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 7, *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 822.

[3] Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978).

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Methodology

Armed forces serve foreign policy functions in many ways—by their existence and character alone, by their location abroad, by their routine exercises and visits, by their provision of military assistance and other forms of support. The United States has used military units often and in a wide variety of ways since World War II. Most of these uses have had a political dimension; that is, they were liable to influence the perceptions and behavior of political leaders in foreign countries to some degree.

For the purposes of the study described in this article, we define a political use of the armed forces as a physical action taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Using this definition, 215 incidents were identified in which the United States used its armed forces for political objectives between January 1, 1946, and December 31, 1975—an arbitrary cutoff date. We are confident that the list of incidents adequately represents all those instances in which U.S. armed forces were used in a way that would fit the terms of the definition.[4]

The use of military power as a tool of diplomacy can risk the security and well being of the United States and importantly affect U.S. and other international relationships both immediately and for a long time afterward. Although on some occasions the risks of intervention may be small, in many instances it is difficult to determine all possible dangers and the likelihood of their being realized. Military action in still other situations may clearly entail great risk—particularly if the USSR is an actor and is committed to a different result, or if another opponent is prepared to use violence as a last resort. The discrete political use of military power may also lead to unwanted dependency on the United States and the hostility, not only of antagonists, but of other nations in the affected region. U.S. relations with the USSR, China, and uninvolved U.S. allies may be made more difficult. In light of the Vietnam War experience, the effects of U.S. military activities abroad on the political culture of the United States and the fabric of American politics should also be considered. Before reaching a judgment that military intervention is necessary for the preservation of important U.S. interests and accepting the immediate and long-term risks that may be apparent, policymakers would be wise to consider also the utility of past political-military operations.

To evaluate this past effectiveness, two approaches, aggregate analysis and

[4] Analysts undertaking a similar study on a classified basis have indicated that there is a correlation of 0.89 between our incident list and a list of incidents which, under the terms of the definition employed in this study, their data would indicate took place. See Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., "A Comparison of the Brookings and CNA International Incidents Projects," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 174 (Washington, D.C.: February, 1977), processed.

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case study, which present macro- and micro-views of the same phenomena, were adopted. The value of the first is that it permits broad generalizations that might be applicable in the future when the armed forces are used for political objectives. Individual case studies can confirm or disprove these generalizations, allow the inference of propositions related to the peculiarities and complexities of specific situations, and provide a sense of the psychological climate and individual concerns that condition the choices of policymakers. In short, the two approaches are complementary; each has advantages and disadvantages, but together they afford greater understanding than either can provide separately.

For the aggregate analysis, a sample of thirty-three incidents, 15 percent of the total number of cases examined, was selected for systematic and rigorous analysis of outcomes. For each of the incidents in the sample, the available literature, documents, and newspaper accounts were investigated so as to determine:

—U.S. objectives vis-à-vis each participant, and whether those objectives were satisfied within six months and retained over three years following the use of U.S. armed forces;

—the size, type, and activity of U.S. armed forces involved in the incident;

—the character of the targets in relation to U.S. objectives;

—other activities (for example, diplomatic) undertaken in support of U.S. objectives along with the use of the armed forces;

—certain U.S. domestic conditions.

In the analysis, the degree of satisfaction of U.S. objectives was related to each of these other factors with the aim of highlighting the crucial variables determining whether a political use of the armed forces was likely to be successful or not. Five specialists made detailed assessments of the specific mechanisms through which military operations affected the perceptions and decisions of foreign policymakers in ten case studies.[5]

What have been the results of discrete U.S. political-military operations? Are the prospects for success in such ventures good enough that policymakers should consider the armed forces an important option in these situations? Or should they view use of the military with great caution, since this type of activity often fails to meet its objectives and sometimes backfires? More to the point, under what circumstances are discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives more likely to succeed, and when are they more likely to fail?

The Utility of Military Force

The evidence supports the hypothesis that discrete uses of the armed forces are often an effective way of achieving short-term foreign policy objectives.

[5] David Hall, William Quandt, Jerome Slater, Robert Slusser, and Philip Windsor.

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The aggregate analyses show clearly that the outcomes of United States political-military activities were most often favorable from the perspective of U.S. decision makers—at least in the short term.

In a very large proportion of the incidents, however, this "success rate" eroded sharply over time. Thus, it would seem that, to the degree that they did influence events, discrete uses of military forces for political objectives served mainly to delay, rather than resolve, unwanted developments abroad. Though there is some value in "buying time"—that is, keeping a situation open and flexible enough to prevent an adverse fait accompli—it should be recognized that these military operations cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions that can form the basis either for sound and successful alliances or for stable adversary relations, such as diplomacy, close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and perceptions. What political-military operations perhaps can do is provide a respite, a means of postponing adverse developments long enough to formulate and implement new policies that may be sustained over the longer term. Or, if that is not possible, the political use of armed forces may serve to lessen the consequences of detrimental events. However, some of the case studies suggest that even these delaying and minimizing accomplishments do not always obtain.

In some cases the discrete use of force clearly has been ineffectual. For example, U.S. support for Pakistan during the 1971 war with India was a relatively empty gesture because the target actors recognized that under virtually no circumstances would the United States become militarily involved in the war. Consequently, the deployment of the *Enterprise* task force to the Indian Ocean had almost no effect on the decisions of either the immediate actors, India and Pakistan, or the actors indirectly involved, China and the Soviet Union.

In other cases, a discrete political application of the armed forces seems to have been associated with the creation of a situation that remained tolerable for a period of months or, in some cases, years. The intervention in Laos in 1962 was such an incident; the landing of U.S. Marines in Thailand coincided with the negotiation of a settlement that kept the peace in Laos for several years. U.S. actions to oust the Trujillo family from the Dominican Republic following Rafael Trujillo's assassination, and subsequent actions to support the new government, were of a similar character. These actions precipitated a more acceptable political situation in the Dominican Republic that persisted for several years, even though it ultimately foundered in 1965.

Was it worthwhile to use armed forces to obtain positive outcomes that could be sustained only temporarily, whether the duration was of several months or several years? We believe the answer is yes, insofar as an opportunity was gained for diplomacy.

When a positive outcome did not endure, it was usually attributable not to an absence of follow-up diplomatic effort, but to the fact that the internal situation within a state, or a specific interstate relationship, was strong and durable and thus not subject to penetration by either single or periodic

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U.S. military actions or by the use of other U.S. policy instruments. Realizing that this was the situation in Vietnam in 1964–65, American policymakers chose war as the solution, which contrasts with U.S. policy in the late 1940s in China when Communist forces there triumphed and forced the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek to flee to Taiwan; or in the early 1960s over Cuba when Fidel Castro identified his regime with communism and the Soviet Union; or in the late 1960s against North Korea after the *Pueblo* was seized and a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft was shot down.

Finally, in some cases with very special circumstances, discrete political uses of the armed forces contributed to the establishment of new international relationships, such that U.S. interests were protected for decades. For example, following the 1946 visit to Turkey by the battleship *Missouri* and further displays of U.S. military support for Ankara, Soviet pressures on Turkey declined; they have not been renewed in a serious way since. Displays of American military support for Italy prior to the 1948 elections seem to have contributed, along with such other instruments of policy as economic aid and covert support for democratic political parties, to the defeat of the Italian Communist party. The dominance of the Christian Democratic party, which resulted from that election, persisted for more than two decades. Political uses of the armed forces during the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961 helped create stable conditions in Central Europe that continue to exist.

The Effects of the Military Demonstration

What is the mechanism at work here? How do the armed forces play their special role? The process begins when a given framework of relations among several countries, or a domestic political configuration abroad, is disrupted by something unexpected or at least unwelcome: a domestic upheaval, a new departure in a major power's foreign policy, or perhaps an unexpected armed clash between the military units of hostile states. Regardless of cause, this development often creates uncertainties and a distinct psychological unease among interested parties; at other times it leads directly to an unraveling of the fabric of relations that previously had been established and maintained by existing policies. Under such circumstances (and mindful of the fact that even when favorable outcomes do occur they are likely to persist only over the short term), a discrete demonstration of U.S. military capability can have a stabilizing and otherwise beneficial effect, perhaps persuading the target that the wise course of action is to alter the undesirable policy.

The effect of the military demonstration will depend to a large extent on whether the target finds the threat credible. A prime example was the arrival of U.S. military forces off the coast of the Dominican Republic in November 1961, an event that changed the perceptions of the Trujillo family and their lieutenants as to the United States' willingness to act. Coupled as it was with a clear ultimatum, the action seems to have exerted a powerful influence.

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Such a military demonstration may be particularly effective when the target state is not fully committed to the course from which the United States hopes to dissuade it. We will never know for sure, but U.S. actions in support of Yugoslavia following President Tito's break with Stalin may have lessened Stalin's inclination to take more aggressive measures against Yugoslavia. Moscow may also have been somewhat deterred from taking action against Rumania following the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. We will return to these distinctions. First, however, it is helpful to examine the mechanisms at work more closely.

In some of the cases studied, the insertion (even symbolically) of U.S. military forces may have provided leverage to U.S. decision makers where previously there had not been any. A U.S. military presence or operation may furnish an incentive to a foreign leader to consider the wishes of U.S. policy-makers. After U.S. Marines landed in Thailand in 1962, and the threat of a U.S. intervention in Laos became credible, for example, the United States may have gained a decided edge at the negotiating table. In such a case the prime result is to lessen the potential U.S. loss. Foreign decision makers may act to avoid those extreme choices that they fear would precipitate a violent U.S. response. Unless the United States is willing to extend its new military presence into a permanent operation, however, any such demonstrative action is likely to be successful, to the degree it is successful at all, only for a limited time.

The intervention in Lebanon in 1958 provides a pointed example of this phenomenon. Although President Eisenhower authorized the landing of U.S. Marines and other forces in Lebanon in July 1958, the president—or at least Secretary of State Dulles—recognized that an American-imposed solution in Lebanon would be unacceptable to most of the Lebanese actors and therefore short-lived. Thus the United States adopted a twofold approach. On the one hand, a massive demonstration of American military power was staged, involving the landing of thousands of American troops. On the other hand, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy was dispatched to Lebanon, where, recognizing the political realities of the situation, he negotiated a settlement that was probably more favorable to the actors who opposed U.S. policy than to the presumed American client, President Camille Chamoun. In other words, to the degree that it did influence the situation, the U.S. military demonstration seems to have bought sufficient time to reach new political arrangements that more realistically reflected the distribution of power among competing ethnic and political groups in Lebanon. Without the more realistic political solution negotiated by Murphy, the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon would probably have been associated with a much less favorable outcome. At the same time, without the leverage provided by the U.S. military presence in Lebanon, with its implied threat of greater violence, Murphy might well have failed in his attempt to negotiate a political solution.

Military demonstrations also can ease domestic political pressures on the president from groups demanding more forceful action. In less serious incidents,

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these pressures—which can originate from ethnic groups, the Congress, friends and political associates of the decision makers, and executive branch uniformed and civilian officials, among others—are directed at lower-ranking foreign policy managers. Insofar as they can help to stabilize a situation, thereby postponing perceived adverse consequences of unexpected changes in international relations or the internal politics of foreign nations, discrete uses of the armed forces may diminish calls for more decisive action. The postponement provides the time needed to gather support within the bureaucracy and in the Congress and the public for the fundamental changes in policy required to accommodate developments. In the absence of the time bought by the military demonstration, these fundamental changes in policy may be more difficult to bring about, and the president might fear that his constituencies, both at home and abroad, will see him as bowing to foreign pressures.

This phenomenon was also demonstrated pointedly by the intervention in Lebanon in 1958. During the spring of 1958, President Eisenhower resisted several requests from President Chamoun for American military assistance. An unexpected event—the coup in Iraq in July—made it impossible to avoid the request any longer. Eisenhower feared that further inaction, after the seeming wholesale defeat of American clients in the Middle East, would have negative effects both on the perceptions of decision makers in foreign nations and on domestic opinion in this nation. American support for the realistic solution to the Lebanese problem negotiated by Murphy might have been difficult to muster without the symbolism of American strength suggested by the military intervention. In the absence of the intervention, President Eisenhower may have feared the effects of such an apparent concession on opinion both at home and abroad.

Similarly, following American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker negotiated an agreement in which it was all but explicit that the president elected the following year would be either Joaquin Balaguer or Juan Bosch. Balaguer was the last president during the Trujillo era, and a person the United States took pains to keep out of the Dominican Republic in later years; Bosch was strongly disliked by many American officials and suspected of tendencies that might allow an eventual takeover by the extreme left. The emplacement of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic thus not only made an election there possible, it also made it possible for the United States to accept results of that election which it previously could not have tolerated.

None of this is meant to imply that the gains seemingly associated with discrete uses of the armed forces for political objectives have been fraudulent. The amelioration of pressures for extreme actions is an important benefit, as is the provision of time necessary to build a consensus for a new U.S. policy; so too is the provision of leverage to negotiators.

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Correlates of Success

Four groups of factors have been associated with the relative success or failure of political uses of the U.S. armed forces: the type of objective; involvement by the Soviet Union; the context of the incident; and the nature and activity of the U.S. military forces involved. (Unless noted otherwise, these conclusions refer mainly to short-term outcomes.)

U.S. Objectives

The nature of U.S. objectives may be an important determinant of whether a political use of force is successful. Favorable outcomes occurred most often when the objective of U.S. policymakers was to maintain the authority of a specific regime abroad. Such was the case, for example, when naval movements and other activities were undertaken in support of King Hussein during the 1970 civil war in Jordan. Indeed, the aggregate analyses suggest that maintenance of regime authority was the one type of objective associated with the persistence of a favorable outcome over the longer term. The armed forces were least often associated with favorable outcomes when the objectives concerned the provision of support by actors to third parties—for example, the many incidents in which U.S. military activities were undertaken in order to persuade the Soviet Union to cease supporting hostile political initiatives by its allies or clients.

Between these two extremes there were a reasonable number of favorable outcomes when discrete political uses of the armed forces were undertaken to offset the use of force by another actor. Over the longer term, however, frequencies of favorable outcomes were low when discrete political uses of the military were aimed at either the use of force by another actor or another actor's support of a third nation's use of force. Illustrative are the futile attempts during the late 1950s and early 1960s to convince the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong to terminate their insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam.

Perhaps more significant, the mode in which the armed forces are used as a political instrument may also be an important determinant of success. It is evident from the aggregate analyses that discrete uses of the armed forces for political purposes were more often associated with favorable outcomes when the U.S. objective was to reinforce, rather than modify, the behavior of a target state. This stands to reason. Nikita Khrushchev, no doubt, found it much easier not to follow through on the various threats he made concerning Europe and the Middle East than he did to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba; just as deterring the outbreak of violence is usually an easier task than bringing violence to a satisfactory conclusion.

Human behavior is difficult to change. Individuals tend to be more aware

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of the risks of change than they are of the dangers of continuing their prevailing course. After all, established policies are known entities; even when the risks in continuing established policies are evident, the dangers of change will often appear more threatening. More to the point, no one—least of all the head of a nation—can afford to be told publicly what he should be doing. Thus, national leaders will resist demands for policy modifications most strenuously when such demands are made publicly, which is usually unavoidable when military power is used.

In short, whether a discrete application of military power was made in order to coerce a hostile target state to change its behavior or to encourage a friendly target state to change its behavior, the outcomes were similar; most often they were unfavorable from the U.S. perspective. On the other hand, when U.S. policymakers used the armed forces to coerce a hostile target state to continue to do something (for example, stay at peace), or to encourage a friendly state to remain on the same course, military demonstrations were relatively more often associated with favorable outcomes.

Consider, for example, the starkly different outcomes of the Berlin crisis of 1958–59 and 1961 and the several incidents in Southeast Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the former situation the United States sought essentially to assure allies and to deter certain threatened actions by the USSR and East Germany. Both types of objectives required only that the targets not change their behavior, and both were achieved. Not so favorable, especially over the longer term, were the outcomes of the Southeast Asian incidents, in which the United States sought to compel various Communist actors to stop using force and to induce the government of South Vietnam to behave differently (that is, more assertively). Here both types of objectives required a change of behavior on the part of target states, and only rarely were these outcomes achieved.

To some extent this conclusion may reflect Tolstoy's view that the only decisions that are carried out are those corresponding to what would have happened if the decisions had not been made. In many of the incidents, although U.S. decision makers may have thought—or feared—that a target state was prepared or intending to change its behavior, and thus used the armed forces to reinforce existing behavior, the target state actually may have had no such intention. A good example is the U.S. military activity that followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, consisting primarily of increases in the readiness for war of U.S. forces in Europe. One objective of that action was to deter a Soviet invasion of Rumania. No invasion occurred; hence the military demonstration appears to have been effective. The question, however, is whether Soviet leaders ever seriously contemplated such an invasion. The same may be said about the Soviet Union not taking violent action against President Tito and Yugoslavia almost two decades earlier. This is not necessarily to discount the importance of the U.S. military activity. U.S. policymakers had other important objectives in mind as well. Still, the proportion of favorable "reinforcement" outcomes that are accounted for by the "unreality" of the feared

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target state behavior may be high. Unfortunately, that proportion is impossible to determine empirically.

Political uses of the armed forces were often associated with favorable outcomes when U.S. objectives were at least loosely consistent with prior U.S. policies. The purpose of discrete political uses of force must fit within a fundamental framework of expectations held by decision makers both in this country and abroad if the military activity is to be associated with a favorable outcome. With regard to the incidents in the sample, although prior diplomacy was closely associated with positive outcomes, diplomacy during the course of the incidents themselves was not.

When a treaty exists, or when policymakers have taken pains to make clear that the United States perceives itself to have a commitment, antagonists are less likely to probe, or to probe only within narrower limits than would have been the case otherwise, and to leave themselves a way open for retreat. In other words, antagonists may be less likely to try to present the United States with a fait accompli that could be reversed only through a major use of the armed forces. Prior diplomacy may have reinforced the antagonists' continued performance of desired behavior, and thus lessened the significance of a breakdown in relations or the severity of a crisis. Rather than have to cope with hostile actions, policymakers in these cases might have only had to respond to hostile rhetoric; alternatively, the degree of desired behavior modification of foreign decision makers might have been less.

Hence, although China initiated the 1958 Offshore Islands crisis by shelling Quemoy and Matsu, and Khrushchev threatened Berlin on several occasions, both Peking and Moscow carefully controlled their behavior during these incidents because they perceived a prior U.S. commitment (or at least feared the strength of announced U.S. commitments). In the absence of a prior U.S. commitment, as in Korea in 1950, we might surmise that not only would China and the USSR have gone further in their initial actions, but also that sudden U.S. diplomatic action, even if supported by a discrete political use of force, might have had a lesser effect. Skilled diplomacy during incidents—for example, by Robert Murphy in Lebanon, Averell Harriman in Laos, and Ellsworth Bunker in the Dominican Republic—has typically borne fruit only after ambiguous U.S. military commitments have been clarified by the movement of major military units. Thus, the United States should not count on skilled diplomacy as being effective in controlling crises in the absence of prior commitments and reinforcing uses of the armed forces; it should, however, aim to avoid such difficult tests in the first place by being quite clear as to what its commitments are.

Similarly, the aggregate analyses suggest that prior U.S. military engagement in conflicts in a region was often associated with favorable outcomes when subsequent demonstrative uses of military force took place. The fact that the United States previously had been willing to engage in violence in the region may have made the threats or assurances implied by the subsequent military

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activity more credible. Much less often associated with favorable outcomes were previous demonstrative uses of force in the region; the willingness to engage in violence seems to have been the key. Previous discrete political uses of force were associated with favorable outcomes more often, however, when the U.S. objective was to assure that a target state would continue to do something. Good examples are provided by U.S. naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean. U.S. military forces have not fought in that region since 1945, yet as concerns the assurance of Israel (and less frequently, Jordan), these displays of naval power were often associated with favorable outcomes. U.S. objectives in situations were far less often attained, however, when the political use of force was meant to modify the behavior of Israel's (or Jordan's) enemies.

In short, prior demonstrative uses of force or even prior military engagements did not seem to be sufficient to compensate for the previously noted difficulty of modifying a target state's behavior. Indeed, very little seemed to compensate for the difficulty of modifying behavior; more than any other factor this was the basic determinant of when a discrete political use of force would or would not be associated with the attainment of foreign policy objectives. It overshadowed the diplomacy that accompanied the military activity, the nature of the situation, and the timing, size, composition, and activity of the military units themselves.

Soviet Activity

A second group of factors that seemed to be associated with favorable outcomes in the aggregate analyses included the character of United States-Soviet relations and the specific role played by the Soviet Union in an incident.

One conclusion that runs counter to prevailing views concerns the possible effects of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear balance on the relative fortunes of the superpowers. We did not find that the United States was less often successful as the Soviet Union closed the U.S. lead in strategic nuclear weapons that had been maintained for the first twenty or so years following World War II. Whether discrete political uses of U.S. armed forces were associated with positive outcomes seems to have been independent of relative United States-Soviet aggregate strategic capabilities. Of course, the United States may have engaged less often in these incidents since the late 1960s precisely because it understood that its chances of success were smaller; as the USSR closed the nuclear gap, the United States may have chosen to participate in incidents more selectively, choosing only those cases in which its chances of success were greatest.

Since this study was not designed to test the effects of the strategic balance, the findings in this regard are clearly tentative. Still, both the aggregate analyses and the case studies provide little support for the notion that decisions during crises are strongly influenced by aggregate strategic capabilities. Studies of Lebanon and Jordan, for example, indicate that, to the extent

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that evaluations of the military balance played any role, decision makers in the United States and Soviet Union, as well as those in the nations directly involved, were more concerned with the local balance of conventional power. More to the point, most local actors in these incidents seem to have had only a rudimentary and impressionistic sense of relative military capabilities in general.

Soviet political and/or military involvement in the incident itself, on the other hand, was clearly associated with the frequency of outcomes favorable to the United States, which were less often favorable when the Soviet Union was involved, particularly when the Soviet Union threatened to employ, or actually employed, its own armed forces in the incident. The seemingly pernicious effect of Soviet involvement was tempered at times when broader United States-Soviet relations had been improving, and outcomes were more often favorable when overall United States-Soviet relations were characterized by greater cooperation. As in the previous finding, this conclusion is stronger when just those incidents in which the Soviet Union participated were considered, and stronger still when just those incidents were considered in which Soviet military forces were involved.

Nature of the Situation

Outcomes were favorable more frequently when discrete political uses of force were directed at intranational, as contrasted to international, situations. We are not confident about this finding, however, because two other factors that are also closely associated with favorable outcomes are highly correlated with intranational situations: lesser amounts of force tend to be used in intranational situations; and the U.S. objective in these situations is more often reinforcement, not modification, of behavior.

In the international situations, a positive outcome was most likely if the United States was involved from the very onset of a conflict. This finding complements the previous finding concerning the need for the U.S. objective and the specific use of force to be consistent with the prior framework of relations between the United States and the nations involved in the incident. In those situations in which the United States was involved initially, such as the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and 1961, U.S. statements of aims and objectives were more likely to be considered seriously. Similarly, U.S. threats or promises implied by the use of armed forces were more likely to be perceived as credible. In international situations where the United States intervened in affairs that did not concern it directly (or at least not initially), however, there seems to have been some question in the minds of the other actors whether U.S. threats or promises were credible. Consider the perceptions of Hanoi in the late 1950s and early 1960s and those of the Gandhi government in India during the crisis and then war with Pakistan in 1971, for example. The U.S. military demonstrations then were not taken too seriously at first. Why, North

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Vietnamese and Indian leaders might have asked, would the United States become involved militarily? Such questions were less likely to be raised in those situations in which U.S. interests were directly and obviously threatened.

Boding ill for the future, the proportion of incidents involving hostility between states appears to be increasing, while there is a decline in situations of an intrastate nature. Less and less is the United States being called upon by governments for support against internal dissidents; rather, the trend is toward being asked by one state for support against another. Insofar as such a shift is discernible, the risks of involvement to the United States, especially in a situation of violence, can only increase. The shift away from an intrastate focus means that the instruments brought to bear by regional actors will often be more powerful, both diplomatically and militarily. Allies usually act more overtly when they are supporting a state rather than a subnational group; hence, the facing-off of states is more likely to occasion the facing-off of alliances, whether formal or otherwise. Most important, the likelihood of superpower confrontation is increased.

States, unlike subnational groups, also have air forces, navies, and heavily armed ground forces. Thus the level of violence that can be threatened in a crisis or manifested in a conflict is much greater. For a threat by U.S. policymakers to be credible in these circumstances, large and technologically sophisticated forces must be available. Should these forces be committed in a conflict, they might have to be used in strength and be prepared to take significant casualties. The danger that U.S. action of this sort might stimulate a Soviet military response is obvious.

Size, Activity, and Type of U.S. Military Forces

The firmer the commitment implied by the military operation, the more often the outcome of the situation was favorable to the United States. Forces actually emplaced on foreign soil were more frequently associated with positive outcomes than were deployments of naval forces, which can be withdrawn almost as easily as they can be moved toward the disturbed area. The movement of land-based forces, on the other hand, involves both real economic costs and a certain psychological commitment that are difficult to reverse, at least in the short term. This is an interesting finding, not so much because of its novelty—after all, it only confirms the common perception—but because its implications run counter to common U.S. practice. The navy has been the preeminent military force in discrete political operations. Naval forces participated in more than 80 percent of the incidents; and reliance on the Navy was the case regardless of region, time period, type of situation, and whether or not the Soviet Union participated in the incident.

Naval forces can be used more subtly to support foreign policy initiatives—to underscore threats, warnings, promises, or commitments—than can land-based units, and they can do so without inalterably tying the president's hands.

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But it is precisely this last fact that probably diminishes the effectiveness of naval forces in a political role. Foreign decision makers also recognize that warships can be withdrawn as easily as they can enter a region of tension and, hence, that the commitment they imply is not so firm as that implied by land-based units.

Positive outcomes were particularly frequent when land-based combat aircraft were involved in an incident. This would suggest, particularly in view of the much greater mobility of modern land-based tactical air units, that the air force might be used more frequently in political-military operations than has been the case in the past.

Such a shift in U.S. practice would not be without its costs, because the use of land-based forces is perceived by foreign decision makers as greater evidence of commitment. If the U.S. objective is not so certain, if all that is desired is to take an action that signifies interest and concern but leaves room for maneuver—such as U.S. naval deployments during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974—then the use of land-based forces would not be advisable. Moreover, in situations in which a military move is intended as a bluff or to screen a political defeat—as seems the case in the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971—the use of land-based air forces would not be advisable. In all these types of situations, naval forces would provide greater flexibility to decision makers and thus would be more appropriate even if their probability of succeeding may be less.

There are other ways to enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces. Outcomes were more often favorable when the units involved actually did something, instead of merely emphasizing their potential capability to intervene—for example, by reducing the time delay between a decision to intervene and the actual operation by moving toward the scene of the incident or by increasing their state of alert. The involvement of the military unit in a specific operation, such as mine-laying, or mine-clearing, or patrolling—and certainly when the actual exercise of firepower was involved—seems to have indicated a more serious intent on the United States' part. The movement of the force toward the region of concern by itself could be an ambiguous signal; it might not be clear to foreign decision makers what the United States had in mind, or the movement might pass unobserved. A more specific action, one that gave a clearer signal, thus was more often associated with favorable outcomes.

Positive outcomes were also more likely when the forces involved included strategic nuclear forces. Foreign decision makers seem to have perceived the use of strategic nuclear forces—whether or not it was accompanied by a specific threat to use nuclear weapons—as an important signal that the United States perceived the situation in a most serious way. Thus, the employment of nuclear-associated forces, such as Strategic Air Command aircraft or Sixth Fleet carriers when they were central to U.S. plans for nuclear war, served the same purpose as the involvement of military units in a specific activity or the use of ground forces as compared to naval forces: they bolstered U.S. credibility.

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The risks of such a policy should be evident. There is no guarantee that any military demonstration will be successful. When nuclear weapons are involved, and the demonstration is not successful, the result could be disastrous; U.S. policymakers may be faced with the choice of admitting the emptiness of the nuclear threat, and thus undermining the credibility of fundamental U.S. commitments, or actually employing nuclear weapons.

Moreover, it may be that positive outcomes have more often occurred when nuclear forces were involved simply because these weapons have been used infrequently. The more U.S. decision makers turn to nuclear forces, even demonstratively, to ensure the credibility of signals in incidents such as we have described, the more quickly the special message now associated with nuclear weapons might erode. Eventually the movement of nuclear forces would not receive much more attention and would not convey any more credibility than movements of conventional forces.

A Last Word

The discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives should not be an option that decision makers turn to frequently or quickly to secure political objectives abroad; it should be used only in very special circumstances. We have found that over the longer term such uses of the armed forces were not often associated with positive outcomes. Decision makers thus should not expect them to serve as substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad, and incorporating diplomacy and the many other potential instruments available to U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, there are dangers in using the armed forces as a discrete political instrument. Symbolic low-level uses of force may be disregarded by antagonists or friends in a situation in which U.S. policymakers have not seriously contemplated the need for, or the consequences of, using larger forces in a more manifest way. Foreign decision makers may not perceive important U.S. interests to be involved; the initial U.S. military action may be seen as symbolic of U.S. interest but not of a commitment; foreign decision makers may calculate that they will be able to cope successfully with the forces that they expect the United States to bring to bear; or, when an actor feels its very existence is at stake, the calculus may not matter at all. In all these situations there is a risk that lesser military actions may lead to pressures for greater U.S. involvement.

Case studies bear this out: The Castro regime did not yield at the Bay of Pigs; Hanoi and the Viet Cong were not swayed in the early 1960s; and India dismembered Pakistan in 1971. In each case, either the United States suffered humiliation or the fear of exposure embarrassed decision makers into escalation and war.

Still, in particular circumstances, discrete political uses of the armed forces

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often were associated—at least in the short term—with the securing of U.S. objectives or the stabilization of adverse situations while more fundamental policies could be formulated. Thus, at times, and although decision makers should view this option with some caution, the discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives seems to have been a useful step in shoring up situations enough to avoid dramatic setbacks, to mitigate domestic and international pressures for more forceful and perhaps counterproductive actions, and to gain time for sounder policies to be formulated and implemented.

To reach this conclusion about the apparent effectiveness of the armed forces as a political instrument is not to reach any judgment about the wisdom of using the armed forces for these purposes. That is a more difficult question, which can only be answered in the context of the specific choices—and the various costs and benefits associated with each choice—facing decision makers at that time.*

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The Patron-Recipient Relationship and Minority Politics in New York City

CHARLES V. HAMILTON

This article examines the development and consequences of a particular style of politics that I call the "patron-recipient relationship," as it operates in one urban area, New York City. The patron-recipient relationship is an outgrowth of public and private policies, particularly related to the anti-poverty efforts of the 1960s. Those efforts had varying and, in some instances, conflicting interpretations as to their motivation and goals. These programs, however, had unanticipated political consequences and in fact "depoliticized" the constituencies they were designed to serve. This contention might appear to be more condemnatory than is intended; the policymakers who devised the programs or the various local authorities and groups that administered them had no intentions of curtailing the development of political power among "target groups." In fact, as is widely known, the language of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 called for "maximum feasible participation." And advocates of "grass-roots" participation have even suggested that poor people have, indeed, been politicized as a result of the programs.

Professors Greenstone and Peterson have defended participatory, community control processes of the antipoverty programs.[1] In their study of community action programs in five cities (Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, and New York), Greenstone and Peterson develop a latent-manifest interest theory that suggests that such processes are especially important to blacks in their ef-

[1] J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973).

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forts to overcome the "imputation of Negro inferiority." "The patterning-role orientation in American race relations," suggest the authors, "is the white imputation of Negro inferiority. This attitude has so sharply distinguished blacks not only from whites but from all other racial groups that it has produced a dichotomous cleavage in American society comparable to the possession or nonpossession of economic authority in class relations."[2] And Greenstone and Peterson conclude:

> Although racial oppression and inequality often seems virtually intractable, the policy most likely to eradicate it must follow the path of collective self-development that other ethnic groups utilized to establish themselves in a society that was at once white Protestant in its dominant cultural orientation, capitalist in its economic values, and only partially egalitarian in its political aspirations. Community control, for all its faults, can facilitate the forward thrust of black power in the American regime.[3]

The latent-manifest interest theory and the "imputation of inferiority" premise shed considerable light on the politics of community control processes; nonetheless, the organizational-benefit structures and processes under discussion are hardly likely to lead to the political empowerment goals desired.

One black newspaper stated:

> Every ethnic group that has achieved political power in American cities has used the bureaucracy to provide jobs in return for political support. It's only when Blacks begin to play the same game that the rules get changed. Now the use of such jobs to build political bases becomes an "evil" activity, and the city insists on taking the control back "downtown."[4]

What has developed in some black communities, however, is a patron-recipient relationship which must be distinguished from the patron-client relationship of earlier ethnic groups. The latter *was* a mechanism for the development of local political power bases; the former could hardly be such. The patron-client relationship *did* serve in some ways to politicize constituents. The patron-recipient relationship articulates the same purpose, but there are critical differences that must be taken into account and that are made manifest when one examines minority (used in this article to refer to blacks) politics in New York City over nearly two decades. In New York City, the black constituency has lost, not gained, political influence, if one measures this in terms of the capacity to elect and influence people who will likely have control over the way programs are run. The black constituency has evidenced a marked decline in participation in that process (electoral politics) aimed at capturing and controlling, not funded programs, but positions of governmental (institutional) power. This is the function of a politicization process gone awry.

Black politics in New York City since the mid-1960s has become largely an intracommunity struggle for the control of "soft-money, funded programs" or for

[2] Ibid., p. 79.
[3] Ibid., p. 315.
[4] *New York Amsterdam News*, April 1, 1978, p. A-4.

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specific grant money from federal and philanthropic sources; and there is only some (but not overly substantial) evidence that the participants paid particular attention to mobilizing a constituency for sustained impact at city and state levels in the struggle for elective public office and the "hard" tax money that the holders of those offices control. Thus, while participation in poverty-program politics has increased in black communities, participation in electoral politics beyond the local communities has decreased. If the assumption was made that the two were not related, then this could hardly be an indication of a growing political sophistication. Earlier ethnic, patron-client politics did not make that mistake.

A couple of caveats should be added at this point. It is not the purpose of this article to join that chorus of critics of the antipoverty programs or critics of the efforts to involve previously excluded people in the formulation and implementation of civic solutions to social and economic problems. Although there is much to criticize and modify, such efforts must continue.

Urban Politics and Political Benefits

When political scientists talk about clientelist politics in the United States, they usually, and correctly, refer to "machine" politics, on which there is a vast literature.

> "Machine politics" represent a particular form of electoral clientelism which received its prototypical expression in urban America around the turn of the last century. By virtue of the political coordination of favors, patronage, and public contracts such parties created formidable electoral majorities which repeatedly swept into power.[5]

The "machine," thus, is an American version of the patron-client relationship. That relationship has been defined in ways that permit one to focus on a few key characteristics. James C. Scott has provided a definition that is cited most frequently:

> The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between roles—may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.[6]

Scott's article distinguishes three critical components of a patron-client relationship: reciprocity; face-to-face, personal, friendly quality of the relationship; and diffuse, "whole-person" nature. There is a close, personal relationship, not a

[5] James C. Scott, "Political Clientelism: A Bibliographic Essay," in *Friends, Followers, and Factions*, eds. Steffen W. Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Lande, and Laura Guasti (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 493.

[6] James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972): 92.

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formal, impersonal, contractual tie. The relationship is multifaceted; it covers a number of services of exchange.[7]

The American political party machine in its classic form exemplified these qualities. The party official provided favors, divisible benefits, jobs for the constituents. In return, grateful constituents gave their votes on election day. If at first the ward leader or precinct captain was not of the same ethnic group as the "client," eventually this came to be the case as the client group grew in numbers, political strength, and political maturity. At all times, both patron and client clearly understood the basis of the relationship: *quid pro quo*. (In this sense, I suspect, Scott characterizes it as "largely instrumental.") On these patronage terms, the local party built a base of support and power. And at all times what the client was required to do was to demonstrate loyalty and support—primarily by voting for the patron's choices. The stakes, of course, were elective public offices. Thus, the patron-party captured *institutional positions of power*, positions supported by "hard-money" tax revenues that had patronage jobs attached to them and that offered divisible and indivisible benefits to the polity. In this way, earlier ethnic groups could clearly see a connection between the process (voting) and the products (be they divisible benefits in the form of jobs and favors or, less likely, indivisible benefits in the form of cleaner streets, community facilities, and the like).[8] Perceiving such a connection, clients had some incentive to participate. If the patron-party failed to deliver or if the client-constituent failed to support the party, the relationship could be expected to be abrogated. In time, as several studies have shown, the basis for the relationship eroded, and the classic patron-client relationship became less prominent. The patron saw politics as a competitive business: he knew he needed customers to enhance his bargaining power in the industry. Sometimes the client was advised explicitly that his or her political support was expected in return. Other times, it was simply understood.

When contemporary observers compare earlier ethnic-based machines with poverty-program structures, they are talking about fundamentally different types of goal-oriented, benefit structures. The machines were in business to win elections and to capture public offices. They provided services to clients who would reciprocate by supporting the machines. The connection between politics and administration was never misunderstood.

The Patron-Recipient Relationship

The patron-recipient concept refers to that situation whereby goods and services (benefits) are supplied by one party (patron) to another (recipient) under cir-

[7] Ibid.

[8] A recent study has suggested that the benefits supposedly handed out by the ethnic machines were not as great as conventional literature has intimated. See, Henry C. Wells, "Party Transformation and Neighborhood Politics: A Case Study of Urban Political Change" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1978).

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cumstances that do not require the recipient to reciprocate in any sustained, systematic way. The patron does not depend on the support or loyalty of the recipient to maintain the patron's role. The only requirement of the recipient is that he or she be in need of the services offered by the patron.

This relationship is indistinguishable from what is commonly understood as charity, and calling it that would not be too misleading. In the political context, however, the terms "patron" and "recipient" give this relationship a sharper, more specific meaning. In some ways the patron presumes to "speak for" or "represent" the needs of the recipient. And by accepting the patron's benefits, the recipient implicitly concurs with this presumption.

This relationship should not be associated with the kindly act of one friend toward another as in the proffering of a gift or a "token" of kindness and friendship. In such instances, the donor is hardly considered the donee's patron. The patron-recipient relationship is characterized by beneficence and an understanding of a hierarchical association—the patron is superordinate (in many respects, but certainly in terms of possession of benefits to be dispensed); the recipient is subordinate.

The patron-recipient relationship can be a pyramidal structure, as in some patron-client ties.[9] The patron of one recipient might well have a patron of his own from whom benefits are received. In such a situation, the intermediary's role is based largely on his ability to convince *his* patron of the intermediary's value to the recipients at the bottom of the structure. Here, one might find an element of reciprocity between the intermediary and the recipient. The intermediary might call on the recipient to support his requests of the patron. It is to the mutual advantage of the intermediary and recipient to present a united front to the patron. In most circumstances, this is rarely required.

When the relationship operates consensually and smoothly, the characteristic of reciprocity is absent. The recipient receives from the patron and is asked to do nothing *but* receive the benefits. Unlike the political patron-client relationship where the client clearly has to give continuing support (for example, vote), the recipient is not called upon politically to support the patron. The client becomes a political actor; the recipient remains a political nonactor. The recipient, for the most part, is a passive partner.

Theoretically, the patron-recipient relationship is based on the premise that after a certain point individual recipients will no longer need the benefits offered by the patron. Thus, the relationship, optimally, is terminal. (This, of course, is not a characteristic of the patron-client relationship.) Thus, the patron expects to service a revolving recipient group, which becomes one measure of the patron's viability: the numbers of *different* recipients served. This is so, because the basis of the relationship is the recipient's needs, not necessarily the patron's resources. Presumably, that need can be met. Therefore, it is not expected that a permanent or even long-term relationship be developed between the patron and the recipient. Again, unlike the patron-client association, it is hoped that the

[9] James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change."

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particular patron-recipient relationship will be ephemeral and transitory. It is difficult, therefore, to perceive a viable, sustained political foundation being built upon such an orientation.

The Patron-Recipient Process in New York City

Several mechanisms channel funds into the city to serve a needy populace. These funds come from various "patron" sources, including the Community Services Administration in Washington, D.C., various federal government departments, state agencies, private philanthropic foundations, and private businesses. The range of "funded" activities is broad: housing, health services, adult education, economic development, manpower and youth services, drug and alcohol treatment, family counseling, day-care centers, senior citizens programs, consumer protection, legal aid services, cultural and recreational programs.

The organizations and groups administering these programs, likewise, cover a broad spectrum: community corporations established by state charter; delegate agencies that receive money from those community corporations; churches; small, private, nonprofit groups which might include block associations, tenants councils, and civil rights groups; government agencies. In 1978, the antipoverty programs had 26 community corporations and 276 delegate agencies throughout the city. There were 115 Head Start centers. The community action programs received approximately $39 million in city and federal funds, and $13 million for the city's Head Start program.[10] The federal government's jobs program, the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA), had approximately $171.9 million, and the Model Cities program had a budget of $34.6 million. One source in the mayor's office reported that there were more than 400 individual antipoverty projects throughout New York City.[11]

This overall process is designed to deliver a vast array of services and income to various "targeted" populations. Eligibility requirements for receiving benefits vary with the program, of course, but in no instance is a political test part of the formal requirements. In fact, all the programs explicitly eschew political criteria, although informally this might not be the case. There have been charges (which are not the concern of this article) that some directors of programs have used the resources for political purposes. With the receipt of government funds, engaging in partisan political activity is explicitly prohibited; the Hatch Act also limits the activity of those who work in the programs. Restrictions are also placed on funds coming from private philanthropic sources. One form of political activity apparently is permitted—voter registration. This is allowed as a nonpartisan, civic education activity, and a number of organizations indicate that they encourage people to register to vote and even conduct voter registration drives.

[10] Human Resources Administration, *Newsletter*, New York City, November 30, 1977.
[11] *New York Times*, February 3, 1978.

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Basically, the process is a simple one: To obtain funds, a group or organization submits to an appropriate agency an application outlining the need for the goods and services and stipulating the qualifications of the applicant to administer the program. Having received a grant of funds, the group or organization proceeds to offer various services to those who qualify on a needs-test basis to receive them. Thus, the patron-recipient pyramidal benefit structure is in place. And this has been the prevailing structure in most poverty-designated urban (and rural) areas since the mid-1960s.

Advocates defend this process as providing the wherewithal to the local people to combat both economic and political poverty,[12] a process they describe as leading to the development of political power for the constituents. In some cases, as with the twenty-six community corporations, local residents have had the opportunity to elect their representatives to the corporation boards; this has occurred twice in New York City in 1970 and 1972. Such elections were seen as important politicizing experiences for the participants. Proponents of the process constantly related antipoverty elections to elections in the larger political system. Two comments from antipoverty officials in 1973 are typical:

> Participation in the Community Corporation electoral process makes real the promise of community organization, demonstrably assisting community residents to come together—to organize around their own interests and issues and to prepare for participation in the larger electoral process.[13]

The other view is even more optimistic and enthusiastic:

> The Community Corporation elections of July, 1972 represent a shattering of apathy within New York City's twenty-six poverty areas. The sixty-five thousand voters who participated in the election constituted a force slightly larger than the turnout for the two preceding Democratic mayoral primaries in those same communities. What was set in motion in July, 1972 continued to gain momentum in the June, 1973 mayoral primary. . . . All observers now recognize that there is a new awakened mass, a new political force at work in New York City. . . . The old apathy is dead.[14]

Thus, professionals in community development agencies saw the election process as a training ground providing skills to be used in other electoral political situations.

A benefit structure predicated on a patron-recipient relationship, however, is hardly likely to lead to the kind of politicization that maximizes political influence. Indeed, such a relationship creates a model of process-product-participation that does not stress the efficacy of a major process (electoral politics) in the political system. Recipients receive benefits (products), but these are not a function of their voting (active participation); rather, recipients receive these benefits through nonactivity and passivity or through episodic protest

[12] See for example, Greenstone and Peterson, *Race and Authority*, chap., 10.

[13] Statement by James E. Greenidge in *Community Corporation Elections 1972: A History and Analysis* (New York: Community Development Agency, Fall, 1973), p. 1.

[14] Statement by Major R. Owens in ibid., p. ii.

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politics—another process. Thus, this process is "depoliticizing" precisely because it fails to take into account the very important fact that it is the *elective* political offices that ultimately control the fate of these "soft-money" programs.

In spite of Greenstone and Peterson's finding that New York City, among the five cities they studied, was the most *proparticipatory* in the antipoverty programs, one finds electoral participation there on the decline. Notwithstanding the enthusiastic language of the antipoverty officials cited above, the results in recent years indicate no "new awakened mass." Local communities in New York City's poverty areas have had considerably more control over antipoverty resources than their counterparts in many other cities. Whatever this has meant in terms of delivering services to constituents—overcoming "economic poverty"—it has not contributed to alleviating the condition of "political poverty" Greenstone and Peterson talked about.

Electoral Behavior of Black Districts in New York City

There are numerous forms of political activity—voting, mass protest, pressure group, individual intervention. To attain and exert political influence a relatively powerless group must seek to maximize its participation in all or as many areas of political activity as possible. It is particularly important to do so when a group attempts to operate on many levels and on several "fronts" at the same time, taking on a wide range of social issues. In the concluding section, I argue that since the patron-recipient relationship tends to rely primarily on protest and pressure group styles of political action, it does not contribute to the enhancement of electoral political effectiveness "in the larger arena." In this section, I will examine the electoral behavior of blacks from 1961 through 1977 in New York City where the patron-recipient relationship has been quite manifest.

Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, describing a relatively active black political community in the early 1960s, wrote:

> Whatever the situation in other communities, the Negroes of Harlem and other New York communities are deeply involved in politics. They register and vote in substantial proportions, their newspapers keep up a continual flow of political news, they are active in club membership and in the support of political leaders. Clearly politics is seen as an area in which to advance the interests of individuals and the group.[15]

Among the leadership cadre, it is still accurate to say that interest in politics remains high. New York's major black newspaper, *The Amsterdam News*, gives extensive weekly coverage of political matters affecting black interests in its news stories, opinion columns, and editorials. The activities of black civic and political leaders are reported constantly and prominently; and many such leaders frequently write opinion columns in the newspaper. Activity at all levels (local, state, federal) is reported; protest and pressure group activities are given

[15] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), p. 67.

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wide exposure, and elections at all levels are followed closely (interviews with candidates and accounts of their views are frequently printed verbatim). At election time, bold headlines implore readers to "Be a Good Citizen, Go Out to Vote." Editorials admonish that nonvoting should be a cause for "not complaining." Political clubs still meet on Monday and Thursday evenings, although attendance varies considerably, depending on the event and the proximity to election time.[16] There are more than occasional contests for party district leadership and local elective office positions. In the 1972 elections to the community antipoverty boards, 99 candidates contested for 35 positions in central Harlem, and 124 for 40 slots in Bedford-Stuyvesant.[17]

Greenstone and Peterson have seen some positive impacts of the antipoverty political struggles on other policy areas in New York City.

> Stated in terms of traditional American pluralism, black leaders . . . sought to utilize the anti-poverty program's resources in order to institutionalize black interests within the system of group bargaining, as a way of turning other urban institutions from protecting white influence and control toward promoting black values, interests, and autonomy. Insofar as blacks obtained effective control over CAPs [Community Action Programs], they did acquire an institutional base that hardly any other bureaucratic institution in northern cities had provided. And the extent to which CAP facilitated the development of community control over the schools (notably in New York) or control over the subsequent Model Cities programs (notably in Detroit) provided a good measure of participation in CAP itself. Indeed, Harlem's Haryou-Act, an autonomous all-black program funded by CAP, became a symbol of participation for black leaders around the country.[18]

The following data cover the period from 1961, just prior to the initiation of participatory community action programs and other Great Society activities, to 1977. It seems reasonably clear that, notwithstanding the relatively high level of local participatory control of many of the programs, this involvement has not been transferred to correspondingly high levels of electoral participation. A patron-recipient relationship, which many of the programs fostered, therefore, could conceivably work against the politicization of the masses as electorate, even while a leadership cadre was being otherwise politically developed and involved. *A pyramidally structured patron-recipient relationship would permit this, precisely because the local leadership would not need to mobilize a mass (clientelist) base in order to justify its leadership role. Rather it derives its legitimacy not from the votes it could deliver, but from the resources it could extract from its own patron. Thus, one might find simultaneously extensive elite activity and widespread mass inactivity.*

The data in Figure 1 show the voter turnout behavior of blacks in New York City's Democratic mayoral primary elections from 1961 to 1977. There was a steady decline from 1961 to 1973. In the 1973 runoff election, a prominent

[16] There are currently at least twenty reasonably functioning Democratic party clubs in Harlem.
[17] *Community Corporation Elections 1972*, p. 83.
[18] Greenstone and Peterson, *Race and Authority*, p. 95.

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FIGURE 1

Percentage Voter Turnout of Selected Black Assembly Districts in Harlem and Brooklyn in Democratic Mayoral Primaries, 1961-1977 *

* The Assembly Districts examined are: Harlem—for 1961, 11 and 12; for 1965, 75, 77, and 79; for 1969, 70, 72, and 74; for 1973 and runoff, 70, 72, and 74; for 1977 and runoff, 70, 71, 72, and 74; Brooklyn—for 1961, 6 and 17; for 1965, 39, 45, and 46; for 1969, 37, 55, and 56; for 1973 and runoff, 54, 55, and 56; for 1977 and runoff, 54, 55, and 56.

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Municipal Service Administration).

Puerto Rican, Herman Badillo, ran against the ultimate winner, Abraham Beame. This contest evoked some added interest. The 1977 race saw an upward turn (especially in Harlem) due no doubt to the candidacy of the black candidate, Percy E. Sutton. But in neither Harlem, which was Sutton's home base and where he has an active political club and has spent all of his political life, nor Brooklyn's black assembly districts was the turnout greater than 50 percent of the *registered* voters.

Democratic mayoral primaries are frequently tightly contested in New York City, with, at times, as many as four to six candidates running. (This is to be expected in a heavily Democratic city where a primary victory will more than likely lead to ultimate election to office.) This means that primary votes are that much more important. In the seven primaries (including two runoffs) from 1961 to 1977, only three times did the winner receive more than 45 percent of the votes cast (see Table 1). Yet, in 1973, when the winner received only slightly

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TABLE 1

Percent Vote for Winner in Democratic Mayoral Primaries

Year	*Winner's City-wide Percentage*
1961	.61
1965	.45
1969	.33
1973	.35
1973 (runoff election)	.61
1977	.21
1977 (runoff election)	.55

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Muncipal Service Administration).

over one-third of the total vote, the blacks turned out at their lowest rates (25 percent in Harlem; 22 percent in Brooklyn) during the sixteen-year period studied.

Black voter turnout is higher in general elections, consistent with electoral behavior of the larger populace. Except for 1965 when John V. Lindsay won as a Republican-Liberal and 1969 when Lindsay ran and won as a Liberal-Independent, the general election is normally less of a contest than the primary, with the Democrats usually winning by comfortable margins. The black turnout in general elections has been steady or on the decline, except for 1969 (see Figure 2). The 1969 contest stirred interest presumably because the Democratic and Republican candidates were perceived by blacks as clearly quite conservative. Thus, blacks switched allegiance and voted overwhelmingly for Lindsay on the Liberal party line. As the successful Republican mayoral candidate in 1965, Lindsay received 31 percent and 36 percent of the black vote in Harlem and Brooklyn, respectively. Four years later, his support increased dramatically to 77 percent and 76 percent, respectively; and these were districts where the Democratic registration ranges from 81 to 85 percent. This switch, along with reasonably respectable turnout rates and substantial support from New York City's Jewish and liberal voters, has been suggested as a major explanation for Lindsay's upset victory that year. This is the only instance in the sixteen years under study where the black vote appears to have been used effectively to reflect seemingly widespread black interests. It apparently was not a sustained phenomenon, as the 1973 and 1977 rates indicate.

One of the most surprising findings from examining elections over this period has been the relatively poor showing black candidates make *in their own districts* when they run for positions beyond their own neighborhoods on the city and borough (county) levels. Not only is the turnout not particularly impressive, but the black candidates do not carry the black districts by sizeable majorities. This is in stark contrast to experiences in recent years in other cities

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FIGURE 2

*Percentage Voter Turnout of Selected Black Assembly Districts in Harlem and Brooklyn in Mayoral General Elections, 1961-1977**



*The Assembly Districts examined are the same as for Figure 1.
SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Municipal Service Administration).

where black candidates have run successfully for the mayor's seat.[19] In the three cases presented here, the black candidates were highly visible, well known, and had previously been elected to public offices from their black community bases in Harlem.

In 1969, Charles B. Rangel was a New York state assemblyman. He ran in the Democratic primary for president of the City Council in a field of six candidates. He lost, but as Table 2 indicates, only 23 percent of the voters in Harlem voted, and Rangel received only 54 percent of the vote in three Harlem assembly districts. (The 23 percent turnout was 10 points below the 33 percent citywide turnout for this contest.)

In 1977, Percy E. Sutton was borough president of Manhattan, a position he had held for a decade. He had previously represented Harlem in the State

[19] Maynard Jackson was reelected to a second term in 1977 as Atlanta's first black mayor, receiving 93.2 percent of the black vote. Coleman Young won 95 percent of the black vote in Detroit in his successful mayoral reelection bid in 1977. Ernest Morial became New Orleans's first black mayor in November, 1977, capturing 96 percent of the black vote.

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TABLE 2

Harlem Vote for City Council President in 1969 Democratic Primary

Assembly District	Democrats Registered	Percent Turnout	Percent of Vote Cast: Charles Rangel	Hugh Carey	James Breslin	Francis Smith	Elinor Guggenheim	Robert Low
70	19,917	.22	.34	.14	.07	.12	.19	.13
72	19,944	.27	.69	.11	.05	.04	.05	.06
74	30,418	.22	.55	.15	.08	.07	.07	.08
All A.D.s			.54	.13	.07	.08	.10	.09

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Muncipal Service Administration).

Assembly from 1965 to 1966. He ran in the Democratic primary for mayor in 1977 against six other candidates. Sutton's civic and political record predated his election to the State Assembly. He was a lawyer involved in civil rights cases (he had been a lawyer, also, for Malcolm X), active in the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and active in a number of community causes for more than twenty years. Out of a field of seven candidates in 1977, he placed fifth in the final vote with approximately 15 percent of the vote. In crucial black districts in his home base of Harlem, he received only 50 percent of the vote (Table 3). Black assembly districts in Brooklyn gave him 57 percent of their vote (Table 4). These are hardly impressive results in a hotly contested primary where ethnic politics is recognized by many political observers as a crucial factor in political success.

At the same time, a black candidate, David Dinkins, ran for Sutton's vacated seat as Manhattan borough president. Also a well-known and active civic and political person, Dinkins had served in the State Assembly. He was an active member of the Council of Black Elected Democrats and was serving in the appointed position of city clerk in 1977. More than an honorific position, the borough president has two votes (out of twenty-two) on the important citywide Board of Estimate, as well as the power to make some important appointments (to the Board of Education, community planning boards, for example). The

TABLE 3

Harlem Vote for Mayor in 1977 Democratic Primary

Assembly District	Total Votes Cast	Percy Sutton	Mario Cuomo	Joel Harnett	Edward Koch	Bella Abzug	Herman Badillo	Abraham Beame
70	13,364	.36	.08	.01	.15	.21	.13	.06
71	16,268	.63	.03	.01	.10	.10	.08	.04
74	15,355	.48	.05	.01	.11	.15	.11	.08
All A.D.s		.50	.05	.01	.12	.15	.10	.06

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Municipal Service Administration).

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TABLE 4

Black Vote in Brooklyn for Mayor in 1977 Democratic Primary

Assembly District	*Total Votes Cast*	*Percy Sutton*	*Mario Cuomo*	*Joel Harnett*	*Edward Koch*	*Bella Abzug*	*Herman Badillo*	*Abraham Beame*
54	6,649	.59	.03	.01	.06	.08	.19	.04
55	6,724	.53	.05	.01	.07	.08	.21	.05
56	9,837	.60	.03	.01	.06	.07	.12	.12
All A.D.s		.57	.04	.01	.06	.07	.17	.08

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Municipal Service Administration).

position had been held by a black since the 1950s. Dinkins did not fare as well as Sutton in the same Harlem assembly districts, receiving only 48 percent of the votes there and coming in third in a field of four (Table 5).

Professor Joyce Gelb has documented the electoral performance of blacks during the contest of another prominent black candidate, Basil Paterson, for lieutenant governor of New York in 1970.[20] Black Democratic leaders were able to engineer then State Senator Paterson's nomination by the State Democratic Convention, but they were not able to arouse substantial black voter turnout on election day.

These data indicate a continuing low level of electoral participation on the part of blacks throughout the almost two decades under study. In every election, various groups mounted voter registration drives in the black communities, and invariably reports came in of more than modest increases in the voter rolls. But this was not translated into increased voter turnout at the polls. If the existing benefit structure did not *cause* the decline, it clearly has not stemmed it.

CONCLUSION: THE "POLITICS" OF A PATRON-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP

A patron-recipient relationship is a political benefit structure that does not require the recipient to respond or to reciprocate in any sustained political way in order to receive benefits. It does not, therefore, serve as a viable politicizing mechanism in terms of electoral politics. Leaders who serve the role of intermediary-patrons and whose positions are legitimized as long as they are able to deliver the particular benefits the arrangement offers can and do develop. Their positions are not predicated on the electoral mechanism; thus, neither they nor their recipients perceive any particular efficacy in that process. When the flow of benefits is threatened, they resort to the episodic political activity of protest and pressure, seeking to mobilize an otherwise politically dormant constituency.

[20] Joyce Gelb, "Black Power in Electoral Politics: A Case Study and Comparative Analysis," *Polity* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1974): 500–528.

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TABLE 5

Harlem Vote for Manhattan Borough President in 1977 Democratic Primary

Assembly District	*Total Votes Cast*	*David Dinkins*	*Andrew Stein*	*Robert F. Wagner, Jr.*	*Ronnie Eldrige*
70	11,174	.31	.23	.35	.10
71	12,503	.58	.14	.24	.04
74	12,226	.52	.21	.23	.05
All A.D.s		.48	.19	.27	.06

SOURCE: Official Canvass of New York City Board of Elections (New York: Municipal Service Administration).

The leaders and spokespersons of such a constituency are at a distinct disadvantage in the pluralist bargaining process. They must attempt to function in the competitive political industry with less than adequate resources. *They are rendered weak by the nature of their own benefit support system.*

This consequence is not entirely unique to patron-recipient relationships. Professor Herbert Gans has described the effects of a nonparticipatory constituency on Boston's West End Italian residents in the 1950s.

> The rarity of participant motivations and skills among the West Enders has meant, among other things, that the politician who represents them does not have the benefit of citizen groups that can demonstrate to his legislator colleagues or to the Mayor the extent of his political influence. In short, he is required to be his own pressure group—a fact that does not enhance his political effectiveness.[21]

Not only is the patron-recipient relationship depoliticizing in the sense of not making sustained electoral mobilization necessary for the receipt of benefits. It might also have the effect of encouraging privatized, individualized responses to problems. A recipient (unlike a client-voter) does not receive benefits as a function of concerted action with others. Rather the benefits are received on an individualized basis, and there need be no lingering feeling of gratitude, loyalty, or attachment to the patron or to a group with which the recipient might be loosely identified for programmatic, not political, purposes. In fact, in the ideal patron-recipient relationship, the ultimate goal is for the recipient *not* to need the patron in time. Thus, while the benefits flow, there is no need for collective action. If the benefits are stopped, either there is no basis for the relationship or attempts are made at protest and pressure politics to reinstitute or reinforce the relationship. But generally, the recipient group is not perceived as a cohesive, collective entity. And this, itself, mitigates against success even in protest politics over an extended period of time.

This could account, in part, for nonidentification on a political-electoral level with the patron or group, and might partially explain the low level of political support for black candidates in the black districts. This is an additional

[21] Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 174.

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depoliticizing consequence, given the assumption that group identification and solidarity are essential at a critical stage of political development. (If one wants to use the ethnic analogy, Robert Dahl's three stages of ethnic political development are relevant to this point.)[22] But the benefit structure of a patron-recipient relationship does not put a premium on such continuous, collective political identification and action.

To the extent that the relationship is pyramidally structured, it operates against political mobilization at the local, "grass-roots" levels. Recipients look to an intermediary-patron who turns to an external (outside the community) source of "funding" and support. "Vertical structures of fragmented influence" and benefit flow are created. Neither intermediaries nor recipients are politicized to mobilize in horizontal, cross-community structures. An intermediary-patron's role is legitimized (and for the duration of the grant period, secured) if she or he is "funded."

Ultimately, the patron-recipient relationship focuses on "grants" and "funded programs" and on the corresponding administrative organizations. It is misleading to call these arrangements "institutions of power" (as Greenstone and Peterson and some others do). They are, at best, structural arrangements for administering soft-money programs that are, possibly, renewable public policy outputs. They may well deliver useful and needed services, and this fact alone could well be their only and sufficient justification for existence. But one should not call them "institutions" of power. "Institutions of governance" in the American political system are what the earlier patron-client groups captured, and they proceeded to build bases of institutional power, administering a network of ongoing governmental services supported by the tax base. These institutions were captured and controlled through a variety of political activities, and electoral participation was a *very* important, if not the most critical, one.

Precisely because the *elected* authorities in the American political system will continue to have formal and in many instances decisive power over public policies, a political strategy that fails to concentrate heavily on the stakes of the electoral process means that groups not involved electorally will always be in demand-making, benefit-seeking, and invariably subordinated positions. The ultimate decisions concerning allocation of resources will always be made by "others." Failure to mobilize electoral support on a sustained basis gives particular authoritative decision-making functions permanently to others by political default. Perpetuation of the patron-recipient relationship as a particular benefit structure has within it the potential for indefinite dependency on

[22] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). Dahl suggests that at the first stage "the group ordinarily has a high degree of political homogeneity; ethnic similarity is associated with similarity in political attitude, and there is a pronounced tendency toward voting alike" (ibid., p. 35). In the second stage, the ethnic group becomes more socioeconomically heterogeneous, but "the middling segments retain a high sensitivity to their ethnic origins" (ibid.). In the third stage, the middle class of the ethnic group tends to be more attracted by class appeals than ethnic appeals (see ibid., chap. 4).

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the part of the recipient class. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the "imputation of inferiority" (a thesis I accept) can be successfully dealt with by such a structure. In fact, I would argue the greater possibility of the imputation being reinforced.

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Secularization, Industrialization, and Khomeini's Islamic Republic

CHERYL BENARD
ZALMAY KHALILZAD

The recent political developments in Iran are frequently said to reflect a failure of intelligence and policy in Washington and other major world capitals. With equal justification, one could speak of a failure of orthodox theories of development. The establishment of an Islamic republic by means of a mass-based movement in Iran in 1979—and signs of a similar popular potential in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and even Turkey—could not have been predicted by either liberal or Marxist theoretical models of modernization. The time has come to reassess one of the most cherished and basic assumptions of mainstream theory: that secularization accompanies industrialization and social change, with the traditional elites and belief systems giving way to a modern state, and religion occupying its allotted space in the private realm.

In earlier cases it was easier for the theorist of development to explain the political uses made of Islam, the reference to Islamic values, and identity. In the case of Qadhafi's Libya, for example, the reestablishment of Islamic law could be interpreted as an attempt to achieve popular and ideological support for what was in reality a "modernizing" military government. Theorists portrayed Islam as serving as a traditional fundament for a transitional society that constructed its value system from heterogeneous elements including socialism, neutralism, and a belief in "progress." In the case of the Palestinians, the mixed religious composition of even the most radical segments of the Palestine Liberation Organization allowed it to be classified as a nationalist irredenta movement rather than a genuinely Islamic phenomenon.

Based on the Iranian revolution and Khomeini's concept of an Islamic

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republic, this article will attempt: to examine the failure of modernization theory to accommodate the reemergence of political movements on the basis of religion on a scale of significance that cannot be dismissed as momentary fluctuations in the secularization process; to speculate on the possible direction mainstream theory may take in response to the developments in Iran and the surrounding region; and to present some possible hypotheses to explain the significance of political mobilization in the form of a religious movement. The Iranian revolution raises far-reaching questions for political development theories and illustrates many of their shortcomings. This article, rather than providing definitive answers to these questions, aims at initiating a debate about the fate of modernization theory in light of developments in Iran.

Premises of Modernization Theory

Orthodox theories of political development, both Marxist and liberal, proceed from a series of assumptions: that there is a basic model of modernization to which, with only minor variations, all countries conform in their transition from a traditional to a modern society. This model can be derived from a study of the historic experience and institutional structures of the country that was more advanced than others and could therefore serve as a guide and leader. (Depending on the ideological predisposition of the author, this country would be the United States, the Soviet Union, or China.) Development required that modern structures of economic and social organization replace traditional structures. This developmental model encompassed the essential elements of "industrialization in economics; secularization in thought and social and legal organization"[1]; urbanization; the acquisition of modern patterns of behavior, personality, and communication—"cosmopolitan attitudes"[2]; democratization in the political sphere; and integration into the "world culture."[3]

The postulate, within social theory, of a basic and global pattern of development has its source in Western beliefs in growth, progress, and international integration.[4] The school of "nation building" operated on the premise that the essential elements of modernity—values, institutions, and technical know-how—could be transferred from the advanced West to the rest of the world, and that this process of transference in fact constituted modernization.[5] Thus, ac-

[1] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 387.

[2] Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 10.

[3] Ibid.

[4] See, for example, Ali Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis," *World Politics* 21 (October 1968): 69–83.

[5] Correspondingly, one of the arguments used in the 1950s and 1960s for advocating development aid programs was the belief that this would set the recipients on a democratic and pro-Western course and reproduce Western political systems. The Marshall Plan was cited as evidence for the efficacy of such a policy. See Gabriel Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

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cording to Gabriel Almond's formulation: "The political scientist who wishes to study political modernization in the non-Western area will have to master the model of the modern, which in turn can only be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis of the functions of the modern Western polities."[6]

The belief was that the non-Western world had to follow the same developmental path that Europe and the United States had traveled, but that in addition the process could be facilitated, first, by economic aid, and second, by the pioneer function of the West, which had already created modern social forms and institutions and could therefore serve as a model. The developing countries differed from the "first wave" of industrialization—a historic moment that had passed them by—in two regards: they were faced with a growing gap between themselves and the modern world, which required the giving of aid; and they were spared the necessity of having to develop, through trial and error, a modern political system and modern technology, since the model already existed.

The predominant view of this school held that a modern democratic society evolved from certain institutional structures and forms of social organization, and that the creation of parliaments, political parties, and modern judicial systems would lead to an evolution of lifestyles, means of production, and society. The nation-building school suffered serious setbacks when many of the new "democratic" governments collapsed or were overthrown by military coups in the 1950s and 1960s. The appropriateness of superimposed and modern institutions and political values began to be questioned when all that remained of the imported democratic precepts were the elections in which 99.9 percent of the electorate ratified the victories of the juntas. Social science responded in two ways—first, the military elites were integrated into the model of modernization and classified as NMC, the "new middle class," a characteristically Third World agent of modernization; second, the developing countries were now viewed as having characteristic political forms at variance with those of Europe and the United States, a "non-Western political process,"[7] typified by a catalogue of factors including the emergence of charismatic leaders and irregular social mobilization. While this school tended to list as distinctive elements of the non-Western political process characteristics that were clearly disruptive of social stability and were signs of crisis or rapid social change more than indicators of cultural variation, the functionalist approach attempted to cleanse political science of its ethnocentric bias by identifying "analogous political functions," describing them in "neutral" (de-Westernized) terminology, studying societies as operating units,[8] and rejecting previous distinctions (such as the one between "state" and "nonstate" societies) in favor of the analysis of equivalent political perform-

[6] Almond and Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, p. 64.

[7] See, for example, George Kahin, Guy Parker and Lucian Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review* 49 (December 1955).

[8] One of the standard texts here is Almond and Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Almond argued in the introduction that "all the types of political structures which are to be found in the modern system are to be found in the non-Western and primitive ones" (p. 11).

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ances. However, fundamental to this position remained a hierarchical and evolutionary view, which even found its expression in biological analogies—political scientists would compare political functions the way biologists compared "amoebas and mammals" on the basis of their performance of the digestive function[9]—and traditionalist and modern societies were still presented as opposite poles of an evolutionary scale.

An important element of development theory remained the belief that modernization would be accompanied by, or result in, secularization both in personal attitudes and as a value system guiding political behavior and legitimacy—the general mainstream consensus on the inevitability of secularization was not affected by functionalist modifications of theory. Dankwart Rustow, for example, had "no doubt" that the "overwhelming majority of the urban population, both upper and lower class [in the Near East] live in an increasingly modern and secularized context."[10] Cyril Black argued that rational attitudes and their necessary consequence, secularization, were the "core of modernization."[11] Authors like Lerner, Almond, Powell, Eisenstadt, Smelser, and Shils juxtaposed the traditional, authoritarian, "nonempathetic," static, social model to the "secular political culture." This latter was defined as "multivalued," "rational-calculating," "bargaining and experimenting," dynamic, innovative, and integrated.[12]

The events in Iran were not even speculatively contemplated by dominant theory; for if there ever was a country that apparently conformed to the expected course of modernization, it was Iran. As far as many accepted indicators of development were concerned, Iran occupied a leading position within the Third World: Literacy figures, urbanization, leadership in relation to its neighbors, growth of GNP, infrastructure and communications, and extent of industrialization (indicators which according to Lerner and many others were indivisibly linked with secularization) were substantially higher than Third World averages. The Shah had even announced his plan to catch up with France economically and militarily by 1993.[13]

Iran's GNP grew by more than 50 percent between 1973 and 1976 in constant dollars;[14] per capita annual income reached a Third World record of $2,000; the urban population doubled between 1956 and 1966 (from 5 to 10 million) and was expected to reach 20 million by 1980, making about 50 percent of Iran's population "urban"; student population (elementary school to university) totaled 10 million, including 100,000 university and 500,000 secondary-school students; 3 million peasant families were allotted 75 percent of Iran's arable

[9] Almond, *Political Development*, p. 13.

[10] Rustow, "Politics of the Near East," p. 389.

[11] Cyril Black, ed., *Comparative Modernization* (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 1–12.

[12] See, for example, Almond, *Political Development*, p. 37; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

[13] *U.S. News and World Report*, March 27, 1976.

[14] Abdul Kassim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran: Why the U.S. Ignored a Quarter Century of Warning," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1979):26–29.

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land; the educated middle class doubled in size between 1956 and 1976, growing from 6 to 13 percent of the total employed population—if merchants and businessmen were included in the figures, the middle class constituted 25 percent of the population.[15] While there was some criticism of some of the authoritarian means and repressive measures employed by the Shah, he was often considered by development analysts to be a successful guarantor of national stability—the precondition, for many theoreticians, of the gradual growth of integrated democratic forms. On the basis of these indicators, many political leaders and social scientists viewed Iran as a promising model of planned growth. In 1964 George Lenczowski, praising the Shah's program of creating a modern institutional superstructure, wrote:

> Iran enjoys a few immunities likely to protect it from a violent upheaval à la Iraq. These immunities may be listed as lack of ties with revolutionary Pan-Arabism, the continuous threat of Soviet imperialism which tends to unify the national ranks when the pressure is great and obvious, and, "the historical continuity of the monarchical institution."[16]

As late as August, 1978, the CIA stated in its *National Intelligence Estimate* that Iran could not even be considered a prerevolutionary society, and that "those who are in opposition, both violent and non-violent, do not have the capacity to be more than troublesome. . . . There is dissatisfaction with the Shah's tight control of the political process, but this does not threaten the government."[17]

The error of mainstream theory in assessing the trend of developments in Iran may be attributed to one of three possible explanations:

—The basic assumption that industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and secularization were concomitant and interrelated elements that constituted modernization was incorrect. Instead, some of these developments may take place in various degrees and combinations; or, economic modernization may occur without necessarily bringing about the other developments.

—The hypothesis that industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and secularization constitute modernization may or may not be true. The error of the theory was in identifying the developments in Iran with these categories; in describing the movement of agricultural populations to the cities as "urbanization"; in accepting the figures for GNP as constituting a rise in the standard of living.

—Economic modernization and contact with the West can polarize Third World societies into two main categories of response. One reaction is the attempt to adopt the model of the social order and its values perceived as being (materially or ideologically) superior to one's own.[18] The other is to

[15] James Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (January 1979): 333.

[16] George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Politics* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 232.

[17] Quoted in Abdul Kassim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran," p. 28.

[18] For a general explanation of this response to military, economic, or cultural domination, see

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> reaffirm indigenous national, cultural, ethnic, or religious values in order to strengthen one's society against the domination of a foreign power and an alien way of life. Instead of viewing the supremacy of the foreign power as evidence for the inherent inferiority of their own social order, the second group considers its comparative weaknesses as the result of a deviation from and an abandonment of the essence of one's own values.

Social theory is now faced with the necessity of explaining development trends in the Islamic world. Based on previous responses of the theory to unforeseen currents, it seems likely that the dominant reaction will be that of *accommodation* of the integration of events into the model. Samuel P. Huntington, describing this tendency of modernization theorists to transform deviant developments into support for their beliefs, writes: "Almost anything that happens in the developing countries—coups, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars—become part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface."[19]

Such a reconciliation between events and theory occurred in the case of the unexpected spread of military regimes in the 1950s and 1960s; it seems plausible that it will take place again as modernization theorists struggle to develop interpretations assigning a modernizing role to Islamic religious movements and leaders. Already, authors such as Richard Falk and James Cockroft are demonstrating this adaptability, describing Khomeini as a type of virtuous and beneficent philosopher-statesman free of corrupting power drives or personal ambitions, as leading a spartan life, as a cross between a Muslim Gandhi and a nationalist Plato. In an article tactically avoiding bothersome issues such as the rights of women in Iran, or Khomeini's rapid change of position on such issues as elections or minorities when confronted with the Western press, Falk portrays the Ayatollah as a "nonviolent," honest, and open spiritual leader, and even sentimentally speculates that "Iran may yet provide us with a desperately-needed model of humane governance for a third-world country."[20]

A sharp polarization can be noted in the analysis of Third World political leaders and movements. Leaders with similar policy positions and personal styles are presented either as uncontrollable and irrational demonic figures (such as Qadhafi or Idi Amin) or as authoritarian but benevolent modernizing leaders (such as Ataturk or the Shah). Both classifications have been undertaken in the case of Khomeini; there are laudatory statements such as that of Falk, and, at the other extreme, texts such as the one of Abdul Kassim Mansur (pseudonym of a former State Department official) that called the Shi'ite faith a "primitive and mystic branch of Islam," its religious leaders "aging and ill-educated," and

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Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

[19] Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," in Black, *Comparative Modernization*, pp. 25–61.

[20] Richard Falk, "Trusting Khomeini," *New York Times*, February 16, 1979, p. A-17.

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the Ayatollah Khomeini a Muslim extremist "leading Iran back to medievalism."[21]

Iran, Islam, and the Third World Revolution

In the process of economic development and interaction with foreign and dominant societies, a fragmentation of the political culture can occur. One result is the emergence of contending factions and concepts of legitimate sociopolitical order that manifests as a crisis of legitimacy. Within this general category, however, two parallel and interrelated, but distinct, forms of a crisis in legitimacy coincide in many Third World countries. The first type of legitimacy crisis involves a fundamental lack of consensus over the nature and basis of the political order and the political process. Different social groups, such as traditional, religious, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, and military ones, with conflicting concepts of political legitimacy contend and often form rival blocs. A legitimacy crisis in such substantive form is characteristic of societies in periods of rapid change and does not generally have a counterpart in contemporary industrialized countries, where a basic consensus over the structures and means of the political system exists. In addition, there is a crisis of legitimacy within the rival conceptual systems over the issue of which faction or person has the most valid claim to represent the form.

While this distinction is important, it must be remembered that the overlap is significant, and claims to legitimacy often try to draw from various sources. The military regimes in the Third World, for example, often tried to claim legitimacy on the grounds of national or cultural tradition, or to coopt religious legitimacy by portraying themselves as "defenders of the faith." In Iran, the Shah claimed legitimacy on dynastic grounds, even trying to link the 53 year-old Pahlavi dynasty to Iran's 2500 years of royal rule (as, for example, in Persepolis celebrations); on the grounds of demonstrative power, through displays of military potential; on the grounds of "progress" and "modernization," through evidence of the efficacy of his rule and programs. These claims were discredited as illegitimate by the religious movements and by the various groups of the Left who repudiated first, the legitimacy of the Shah's grounds, and argued, secondly, that even on those grounds he had not fulfilled the requisites. On the *substantive* level of legitimacy, for example, Khomeini rejected the claims of the Shah, arguing that he was not pious; that is, he did not satisfy the religious prerequisites of a leader according to the Shi'ite tenets represented by Khomeini, but had instead established an authoritarian, monarchical despotism that maintained itself by coercive force, since it had no moral claim to the support and obedience of the population.

The Ayatollah also rejected the Shah's claim within the framework of its own logic on the level of *coherence*. Thus, Khomeini argued that because of dependence on foreign control on the one hand and the authoritarian nature of his rule

[21] Abdul Kassim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran," pp. 27–31.

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on the other, the government of the Shah could not claim to be democratic and parliamentarian. Where the parliamentarians had not been directly appointed by the Shah, their supposed election had in fact taken place in accord with the instructions of foreign governments or specific interest groups and they were not representatives of the population. The Shah's claims to have raised the living standard and effectively advanced modernization efforts were also countered by Khomeini, who asserted instead that it will take fifteen years to undo the damage done by the Shah and return Iran to the point it was at before the Pahlavi dynasty took over. In fact, Khomeini said, the Shah has wasted the country's resources, using them for personal gain and for weapons purchases rather than for the best interests of the population; thus, according to Khomeini, the Shah had not genuinely industrialized but had, instead, created millions of refugees who left the agrarian sector and formed huge slums around the cities where they vainly wait for employment. The illegitimacy of the Shah's rule on both counts was interrelated in the arguments of Khomeini, because, as he claims, an impious ruler can only lead the country to ruin; a corrupt leader can only appoint corrupt administrators; a head of state operating on wrong principles of government can only make wrong decisions.

Three Hypotheses

On substantive grounds, there are four major contenders for legitimate power: the various leftist groups; the National Front (a coalition of conservative and national democratic groups); the remaining supporters of the Shah and the monarchy; and the religious movement. It has been primarily the religious movement that most visibly mobilized the masses and that is now consolidating its position in an Islamic republic. This fact, initially puzzling to Western observers, is what needs to be examined. In the following section, three interrelated hypotheses will be presented to explain the occurrence of movements that articulate social and political discontent in reference to the religious values of Islam:

1. Islam is to be understood in its political rather than its explicitly religious or ethical connotation as a symbolic framework and fundament of the collective identity and its opposition to foreign domination and control.[22]

Situations such as the present one in Iran have been studied by development theoreticians under the heading of "charismatic movements." While there are certain similarities in the preconditions and the phenomena these authors have identified as characteristic of such movements,[23] we would hesitate thus to label the present religious movement in Iran. The charisma that rests with Khomeini and gives him authority is a partially "institutionalized" one in the sense of hav-

[22] See, for example, David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), on the "identity function" of ideologies in developing areas.

[23] For a typical text, K.J. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership," *Political Studies* 12 (December 1964): 342.

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ing its own solid tradition and a body of institutions of religious authority and knowledge supporting it. Weber's distinction between charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal authority is a difficult one to maintain, even allowing for overlap, in the case of these Islamic religious leaders, whose authority is derived equally from the charismatic-millennial elements of Shi'ite Islam and their own role in leading the opposition to an "impious" government, from the traditional position of religious scholars and leaders in the community and in political questions, and from the religious law, the *shari'a*. In the case of Khomeini, the personal attributes of having been jailed for his convictions and of living in exile add to his personal link to the sources of authority, while the visual picture he presents—that of a wise man and philosopher rather than a dynamic, innovative, young, heroic figure—serves to distinguish him from the avant-guardist, implanted Westernizers and connect him solidly with traditional cultural and national values and prestige.

In the 1960s, political and social scientists developed theoretical models to explain the emergence of popular leaders in Third World countries. Classifying leaders like Nasir or Nkrumah as "charismatic figures" occupying a position between traditional values and modern society permitted the explanation that such leaders served as focal points and orientation figures in periods of transition. The charismatic leader was seen as functioning as the "nucleus of unity" in situations where traditional identity and social cohesion no longer sufficed to guarantee the integrity of the group; they were the link between the past and the future of the society in periods of normative and institutional flux.

The case of Khomeini illustrates that these models were too simplistic. While he may well serve as the symbolic point of cohesion for a society suffering from a crisis in its value system and identity, Khomeini is not a transitional figure giving psychological comfort in a rapidly changing society, or a common identity to replace the slackening bonds of tradition; nor would it be justified, however, to see him exclusively as a flight back to tradition.[24] Apter's list of the functions fulfilled by the traditional leader in African tribal society and assumed, as he argues, by Nkrumah in Ghana are to a considerable extent applicable to Khomeini as well: the functions of symbolic referent, integrational integer, sanctional source, and criterion of ethnic (that is, national, cultural) definition.[25]

2. In its function of symbolic reference for group identity, Shi'ism can draw on its historic role as a movement symbolizing oppositional claims to legitimacy in a variety of contexts.

To examine this hypothesis, a brief review of Islamic history is necessary. The successors of Mohammed did not have an easy time consolidating their position. Their claim to the succession was not universally acknowledged, so that the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, was forced to reestablish regional cohesion under his authority by negotiation and military campaigns. He died after two years, and his successor, Umar, was murdered by a Persian slave in a period of great ten-

[24] David Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 8.
[25] Ibid.

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sions between the Arabs and the populations of conquered regions over questions of taxation, foreign rule, and the unequal status of Arab and non-Arab Muslims. He was followed by Uthman, the favored candidate of the Meccan elite and a figure of provocation to large segments of the populace, including the supporters of Ali's claims to the succession. When Uthman was murdered, Ali was proclaimed as his successor. The legitimacy of Ali's claim was challenged, most significantly by Mu'awiya, who based his counterclaim on his successful leadership over Syria, his moral responsibility to avenge the death of his uncle Uthman, and his relationship to both Umar and Uthman in a political context. After extensive military confrontations and negotiations between the two factions, Ali was murdered and leadership passed to Mu'awiya. His establishment of a monarchical and Arab government gave the decisive direction to the future developments of what is sometimes called "orthodox" Islam. The "party of Ali," meanwhile, developed from a party contending for the claim to power into an opposition movement taking as its basic premise the illegitimacy of the deviation from the "correct" line of succession from Ali and his descendants to an Arab monarchy. Bernard Lewis writes:

> The real development of the movement [of the Shi'ites] began. . . when, having failed as an Arab party, it sought victory as an Islamic sect. The Shi'ite propagandists appealed with great success to the discontented masses and especially to the Mawali [the non-Arab converts to Islam], to whom the idea of a legitimate succession in the line of the Prophet had a far greater appeal than to the Arabs themselves. *Shi'ism became essentially the expression in religious terms of opposition to the state and the established order*, acceptance of which meant conformity to the Sunni, or orthodox Islamic doctrine.[26]

Shi'ism, originally an Arab movement, spread into Persia and found there its own ground for expansion among opponents to the ruling elite, which happened to be predominantly Arab at that time and was supported by the domestic, dependent elites.

3. Shi'ism[27] in Iran has served as a vehicle for mobilizing political resistance against the domination of foreign rule and oligarchical social structure.

In opposition to the Shah, Shi'ism provided the major mode of articulating social discontent for a number of reasons. Besides the fact that it is a traditional mode of formulating social and political protest, there are more pragmatic factors as well. Iran, in a fashion characteristic of Third World societies, does not have the type of integration and the degree of centralization found in industrialized states. This has been taken to mean, by modernization theory, that such societies lack a consolidated communications system and a developed infrastructure—a judgment only possible if one proceeds from "Western" criteria. In fact, there is both a communications system and an infrastructure, ideological as well as material; but it is a "traditional" infrastructure upon which the

[26] Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 71 (our emphasis).

[27] There are three major subdivisions within Shi'ism. The important characteristic of the dominant sect in Iran is its messianic content in the form of an expected "12th imam."

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modern one has been superimposed. Through its own network of communications, institutional structures, and personnel, the religious system is capable of organizational and conceptual operation in a way and to an extent that the modern channels have not been able to rival.[28] The available concepts and terminology, organizational structures and forms of contact and recruitment, the modes of articulation and formulation of interests, grievances, and goals are "Islamic" rather than, for example, "populist grassroot," petitionary-authoritarian, or Marxist-Leninist.

To those who do not really share the fundamental religious basis but assembled under that movement for other reasons—and it is still not possible to assess how large or how strong such factions are—there are a number of advantages. It was, for example, impossible for any regime in Iran to suppress religious movements with the same rigor that it showed toward suspected Communist organizations and groups; and access to the population was readily available on religious grounds as it would not have been under explicit declaration of Marxist leanings.

In relation to Islam, Shi'ism can play both a distinguishing and an integrative role and can serve as a variant of national self-definition against external threats. For example, Shi'ism was adopted as the official state religion by the Safavids in the sixteenth century in order to articulate the distinction of Persia from the (Sunni) Ottoman Empire. Today, Khomeini talks about the "unity of the Muslim world against imperialism,"[29] deemphasizing the distinction between Sunni and Shi'a in favor of the distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic and secular and pragmatic. In his political doctrine, nationalism is a concept very distinct from the Western form. As in the beginning phases of the pan-African and pan-Arab movements, "national" independence is only the first step toward the establishment of the larger political unit, the pan-African nation, the Arab nation, or the nation of Islam. The pan-Arab socialist Nasir and the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic Qadhafi both envisioned forms of political organization and social unity beyond the state. Khomeini believes that the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran is the first step in the creation of a pan-Islamic federation in which Iran will be one province. Like the pan-African and pan-Arab movements, Khomeini's pan-Islamic goals are likely to encounter the resistance of local, ethnic, and Iranian-nationalist loyalties; the preservative dynamics of existing nation-states; and traditional conflicts of interest. Established governments that have a stake in preserving the status quo, groups with other political aims, such as the Marxists, Arabs resisting Persian leadership claims—to name only a few—will oppose such attempts at integration.[30]

Apparently, the religious movement was able to serve as the "coalition form," uniting opposing forces around the basic common denominator of resistance to

[28] Additionally, there are other very effective and operational structures and networks, such as those of trade organizations like the *bazaaris*.

[29] Khomeini, *Hokumati Islamiyy* [Islamic government] (n.p. 1971), p. 42 (in Farsi).

[30] For a discussion of the pan-Arab experience, see Malcom Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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the existing order. While the struggle against the Shah proceeded, the social goals remained sufficiently vague and general that unity was possible; now, however, when ideals such as the good of the population, abolition of corruption and foreign domination, and independence from basic imports have to be transformed into concrete policies, the ideological differences, together with the struggle for leadership and legitimacy, and the different degrees of political potential are becoming increasingly visible. What was initially only a mass of people in the streets gradually became distinguishable into groups with various resources, different sources of outside and domestic support, varying degrees of potential and continuous participation, and differing capacities for converting diffuse aims into realizable demands and policies.

Conclusion

Religious movements can be a means of articulating radical social discontent, of collecting diffuse sentiments and groups with a common bond, of formulating values, and affirming loyalties. They can also be instruments for bolstering privilege and for solidifying concrete interests and power relationships into a belief system. Religious movements also can rationalize inequities and can mobilize populations under the banner of eschatological movements with the goal of realizing social equality. Religion has served all these functions in European history, where orthodox religious elites, heretical movements, sects, persecutions, and inquisitions played their role in the formation of modern nation-states. Catholicism continues to be significant in Eastern Europe as a type of national underground, in Latin America, where the "theology of liberation" has revolutionary overtones, and in Western Europe as a sociopolitical bond for certain party organizations. In Israel and Pakistan, religion provides the ideological justification for the existence of the state. The concept of secularization in development theory tended to ignore the role played by religion, religious movements, and religious interest groups in the European modernization process, as a static and ideal typical condition in which church and state occupy distinct realms. In regard to the Third World, the undifferentiated and, often enough, undefined concept of secularization has overlooked the social and political potential of certain values, belief systems, and forms of organization.

The case of Iran demonstrates clearly that the introduction of programs aimed at modernization does not necessarily lead to a systematic reduction of the political role and significance of religion. Modernization theory postulated an opposition between religious (that is, moral, value-based) and secular (that is, pragmatic, rational-based) thinking and assumed that, in the public and economic realm, these two systems were inherently contradictory—each possessing its own set of behavior patterns, orienting values, and motivations (competition v. harmony and cooperation; pragmatic v. affective associations; self-interest v. family).

In Khomeini's concept of modernization and political order the pragmatic and

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rational requirements of modernization as evidenced in the West are subordinated to religious values. The extent to which industrialization is feasible on this basis remains to be seen. The emerging trend to interpret Khomeini as an "Eastern alternative" to the rational political process of the West is as premature as the previous announcements of secularization. In fact, both types of society—the traditional and the industrial—operate on the basis of values, though the values themselves differ. Both have a power structure that interprets and applies these values (for example, a technocracy, an ulama), and both are faced with the constraints imposed by the international system. Religious values, like economic values, are interpreted on the basis of moral judgments, external limitations, and concrete interests. While the ruling group will present its decisions as moral imperatives, often they are likely to be the outcome of conflict and reflect power relationships.*

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The Soviets and Strategic Arms: Toward an Evaluation of the Record

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Analyses of Soviet behavior in the nuclear arms competition are no less varied than the general range of approaches to the analysis of Soviet conduct. Several distinct images of Soviet policy may be discerned in recent Western analysis. In one image, stress is placed upon the ideological roots of Soviet behavior, and it is assumed that the worldview inherent to communism leads Moscow to view nuclear competition in the context of a grand historical struggle between capitalist and socialist states. Those who accept this image view Moscow as driven to seek a position of dominance in the nuclear competition in order to advance communism or the global power of the Soviet Union. They also suggest that the leaders in the Kremlin view the arms control process as no more than a tactical means to restrain the Western defense effort.[1] A second image credits Moscow with an uncontrollable impulse to seek ever higher levels of strategic power. Moscow's drive to higher levels of armaments is seen, not as the result of the commitment of the leadership to achieve military superiority, but as the result of the domination of military and defense interests and the unrestrained momentum of weapons technology in the Soviet system. Moscow's interest in arms control in this view is circumscribed by institutional pressure to arm.[2]

[1] See, for example, P. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in the Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976): 207–232.

[2] See, for example, W. T. Lee, "The Politico-Military Industrial Complex in the U.S.S.R.," *Journal of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (1972):73–86; K. F. Spielmann, "Defense Industrialists in the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Communism* 25 (September-October 1976): 52–69; and D. Holloway, "Technology and Political Decisions in Soviet Armaments Policy," *Journal of Peace Research* 11 (1974): 257–279.

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A third image of Soviet strategic behavior views Moscow as a prisoner of an international nuclear system, its nuclear policy largely conditioned by the policy and actions of the West.[3] In this view Moscow is no less concerned than Washington about the dangers of nuclear war and uncontrolled competition. Those who hold this image tend to believe that Moscow's interest in arms control is serious and that the Soviet leadership is eager to reciprocate Western restraint in the strategic competition. A fourth image of Soviet strategic policy stresses the impact of Russian history on Soviet strategic behavior. The Soviet Union is viewed as a historically insecure society, excessively distrustful of the outside world and prone to arm in excess of reasonable requirements.[4] While the Soviet interest in terminating the arms race is real, historically conditioned insecurities cause Moscow to adopt strategic policies that thwart the achievement of arms control agreements acceptable to the West.

The sources of Soviet behavior in the nuclear arms competition and the nature of Soviet policy are likely to remain controversial; however, certain general features of Soviet behavior and policy have become clearer as the nuclear age has lengthened. This analysis will review the general record of Soviet strategic policy since 1945 and examine current problems in understanding Soviet behavior in the nuclear competition.

Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy under Stalin

Stalin spurred Soviet research efforts to acquire atomic and hydrogen weapons and to carry forward rocket development, but he clearly did not view such weapons as revolutionizing warfare. Under Stalin, Soviet military science continued to approach military strategy in terms of the last war.[5] Long-range aviation, rockets, and atomic weapons were viewed as necessary, but not decisive, components of military power. Stalin's emphasis on the development of atomic weapons appeared to reflect not so much a calculated quest for a strategic superiority deemed decisive by Stalin and the Soviet command, but a belief that their development by others was inevitable.

Aware of German and Allied research on atomic weapons, Stalin had upgraded Soviet atomic energy research during the war. Key scientific personnel were recalled from the front in 1943 to work in an atomic project under the direction of I. V. Kurchatov.[6] U.S. success in developing an atomic bomb led in 1945 to further acceleration of this project. Rocket research was also stimulated by the war. Fearing attacks on Soviet cities by improved German rockets, the

[3] See G. W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," *Scientific American* 210 (April 1969): 15–25.

[4] See D. K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," *Foreign Policy* 32 (Fall 1978): 47–62.

[5] See H. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 5–9; see also R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 117–119.

[6] A. P. Alexandrov, "The Heroic Deed," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, December 1967, pp. 10–12.

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Soviet command had closely monitored German rocket programs in the closing months of the war.[7] At the end of the war rocket research programs were promptly upgraded in the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953 improved V1 and V2 rocket designs were being tested in the Soviet Union and test firings of limited-range rockets from submarines were observed in the Baltic.[8] New weapons technology was pursued by the Soviet Union as rapidly as scientific progress permitted. Following the successful testing of an atomic device in August 1949, Soviet hydrogen weapon research proceeded without hesitation.[9]

Although Soviet science pushed ahead with key strategic programs, the actual development of Soviet strategic power in the period 1945 to 1953 was limited by both technical problems and resource constraints. At the time of Stalin's death, the backbone of Soviet strategic power was a force of several hundred TU4 propeller-driven bombers modeled after the B-29. The bombers were not suited to conduct an effective attack on the United States, although a larger force of medium-range bombers made Europe a hostage to Soviet air attack.[10] By 1953 the United States enjoyed approximately a five-to-one advantage in long-range bombers and had developed technically superior medium-range rockets.

Even though Stalin deserved significant credit for the pace of Soviet military modernization, and the rapid technical progress in Soviet rocketry in the mid-1950s reflected in part the progress of development programs begun at Stalin's direction, the conservative military doctrine he championed was to cast a long shadow across Soviet thinking about nuclear arms. Stalin moved the Soviet Union into the nuclear weapons age technologically, but he promulgated a doctrine that viewed the new weapons as requiring no basic alteration in the political or military policy of the Soviet Union.

The Evolution of Strategic Power and Policy, 1953–1960

Stalin's death, as well as the new U.S. emphasis on its strategic power reflected in the doctrine of massive retaliation articulated by Dulles in 1954, set the stage for a reevaluation of the role of strategic power in the Soviet Union. The debate that emerged in the Soviet Union over strategic arms has been well documented in the West.[11] Malenkov, representing one faction of the Soviet leadership, asserted that nuclear weapons changed the character of war, that a nuclear arms race was a fruitless and dangerous policy, and that a more concerted effort must be made to reach an understanding with the West in order to reduce the risk of

[7] N. Ya. Komarov and A. S. Orlov, "Sekretnoe oruzhie fyurera i protivovozdushnaya oborona gordov sssr v 1944–1945 godax," *Istoria SSSR* 1 (January-February 1975): 121–128.

[8] P. Joubert, "Long Range Air Attack," in *The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces*, ed. A. Lee (New York: Praeger, 1959).

[9] Alexandrov, "The Heroic Deed," p. 12.

[10] Stalin had pressed Soviet scientists to develop an improved long-range bomber, but technical problems slowed development. *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (New York: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 43.

[11] Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, pp. 5–13.

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nuclear war. A second faction, represented by Khrushchev and including key military leaders, asserted that nuclear weapons did not fundamentally change the character of war and defended the need for a vigorous modernization of Soviet forces. With Malenkov's dismissal in 1955 and Khrushchev's ascendance in the same year the debate appeared to be resolved in favor of the hard liners. In fact no such resolution was effected, and after 1955 Soviet policy increasingly reflected a dual concern with the danger of nuclear war and with the status of the Soviet Union as a strategic power.

In the 1950s a new emphasis on Soviet strategic power emerged as both cause and effect of progress in the development of rocketry. Significant and rapid technical progress in rocketry was achieved after 1955. Medium-range rockets were successfully tested in 1955 and deployed in 1957.[12] The successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic rocket was announced by Tass in August 1957.[13] The Soviet triumph in rocket technology was apparent worldwide in October 1957 with the launching of Sputnik I. Launchings of larger satellites in the following months confirmed the growing belief in the West that the Soviets had surpassed the United States in missile technology.

The New Emphasis on Strategic Power

As Soviet rocket development progressed in the 1950s, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders placed increasing stress on strategic weapons as measures of Soviet power. The Soviet leadership, however, did not view the function of strategic power in the narrow terms of deterring nuclear attack. That a narrow view of the purpose of strategic arms did not emerge was probably due to the continued influence of traditional military thinking which viewed nuclear arms as an extension of the state's military power and the perception that the United States sought to exploit the existing nuclear balance to its political advantage. In official thinking the political and military functions of strategic weapons came to be closely linked. Soviet rockets were not only viewed as the principal means of devastating aggressors; they were also viewed as means of resisting atomic blackmail by the United States. Khrushchev did not hesitate to use the specter of a Soviet rocket attack to bolster Soviet diplomacy. More importantly the status of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power was associated with the prospects of the more general struggle between socialism and capitalism in the world system.[14]

While Khrushchev boasted about growing Soviet nuclear might and sought to exploit the image of Soviet strategic power, he also acted to accord increasing priority to rocket forces in the defense establishment. The Strategic Rocket Forces were established as a separate branch of the armed services in 1960. At the same time Khrushchev announced that production of Bison and Bear long-

[12] Joubert, "Long Range Air Attack," p. 12.

[13] *Pravda*, August 27, 1957, p. 1.

[14] See Khrushchev's remarks in, for example, *Pravda*, March 27, 1958, p. 1, and *Pravda*, January 28, 1959, p. 1.

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range bombers which had begun in 1955 would be curtailed and that the Soviet Union would rely on rockets as the principal means of defense.

The Party Confronts the Risks of the Nuclear Age

While Khrushchev was introducing a new emphasis on Soviet strategic power into Soviet policy, he simultaneously introduced a second new theme into Soviet policy: the acknowledgement that nuclear war would be a disaster for all mankind. Although in 1953 he had characterized as defeatist Malenkov's view that nuclear war would entail the mutual destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev became increasingly a proponent of just such a view. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, he declared that a fatal war between capitalism and socialism was no longer inevitable since the balance of world power was shifting in favor of the socialist states. Thereafter he offered increasingly dire descriptions of nuclear war as a war "that would eliminate entire countries."[15] Speaking at a Party conference in 1961, Khrushchev warned his audience that "within 60 days of an atomic attack 500 million to 750 million people could perish" and concluded that "sober calculation of the inevitable consequence of nuclear war is an indispensable requirement for pursuing a consistent policy of preventing war."[16]

Even though military and civilian leaders continued to affirm publicly that if nuclear war occurred, the imperialists would suffer devastating blows and socialism would emerge triumphant in the wake of nuclear war, the official image of nuclear war was increasingly grim. This recognition of the destructiveness of nuclear war as well as concern with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons stimulated the growth of a serious Soviet interest in imposing some control on nuclear competition. Moscow was especially interested in avoiding acquisition of nuclear weapons by Bonn or Peking. The Soviet decision in 1957 to begin negotiations with the United States on a nuclear test ban and to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests was evidence of Moscow's serious interest in limiting the arms race.

Explaining the Soviet Strategic Effort

After 1957 Khrushchev increasingly boasted of the growth of Soviet strategic power. In a major speech on defense policy in January 1960 he declared that the Soviet Union was "several years ahead of other countries in the development and mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles of various types"; boasted that the Soviet Union could "literally wipe" any aggressor "off the face of the earth"; and went on to warn of an "incredible" weapon "in the hatching stage" which was "even more formidable."[17]

[15] Speech to the Supreme Soviet, reprinted in *Pravda*, December 22, 1952, p. 4.

[16] *Pravda*, January 25, 1961, p. 2.

[17] *Pravda*, January 15, 1960, p. 1; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 12, no 2. (1960), pp. 11–12.

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The reality of Soviet strategic development, however, fell far short of Khrushchev's rhetoric. Despite declarations of the growing strategic might of the Soviet Union, Soviet strategic power grew modestly between 1957 and 1962. Although medium-range rocket deployment began in 1957, limited deployment of a first generation, liquid-fuel ICBM, the SS-6, did not begin until 1960. The SS-6 was quickly succeeded by two only slightly improved liquid-fuel designs, the SS-7 (1961) and SS-8 (1962).

Despite the spectacular Soviet success of Sputnik in 1957, the United States gained the lead in strategic rocket technology as a result of the rapid progress in Polaris and Minuteman programs achieved between 1959 and 1961. At the time of the Cuban confrontation in the fall of 1962 the Soviet Union could deploy only about 75 ICBM's; the United States could deploy over 400 strategic missiles.[18] In both the solid-fuel Minuteman and Polaris, moreover, the United States had missiles a full generation ahead of those the Soviets were then deploying. It was not until the end of the 1960s that the Soviets could launch a nuclear missile-firing submarine comparable to the Polaris class which the United States first sent to sea in November 1960. The Soviet strategic bomber force remained small in comparison to that deployed by the United States.

Explanations of the gap between Khrushchev's rhetoric about Soviet strategic power and reality vary. Some accounts blame the apparently slow pace of ICBM development on technical difficulties,[19] economic constraints,[20] or the resistance of conservative elements in the military;[21] others see a deliberate design in the pattern of Soviet behavior. Horelick and Rush, for example, suggest that the Soviet leadership made a carefully calculated decision to leap to a second generation of nuclear weapons and that Khrushchev's boasts about Soviet strategic power were a deliberate deception, the object of which "was probably to conceal the very modest scope of the program for the first generation ICBM and to create politically exploitable uncertainty in the West regarding the strategic balance."[22]

Khrushchev's rhetoric was clearly calculated to exploit the *image* of Soviet technological superiority. It appears unlikely, however, that the Soviets were committed to a long-term strategy to seize superiority in the nuclear competition. While technical and production difficulties slowed the pace of the Soviet effort in this period, it also appears that Moscow still hoped to avoid an open-ended arms competition with the West. It is difficult to reconcile a strategy of technological leap with Moscow's acceptance in 1958 of a moratorium on

[18] See F. Barnsby and R. Huisken, *Arms Uncontrolled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 133.

[19] Joubert, "Long Range Air Attack."

[20] L. Bloomfield, W. Clemens Jr., and F. Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 106–115.

[21] M. P. Gallagher and K. F. Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 35–37.

[22] A. L. Horelick and M. Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 37.

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nuclear tests. The test moratorium, hardly a design to leap quickly to a second generation of nuclear weapons, appeared as evidence of a serious Soviet interest in stabilizing the nuclear competition. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet in December 1957 in which he affirmed Soviet desires to end nuclear testing, Khrushchev noted that if the arms race continued, the Soviet Union would be compelled to develop new types of weapons, but that an all-out arms race would detract from efforts to raise the living standards of the Soviet people.[23] As late as 1960, the second full year of the informal test moratorium, the Soviet commitment to the moratorium appeared firm. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev declared that "the first government to resume nuclear weapons tests would assume a grave responsibility."[24] While the test ban may have been supported in Moscow as a means of slowing Western weapons development, strengthening a diplomatic campaign for nonproliferation, and controlling the cost of arms competition, these goals were sought at the price of progress in Soviet weapons development programs.

The Escalation of the Soviet Strategic Effort, 1960–1964

The abrupt resumption of nuclear testing in the fall of 1961 signaled the escalation of the Soviet strategic effort. Whether the resumption of tests reflected long-building pressure from a scientific and defense establishment to get Soviet programs moving once again or whether the decision to resume tests was more directly a reaction to the Kennedy administration's budget plans for a strategic force of 800 Minuteman ICBMs and 45 Polaris submarines by the end of the 1960s is not clear.[25]

In any event, 1961 appears to have been a decisive moment for Soviet strategic policy. The Soviet position in the strategic balance appears to have been reevaluated and decisions made to engage in an intensified strategic build-up. By 1961 it was increasingly apparent to the Soviet leadership that the United States was outdistancing the Soviets in strategic competition. Having acknowledged both the political and military importance of strategic weapons, a position of second place was even more difficult for the Soviet leadership to accept. Growing dissatisfaction with the Soviet position in the strategic balance almost certainly contributed to the risky decision to place missiles in Cuba.[26]

Major policy decisions responsible for the awesome development of Soviet strategic power in the late 1960s appear to have occurred in the period 1961–1964. Key decisions regarding the development of second generation strategic systems (the SS–11, SS–9, and SSN–6) were probably made during this period. Design and production problems hampered Soviet programs;

[23] *Pravda*, December 22, 1957, p. 1.

[24] *Pravda*, January 15, 1960, p. 2.

[25] For a recent Soviet analysis of this period see G. N. Svyatov, "O politike s sh a v oblaste stpoitel stva voorvzhennyx sil e orgranechenia," *Voprosy istory* 2 (February 1978), pp. 66–92.

[26] Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power*, pp. 126–156.

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Khrushchev's penchant for championing quick-fix solutions disrupted orderly research and development. Nonetheless, rapid progress in the production of strategic missiles began to be apparent in 1964. SS-7 and SS-8 deployment increased sharply—220 of these first generation systems were deployed by 1964. By early 1965 deployment began of the SS-9, a second generation, liquid-fuel ICBM capable of delivering large warheads with considerably greater accuracy than the SS-7 and SS-8.

Speaking at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, Marshal Malinovsky noted that since 1961 "considerable attention" had been given to the deployment of Strategic Rocket Troops and atomic rocket submarines. Specifically, Malinovsky observed:

> For the Soviet Armed Forces the period since the XXII Congress of the Party was attended by the solution of many highly complicated and extremely important problems of military organization. The measures carried out in this direction permitted an increase in the service of nuclear ammunition of various designation and also sharply strengthened the equipping of the Armed Forces with means of delivery. . . . The basic efforts of the chief branches of our military industry were subordinated to the rapid build-up of these forces.[27]

In retrospect it is clear that under Khrushchev the outline of a new Soviet policy on strategic arms took shape. Khrushchev's growing stress on the catastrophic character of nuclear war and the devastating effect such a war would have on mankind was to be reflected in a progressive rejection of the view dominant under Stalin that nuclear weapons did not significantly alter the role of war in history. Thus, Khrushchev established the avoidance of nuclear war as a major objective of Soviet policy and as the doctrinal foundation of a serious Soviet interest in arms control. Closely associated with this objective, however, was a commitment to strengthening Soviet strategic power not only to act as a deterrent but also to secure the general position of the Soviet Union as a global power. These two policy themes which emerged under Khrushchev were to be reflected in the policy of his successors.

Soviet Strategic Power and Policy, 1964–1978

Few major changes were evident in Soviet strategic policy immediately following Khrushchev's replacement by Brezhnev and the reshuffling of party and government posts in the fall of 1964. Although there was some deemphasis of the priority that had been assigned to strategic rockets under Khrushchev and a reassertion of the importance of all branches of the service to the defense of the homeland, the scope and pace of strategic programs appear not to have been seriously affected by these changes. The SS-9 and SS-11 production programs underway in 1965 were substantial. Programs in the development of antiballistic missile system and a new class of missile-firing submarines were also

[27] *Pravda*, April 3, 1966, p. 3.

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underway. Although the Vietnam War was cited as necessitating the strengthening of Soviet military power,[28] the high rate of missile production in the period 1965–1969 indicates that an enormous investment in Soviet strategic missile programs had been made in the last years of Khrushchev's rule.

Between 1965 and 1970 the new leadership directed a rapid build-up of second generation systems and planned the development of a third generation of strategic weapons. While evidence of problems in defense production remained throughout the 1960s, increasingly the difficulties were overshadowed by the impressive success in the development of Soviet strategic power. In 1965 the SS-11 was introduced and over the following three years deployment of this system averaged 250 per year. The rapid rate of SS-11 deployment itself indicates an impressive degree of reorganization in the Soviet defense industry. Within a period of a few years, the Soviets were producing a more complicated second generation strategic system at more than twice the rate of first generation missiles underway in the early 1960s. Deployment of Yankee class missile-firing submarines began in 1968 at a slightly higher rate than the accelerated U.S. production of the comparable Polaris in the early 1960s.

Overall, 1965–1970 was a period of intense change in the strategic balance. The pace of the Soviet effort revealed little hesitancy in Moscow in moving toward a large, second generation missile force and initiating the development of a range of third generation strategic systems. Increasingly after 1965, military and civilian leaders spoke of the strategic might of the Soviet Union with a new confidence, but without the reckless boasting that had characterized Khrushchev's rhetoric.[29] Although Soviet leaders often attested the adequacy of Soviet strategic power, they did not discuss publicly the numerical balance. The need for continued effort, however, was affirmed. Speaking in July 1967, for example, Brezhnev declared, "today all branches of our glorious armed forces have been supplied abundantly with such weapons as enable them to protect reliably the inviolability of the Soviet Union," but added, "in military matters, more than in any other sphere we must not mark time."[30]

Evidence of differences related to strategic policy could be discerned in the statements of key Soviet leaders during this period. Military representatives tended to place more emphasis on the dangerous facets of the international situation and the military threat posed by the Western bloc and to stress the need for the continued strengthening of Soviet forces.[31] At the same time, speeches by some civilian leaders appeared to place greater stress on the importance of easing international tensions, the high cost of strategic competition, and the need to devote greater attention to the domestic economy.[32] While

[28] See Brezhnev speech in *Pravda*, July 4, 1965, p. 1.

[29] See, for example, speeches by Krylov in *Pravda*, November 19, 1967, p. 2; Grechko, *Pravda*, February 24, 1968, p. 2; and Yakubovsky, *Izvestia*, February 22, 1969, p. 2.

[30] *Pravda*, July 6, 1967, pp. 1–2.

[31] See for example, speech by Grechko, *Pravda*, February 24, 1968.

[32] See R. Kolkowicz, "Strategic Elites and the Politics of Superpowers," *Journal of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (1972): 40–59.

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policy differences and some degree of debate over priorities within the leadership doubtlessly existed, the pace of the Soviet missile production during this period indicates a substantial consensus on a continued effort to strengthen Soviet strategic forces. Soviet interest in strategic arms control emerged as a corollary of the expanded Soviet strategic effort of the 1960s.

The Soviets and Salt: Bargaining over the Balance

Although Soviet leaders since Malenkov had professed a growing commitment to the goal of ending the arms race, the approaches adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union in U.N. negotiations between 1953 and 1967 had resulted in little serious progress. Each side pressed its demands: the United States insisted on linking nuclear and conventional disarmament and on adopting far-reaching inspection plans; the Soviet Union sought a substantial redressing of the nuclear balance that would greatly reduce the advantages enjoyed by the United States. By 1967, however, the changing strategic balance and the possibility of satellite arms control surveillance contributed to a new climate for arms discussions.

After a series of evasive replies to overtures from the Johnson administration in 1966 to begin direct United States-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations, the Soviet position on strategic arms talks appeared to shift in 1967. In March Kosygin informed Johnson that the Soviet Union was prepared in principle to participate in United States-Soviet discussions on "means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles."[33]

Moscow's decision to enter SALT was made in the context of an ongoing Soviet strategic build-up that was rapidly narrowing the quantitative difference in United States and Soviet strategic forces. By 1968 the Soviets had deployed 850 ICBMs, and in late 1969 or early 1970 the Soviet land-based missile force could be expected to surpass the U.S. arsenal in number, if not in certain dimensions of performance. While there was reason for growing satisfaction with the strategic balance in Moscow—and such satisfaction was in fact evident in the statements of military and civilian leaders—there was also reason for anxieties by 1967 regarding the uncertain future of competition. It is likely that MIRV and ABM programs underway in the United States in early 1967 were viewed in Moscow with real concern. MIRV threatened not only to undercut the recent Soviet gains in the strategic balance but to increase the vulnerability of the Soviet arsenal. Although the Soviets did not view ABM as destabilizing per se, Moscow's own ABM program had encountered technical difficulties by 1967 and concern probably existed over asymmetries in ABM development.[34]

In addition to such immediate military concerns the political costs of an acceleration of strategic competition probably entered into Moscow's decision to

[33] Cited in J. H. Barton and L. D. Weiler, *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 173.

[34] On this latter point see R. L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* 24 (January-February 1975): 21-37.

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begin SALT. A new round in the arms race would exacerbate East-West relations at a time when Soviet relations with the Chinese were worsening and Moscow was engulfed in a diplomatic campaign to improve relations with Western Europe and secure the application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to Germany.

While political as well as purely military motivations appear to underlie Soviet interest in SALT, the Soviet approach to the negotiations has centered on an effort to impose the maximum restrictions on those U.S. programs judged most threatening by Moscow. Moscow's behavior appears to have been guided more by such practical concerns than by a general commitment to stability per se. By entering SALT the Soviets probably hoped to limit ABM and MIRV and to secure their improved position in the overall strategic balance. Moscow probably also hoped that SALT would reduce pressure for new armaments in the United States and permit maximum flexibility for Soviet weapons programs.

Moscow's ultimate objectives in SALT, however, remain a matter of dispute. The Soviet Union has appeared to approach SALT more as a vehicle to bargain on the nuclear balance rather than as a design to achieve a configuration of strategic forces consistent with tenets of deterrence theory championed in the West. In nearly a decade of SALT, however, the Soviets have been only partly successful in limiting key U.S. programs. Significantly, Moscow has been willing to make important concessions. Initially in SALT, the Soviets sought to include in their definition of strategic systems forward-based nuclear systems (FBS), attempted to ban MIRV deployment, and resisted U.S. demands for restriction of large ICBMs. On ABM, however, somewhat to the surprise of U.S. officials who had exaggerated Soviet progress in ABM, the Soviets quickly accepted limitations. Subsequently in SALT I the Soviets abandoned their insistance on including FBS (they still sought some compensation for the asymmetry, however), accepted a sublimit on their heavy missiles, and accepted no restrictions on MIRV. By 1972 it was apparently decided in Moscow that the value of a SALT agreement that limited ABM, froze the numerical missile balance for five years with some important advantages in throw weight to Moscow, and symbolized new cooperation in East-West relations was worth the costs of compromising on FBS, MIRV, and heavy missile limitations as well as the more general costs of improving relations with Washington, at a time Washington was stepping up the war in Indochina. It is unlikely that such decisions came easily in Moscow.

In the SALT II negotiations, which began on November 21, 1972, the Soviets sought an agreement that would implement the principle of "equality and identical security." The Soviets wielded the principle of identical security to suit their more specific objective of limiting new U.S. programs and to demand compensation for geographic asymmetries including the vulnerability of the USSR to FBS. The United States sought to achieve equality in strategic systems, protect its options to develop a range of new systems, and limit further improvement in the Soviet throw weight advantage.

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By 1974 Moscow and the Ford administration appeared to have struck a bargain on a strategic balance at the Vladivostok summit. In accepting the Vladivostok accord in November 1974 the Soviets displayed a willingness to accept a framework for SALT II based on equal aggregates of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers and to drop their demand for compensation for FBS. The Soviets also agreed to extend the sublimit on heavy missiles. The Vladivostok accord also provided for an equal sublimit on MIRV, which, from the Soviet viewpoint, in essence limited U.S. MIRV capacity and allowed the Soviets to reach parity in MIRV systems without losing its significant advantages in overall throw weight. Vladivostok was an ambiguous bargain, however, because it was unclear what systems were to be included in the overall aggregates. Disputes over the status of the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber and the American election delayed further progress in negotiations in 1975 and 1976. Meanwhile ongoing programs in a new series of strategic weapons raised new questions in Washington and Moscow.[35]

In the revised Vladivostok framework negotiated during 1977 and 1978, Washington made concessions to Moscow on the cruise missile deployment, and Moscow showed a willingness to offer assurances on the Backfire bomber. Washington and Moscow in SALT II have been reluctant to freeze the development of new strategic systems, and bargaining on these issues will continue through the third phase of SALT. While the progress achieved in SALT in defining a strategic balance represents one facet of recent Soviet strategic conduct, the continuing growth of Soviet strategic power represents the other.

The Growth of Soviet Strategic Power, 1969–1978

The period since 1969 has in fact been one of intense activity in Soviet strategic programs. Like the United States, during the decade of SALT the Soviets have focused increasingly on qualitative development of strategic forces. SS-9 and SS-11 deployment declined sharply in 1970. (During 1971 the Soviets deployed 60 new ICBMs compared with nearly 300 in 1969.)[36] Three explanations may account for this decision to curb missile production in advance of an agreement on force limitations: an indication of Moscow's increased satisfaction with the quantitative balance; a sound central management decision in anticipation of a missile replacement program expected to begin in the early 1970s; or a signal of Soviet interest in the success of SALT.[37] All three of these interpretations of Soviet behavior may in fact be correct. There is no reason to assume that Soviet behavior is any less complex than American behavior in the sense that a variety of motivations and forces may be simultaneously at work in Soviet policy.

[35] The Soviet position is summarized in "Zadacha orgranichenia strategicheskikh vooruzheny," *Pravda*, February 11, 1968, p. 4.

[36] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1977* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

[37] On this latter point see R. L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military."

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At about the same time decisions were made in Moscow to curb SS-9 and SS-11 deployment, "go" decisions were also apparently reached to proceed with a third generation of follow-on systems. Advanced testing of a third generation of ICBMs (SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) began in 1972 and 1973. The new ICBMs were credited with greater accuracy and had significantly greater throw weight than their predecessors. In 1976 deployment of MIRV models of these new ICBMs began. In 1973 the Delta class nuclear-powered submarine entered service carrying the new SSN-8 missile with a range of 4200 nautical miles, nearly twice that of the Poseidon C-3, the most advanced United States SLBM. Advanced testing of a fourth new ICBM, the solid-fuel SSX-16 was underway in 1977. Testing of two new advanced solid-fuel, MIRV-capable SLBM designs (SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18) began in 1975 and 1976. Testing of killer satellites was also resumed in 1976 after a lapse of several years.[38]

During the period 1970-1978 the United States was completing the adaptation of Minuteman and Poseidon missiles to MIRV capacity, proceeding with the Trident program, and developing the cruise missile and a more accurate ICBM. To what degree Soviet programs represented a response to U.S. action or reflected political or technological momentum within the Soviet Union is difficult to determine; however, if Soviet weapons development decisions were a response, they were a prompt response indicating no protracted debate in Moscow regarding costly programs.

The new systems Moscow began to deploy after 1973 were viewed in Washington as evidence of a Soviet drive for strategic superiority. At the same time, in a speech to the Central Committee Plenum in 1976, Brezhnev warned that by proceeding with Trident, cruise, MX, and B1 development, Washington was provoking an escalated arms race.[39]

Appraising Recent Soviet Strategic Behavior

Post-1969 progress in Soviet programs has raised new questions about Soviet policy in the strategic competition and served to further support for a range of new strategic programs in the United States. In particular, the continuing growth of Soviet strategic power has sharpened controversy over the extent to which the Soviet leadership rejects the goal of strategic superiority and accepts the principles of deterrence theory upon which Western strategic policy is presumably predicated.[40] A second controversy exists over the nature and extent of military influence in Soviet strategic policy.[41] A number of Western accounts suggest that the perspective of the Soviet military dominates the Soviet

[38] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Authorization for Military Procurement Research & Development: Hearing on FY 1978*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 371-396.

[39] See Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*; and Kolkowicz, "Strategic Elites."

[40] Cf. Kolkowicz, "Strategic Elites," and Roger W. Barnett, "Trans-SALT: Soviet Strategic Doctrine," *Orbis* 19, no. 2 (1976): 533-566.

[41] See for example, I. S. Glagolen, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms Control Negotiations," *Orbis* 21, no. 4 (1978): 767-777.

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approach to SALT. As a consequence of this presumed military dominance, it is asserted that the Soviets view SALT less as a means of introducing greater stability into the strategic relationship than as a means of further improving the Soviet position in the strategic balance; and that civilian leadership is unable to resist military pressure for new weapons. A third important area of controversy regarding Soviet strategic conduct concerns the degree to which technology and bureaucratism are salient in Soviet strategic policymaking. Disagreement exists on the degree to which the Soviet strategic decision-making system is dominated by its parts in the defense bureaucracy and the vast defense industry complex and the degree to which weapons technology has acquired a momentum of its own which the leadership is unable to control.[42] Each of these concerns will be examined in turn.

The Nature of Soviet Strategic Doctrine

Soviet military doctrine continues to present reasons for concern in the West. Whether Moscow has accepted the view that the goal of rational nuclear policy is to limit first-strike, counterforce potential is indeed debatable. Soviet doctrine continues to view nuclear weapons in the light of traditional warfare doctrine; that is, the purpose of nuclear weapons is not only to deter attack, but to win war, should war occur, by destroying the enemy's means of attack. Soviet military theorists continue to discuss strategies oriented to fighting nuclear wars. Such strategies call for massive strikes against the military forces, rocket bases, and other integral components of the enemy's capacity to wage war. Deterrence is achieved by preparing to fight nuclear war. Such a strategic doctrine requires nuclear forces suited to the purpose of destroying the West's retaliatory capability.

While Soviet military doctrine continues to associate deterrence with the ability to wage war, Western doctrine itself has acquired a counterforce orientation; thus the United States has developed an increasingly accurate strategic capability. Despite its war-fighting orientation, war avoidance is clearly the principal objective of Soviet strategic policy. The calamitous character of nuclear war has been a theme constantly reiterated by the leadership. Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev has articulated an official view of a grim catastrophe "entailing the mass annihilation of peoples" and causing "hundreds of millions of deaths."[43] The leading Soviet work on military strategy also contains grim descriptions of the consequences of nuclear war. The authoritative text on military strategy edited by Marshall Sokolovskiy declares:

> According to the calculations of scientists up to 2.5 million people can be annihilated immediately and approximately 400,000 more people may perish from subsequent

[42] Holloway, "Soviet Armaments Policy," and Gallagher and Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making*.

[43] *Pravda*, April 8, 1978, p. 3. See also Brezhnev's remarks, *Pravda*, January 19, 1977, p. 2.

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> radiation as the result of an explosion of one thermonuclear bomb. . . . Approximately 100 nuclear charges in the 2 megaton range dropped within a short space of time on a country with developed industry and territory of approximately 300–500 thousand square kilometers would suffice to transform all of its industrial regions and administrative-political centers into a mass of ruins and its territory into wasteland contaminated with death dealing radioactive materials.[44]

So that there will be no doubt about the scope of nuclear destruction, the text notes that the losses of nuclear war "will not only be suffered by the USA and their NATO allies, but also by the socialist countries."[45] According to Soviet doctrine massive retaliation cannot be avoided in modern rocket war. Current Soviet military doctrine thus implies that any nuclear war, no matter how fought, would have enormously destructive effects on the Soviet Union.

Although the goal of strategic superiority has been rejected by Brezhnev,[46] the stress on the destructive character of nuclear war and the imperative of war avoidance on the one hand and its counterforce orientation on the other combine to give current Soviet military doctrine an ambiguous character. The war-fighting focus of Soviet doctrine will continue to raise questions about the rejection of the goal of strategic superiority. Western concerns are only likely to be assuaged as a result of progress in SALT which restricts Soviet counterforce potential or unilateral U.S. steps to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear forces. Similarly, however, Soviet military leaders face the same options with respect to the growing U.S. counterforce capability.

The Military and the Policymaking Process

The nature and scope of the influence exercised by the Soviet military on Soviet SALT policy as well as the extent to which the military acts as an "interest group" has been a subject of controversy in the West. While it is unlikely that a monolithic military perspective exists on SALT, important differences in perspective probably exist between Soviet military and civilian leaders. Differences also exist, however, between the professional military as an interest group in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Party control structure in the Soviet military, although weakened since Stalin, remains strong.

Overall, the military attitude toward SALT appears to have been affected by a variety of considerations, and the military position has in no sense been one of unalloyed opposition to the idea of strategic arms control. SALT was inaugurated during a period not only in which military leaders expressed concern about specific U.S. programs, but also when the military itself was critical of Khrushchev's overemphasis on Soviet strategic forces. It is likely that SALT has been viewed positively by certain elements of the military both as a means of

[44] V. D. Sokolovskiy; *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed., ed. H. F. Scott (New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1975), p. 195.

[45] Ibid., p. 197.

[46] *Pravda*, January 19, 1977.

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limiting those U.S. programs judged most threatening to Soviet security and as a means of restoring perspective on Soviet defense needs. Following Khrushchev's dismissal, the military mounted a successful campaign to reduce the emphasis that Khrushchev had placed on strategic forces at the expense of other aspects of the Soviet military budget.[47] Thus, the military may have perceived SALT as a means of consolidating its gains in this respect. The Soviet decision to enter SALT in 1968 appears to have had the support of the Soviet military, although in general key military leaders have remained consistently less "upbeat" in the assessments of prospects and progress of SALT and more prone to propagate *hard* images of U.S. policies, usually stressing the threatening character of ongoing or anticipated U.S. programs.

Overall military dissent on what would seem to be Moscow's major concessions in SALT, for example, the acceptance of limitations on heavy missiles and the agreement which has extended through SALT II to omit U.S. forward-based systems from SALT limits, has been constrained. The heavy missile limitations in SALT I may have interfered minimally with immediate deployment plans. While Moscow accepted a restriction that limited until October 1977 the number of modern heavy missiles to 313, it is unlikely that SS-9 deployment had been planned to exceed that number. The SS-9 was by 1972 apparently due to be replaced, and the number of SS-9s in the Soviet missile force had been constant since 1970. Provisions of the revised Vladivostok accord limiting heavy missile deployment into the mid-1980s, however, appear to entail a more significant concession on the Soviet part, assuming that the Soviets could deploy the SS-18 at a rate in excess of 50 per year.

Military dissatisfaction with the Soviet position on the FBS issue has been evident. In the months preceding the decision to yield on FBS, Marshall Grechko seldom failed to refer to the "more than 7000 nuclear warheads under American control in Europe"[48] in discussing the overall strategic balance. Significantly, Grechko continued to refer to this issue in the fall of 1971 while Brezhnev omitted reference to such systems. Once a deal had been made on FBS in early 1972, Grechko's remarks appeared more tempered. On the FBS issue, the military may have been mollified by "side-payment" decisions to bolster Soviet European theater forces. Significantly, the Soviet decision at Vladivostok to accept a framework for SALT II based on equal aggregates of strategic systems did not appear to provoke military dissent, although in accepting the Vladivostok framework Moscow appeared to abandon a policy of seeking compensation for FBS.

Although it is significant that the Soviet leadership has made concessions in SALT despite military dissent, the Soviet military will likely continue to exercise considerable influence on SALT policy. Military influence on SALT probably stems less from any political ascendance than the need of the political leadership to rely on military expertise and the political emotions touched by the issue of

[47] See Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military*.

[48] *Pravda*, February 23, 1971, p. 2.

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an adequate defense in the Soviet Union. The military penchant to approach arms control questions conservatively will continue to have considerable impact in Moscow.

Bureaucratism, Technology, and Party Control

The Soviet strategic build-up of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the current pace of strategic weapons research in the Soviet Union, has caused some observers in the West to conclude that Soviet strategic policy reflects a bureaucratic or technological momentum of ideas and interests that the Party leadership is unable to manage and fashion into a coherent strategic policy. Evidence of the impact of bureaucratism in U.S. policy has only furthered the belief that the Soviet Union cannot escape the tendency of the parts in the large bureaucratic defense complex to command the whole.

That the Soviet Union has acquired a vast defense complex is clear. More than a dozen different ministries and three branches of the armed services are involved in what may be termed the strategic decision-making system. While in theory the Party provides a mechanism for bringing discipline and order to the state defense complex—and all the key posts in that complex are held by ranking Party members—the Party is at the same time subject to the centrifugal pull of these same interests. A degree of bureaucratism doubtlessly affects Soviet policy, but the development of Soviet strategic power also appears to reflect an important degree of effective central management and coordination. Three decisions in particular may be cited to support this conclusion: Under Khrushchev long-range bomber production was promptly curtailed in accordance with Khrushchev's announced goal of reliance on missiles as the principal strategic delivery system; SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13 deployment was curbed in 1970 as the emphasis was shifted from quantitative to qualitative improvement in Soviet forces; ABM deployment was halted short of the Moscow Treaty limits.

Each of these decisions, made at the expense of short-run improvements in the strategic balance, was a prudent measure designed not to overcommit resources to systems of limited efficiency. Although the parallel development and deployment of the SS-17 and SS-19, two similar systems which were apparently competitive follow-on designs for the SS-11, may be cited as recent examples of a failure in central management of modernization decisions, some overlap may be regarded as part of a rational policy given past technical difficulties in rockets. In any event, the existence of episodes of inefficiency or redundancy in Soviet programs should not obscure the fact that since the mid-1960s the Soviet build-up has reflected a considerable degree of effective central planning and management.

Conclusions

Although each of the images of Soviet strategic policy discussed earlier finds some basis in the record of Soviet conduct, none of the images offers a view of

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Soviet policy that squares neatly with the facts. While ideologically based assumptions about world politics, the influence of military-industrial complexes, etc., have doubtlessly affected Soviet decisions regarding the nuclear competition and the prospects for arms control, the impact of nuclear weapons on Moscow's perceptions of world politics has itself been considerable. Soviet strategic policy can hardly be understood as a policy designed to advance the Soviet position in a zero-sum global struggle with capitalism. Since Khrushchev, doctrine in Moscow has been subjected to a profound revision that not only acknowledges that nuclear weapons render all-out war suicidal but also makes the avoidance of nuclear war with the West an imperative of Soviet policy. Although the pace of the Soviet strategic build-up and the lack of Soviet hesitation in moving to higher levels of strategic power appear to support the view that institutional pressures to arm and the uncontrolled momentum of weapons technology condition Moscow's behavior in the strategic competition, evidence to the contrary also exists. The rate of Soviet modernization appears to have been governed more by the rate at which technological and production problems could be solved than by a consideration of the possibilities of achieving progress in arms control. There is little evidence since 1961 that decisions were made to delay weapons development or deployment in order to encourage restraint in United States-Soviet competition. The record of Soviet conduct, however, also indicates both an important degree of central control over strategic policy and the ability of the political leadership to make important concessions in SALT despite military objections.

Those analyses of Soviet strategic conduct that view the growth of Soviet strategic power as part of a historically conditioned defensive response appear partially correct but inadequate. There are limits to the degree to which Moscow's strategic policy may be viewed as a "historical reflex." To the extent Soviet policy exhibited a historical reflex in the immediate postwar period, that reflex operated to minimize the importance of nuclear forces in favor of a more conventional approach to defending the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's subsequent emphasis on strategic power challenged traditional Soviet military policy. The weight of history is evident in the fact that Moscow continues to view nuclear weapons in terms of traditional defense and in the references to historical lessons regarding the dangers of military obsolescense that accompanied the strategic build-up of the 1960s; nonetheless, the discontinuities of the nuclear age are clearly appreciated in Moscow.

The image of Soviet strategic policy that views Moscow as a prisoner of an international nuclear system reluctantly responding to U.S. actions, rests at the general level upon the fact that the United States led Moscow in the strategic competition prior to 1969. Given Moscow's strategic inferiority, a systemic rationale for a Soviet strategic build-up was clearly present. Moscow in fact decided to step up its program after the U.S. decision in 1961 to seek a large missile force. Since 1969, however, Soviet conduct appears to many observers to call into question explanations of Soviet policy that stress systemic factors. Yet the

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pace of U.S. modernization in the period since SALT has been such that a systemic explanation of Soviet behavior cannot be ruled out.

The recent record of Soviet conduct contains evidence of Moscow's interest in curbing the strategic competition and the leadership's ability to make concessions. The record also suggests that Moscow is willing to bear enormous costs to deploy a large modern arsenal. In the final analysis the nature of Soviet strategic policy, the depth of Moscow's interest in strategic stability, and the ability of the leadership to restrain Soviet strategic programs are likely only to be tested as a result of arduous SALT negotiations in the decade ahead. SALT remains the most reliable test of Moscow's policy, as in Moscow it is likely to be the most reliable test of U.S. policy.

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CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences

STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN

"Covert action" as practiced by the United States Central Intelligence Agency has been defined as "clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not apparent."[1] The CIA has pursued its most substantial African covert actions in Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) and Angola. As the paramilitary, political, and propaganda operation unfolded in Angola in 1975–1976, both U.S. policymakers and distressed African observers were struck by its connection to earlier American intervention in Zaire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggested that Angolan independence was fraught with the same dangers for U.S. security as Zairian independence in 1960: "We cannot ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet build-up of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years."[2] Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele, Jr., discerned "obvious parallels between Soviet efforts to move in on the Congo after independence in

[1] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report: Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Book I, 94th Cong., 2d sess., April 26, 1976, p. 131.

[2] *New York Times*, November 25, 1975, p. 1.

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1960 and Moscow's behavior in Angola today."[3] From another perspective, an editorial in a government-owned newspaper in relatively "pro-Western" Ghana complained: "The U.S. is now fighting tooth and nail to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola from taking the reins of government just as it used Tshombe to destroy Patrice Lumumba in order to prevent his socialist-oriented party from taking power at independence in the Congo."[4]

This essay compares covert action policies in Zaire and Angola and their proximate results in contexts of overt U.S. and Western support, Soviet and other Communist power competition, and indigenous political and economic circumstances. An opportunity for greater breadth of generalization is provided through reference to other well-documented cases of covert action in the Third World.

Elsewhere, I have discussed the more fundamental and long-term consequences of these CIA operations for American interests.[5] In general, I conclude that CIA and U.S. policymakers' fears of massive, long-term foreign Communist influence were misplaced. By political ideology and experience, the "left-nationalist" forces in Zaire and Angola were strongly oriented to independent action. And because of their relative internal strength they had less need to depend on foreign supporters than the opposing "moderate" groups. Furthermore, U.S. hopes that moderates assisted by the CIA would be politically effective and broadly disposed to such objectives as orderly economic growth, social advancement, and some form of representative government, have been consistently disappointed. The upshot has been increasing dependence by the moderates on U.S. and CIA support and growing popular anti-Americanism. Finally, covert action has revealed and intensified divisions between African states, fostering a cumulatively unfavorable impression among the so-called "leftist" or "radical" states and some "moderate" ones to boot. Yet it is increasingly clear that the United States must seek areas of agreement with an economically and militarily interdependent Third World and such residual strains and suspicions can be counterproductive.

René Lemarchand has described the problems posed to social science research by the "murky underworld" of clandestine struggle.[6] My own presentation of specific covert exploits in Zaire and Angola is based on public documents, including recently declassified papers from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, and confidential personal interviews with policymakers and other informed individuals. When referring to interviews I always indicate the general nature of the source. I make no reference to covert action without

[3] U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, *Angola*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., January 29, February 3, 4, 6, 1976, p. 174.

[4] *New York Times*, January 4, 1976, p. 17.

[5] See my chapter in René Lemarchand, ed., *American Foreign Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 383–432.

[6] René Lemarchand, "The CIA in Africa: How Central, How Intelligent?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (September 1976): 401.

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either documentary proof or the testimony of at least two informed diplomatic or other U.S. government officials.

The evidence is inadequate for in-depth analysis of two important issues: executive and congressional review and control of the CIA, and the rationale for choosing covert rather than overt means. In general, the documentary and interview evidence suggests that with a few probable exceptions[7] the major Zairian and Angolan covert actions were known to top executive officials. But there is little information about the process of review, command, and control in the supervisory 40 Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) and its predecessors. As for the choice of covert technology, it is reasonable to infer that several considerations were influential, depending upon the type of covert action and its environment: effectiveness of proceeding secretly, avoidance of diplomatic problems and an open confrontation with the Soviet Union, and evasion of domestic political accountability.[8]

Covert Action in Zaire

On June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo received its independence under a democratic coalition government headed by the militant nationalist, Patrice Lumumba. "Shortly thereafter," Lawrence Devlin arrived in Leopoldville to assume his duties as chief of the CIA station in the American embassy.[9] Within a few weeks he was deeply involved in an effort to overthrow the government and assassinate some of its top officials, the first of a series of covert action and related "intelligence" programs that would continue into the 1970s.

Soon after independence the Congolese army mutinied; Belgian troops reoccupied part of the country, helping to organize the secession of the Katanga province; and Prime Minister Lumumba and Chief of State Joseph Kasavubu called in United Nations forces to help reorganize the army and remove the Belgians. The United Nations, however, delayed in replacing the Belgian troops and refused to move decisively against the Katanga secession. This policy received crucial backing from the Republican Eisenhower administration which shared Belgium's vision of conservative order and was disposed to follow NATO leads in black Africa. As secessionist and political pressures encouraged by Belgium mounted against his government, Lumumba threatened to dispense

[7] These include: the CIA assassination plot against Congo Prime Minister Lumumba in 1960–61; the temporary use of American CIA personnel as pilots in the Congo civil war of 1964 (see Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974], pp. 229–230); and the presence of American CIA paramilitary advisers in the Angolan civil war of 1975–76. The first and last cases are discussed below.

[8] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 50, 156–57; see also Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, pp. 20, 37, 40.

[9] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 1975, p. 14.

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with the U.N. force except for sympathetic African left-nationalist contingents and to invade Katanga with Afro-Asian and Soviet military assistance.

In the view of U.S. policymakers, Lumumba's persistent, emotional, and shifting pleas for outside help against Belgium revealed his "personal instability" which the Soviet Union came to exploit through "leftist," "anti-white," "Communist," and "Pro-Communist" advisers in the prime minister's entourage.[10] Referring to incidents in which elements of the Congolese army arrested Belgian and U.N. personnel, Ambassador Clare Timberlake warned:

> If the U.N. does not immediately act to take the army out of Government control . . . most of the handful of Europeans still in Leopoldvile will leave and the remainder would be some foreign embassy personnel, Communist agents and carpetbaggers. We are convinced that the foregoing is the Communist plan. Lumumba, [Minister of Information] Kashamura, Ghanaian Ambassador Djin and [Chief of Protocol] Madame Blouin are all anti-white and the latter is a Communist. So are their Guinean advisers. Our latest arrival [French press secretary] Serge Michel of the [Algerian National Liberation Front] is even more in the Commie camp and anti-Western. They seem to have no trouble urging Lumumba further down roads which his own instincts direct him at least part of the way.[11]

The State Department noted that Lumumba "was receiving advice and encouragement not only from Guinean and other African leftists but also from European Communists and of course from the Soviet and other Communist representatives in Leopoldville."[12] (Yet two of the most distrusted counselors, Press Secretary Michel and Ambassador Djin, opposed Lumumba's later decision to accept Soviet aid!)

On August 18th, Devlin cabled CIA headquarters:

> Embassy and Station believe Congo experiencing classic Communist takeover Government. . . . Whether or not Lumumba actually Commie or just playing Commie game to assist his solidifying power, anti-west forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left in which take action to avoid another Cuba.[13]

At a National Security Council meeting the same day, Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon remarked, "If the U.N. were forced out, we might be faced with a situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo," and further observed that Lumumba "was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets." President Eisenhower exhibited acute concern that "one man supported by the Soviets" could threaten the U.N. operation, and one top aide in

[10] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 81–83.

[11] L.D. Battle for Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, The White House, memorandum, "Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis," March 9, 1961, p. 25, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Mass. [hereafter NSF-JFKPL].

[12] Ibid.

[13] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 14. Although this report uses a pseudonym for Devlin, and identifies him only as a "station officer," it is clear from the context that he is the chief of station. On Devlin, see Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 95–96; 97n.; 138.

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attendance remembered the president seeming to issue an assassination order. In any event, other forms of covert action were apparently approved since CIA headquarters on the following day authorized the station "to proceed with operation" (to replace Lumumba "with pro-Western group") and the resulting activities were discussed August 25 at a meeting of the NSC Special Group which oversees CIA covert actions.[14]

The CIA station quickly undertook "covert operations through certain labor groups" and "the planned attempt to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba" in the Congolese senate. After August 25 when the Special Group agreed at Eisenhower's behest that "planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba," a series of assassination plots were encouraged, developed, and put into effect.[15] If any additional impetus were necessary, news arrived on August 26 that an estimated 100 Soviet bloc technicians in the Congo would soon be joined by ten IL-18 Soviet transport planes to be used in a planned central government invasion of Katanga.[16]

Unfortunately, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence *Interim Report: Alleged Assassinations Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* ignores, save for a few unanalyzed suggestions, CIA political action programs against Lumumba and his followers in the fall and winter of 1960 and the role of Congolese leaders financed by the United States with respect to assassination. As I have shown elsewhere, there is strong circumstantial evidence of a U.S. role in the Kasavubu *coup* of September 5 against Lumumba; and there are the direct testimonies of a U.S. diplomat on the scene as well as two former U.S. officials that the CIA was involved in the decisive Mobutu *coup* of September 14.[17] A recently declassified State Department "Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis" seems generally confirmatory: "Planning, of an operational nature, dealt with covert activities to bring about the overthrow of Lumumba and install a pro-Western Government . . . (Operations under this plan were gradually put into effect by CIA.)"[18] Two reliable U.S. diplomatic sources have now confirmed that the Special Group authorized payment to Kasavubu shortly before his *coup*. This certainly casts light upon the Senate assassinations report's observation that, on the day following Kasavubu's initiative, two CIA officers approached "a high level Congolese politician to warn him of the Lumumba danger," offer assistance "in preparation of a new government program" and provide assurances that the United States "would supply technicians."[19]

Several American and foreign diplomats agree that Colonel Joseph Mobutu and his "Binza Group" of political allies (including Foreign Minister Bomboko,

[14] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, pp. 55–58; 15.
[15] Ibid., pp. 60, 15.
[16] "Analytical Chronology," pp. 26–27.
[17] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 88–98.
[18] "Analytical Chronology," p. 30.
[19] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 17.

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Finance Commissioner Ndele, and security chiefs Nendaka and Kandolo) constituted a compact and frequently cooperative vehicle of CIA funds and counsel.[20] As the State Department Chronology relates:

> The UAR and Ghana were not the only ones to pump money [in their case to the Lumumbists] into the political picture. By mid-November, U.S. activities on the political scene in Leopoldville were of sizeable proportions and may have been fairly conspicuous . . .
>
> Ambassador Timerlake and the representatives of another Agency [clearly the CIA] had intensive discussions with Kasavubu, Mobutu, Ileo, Bomboko, Adoula, Bolikango and others . . . [Timberlake cabled] "I hope the Department is not assuming from a few modest successes that the Embassy has Kasavubu, Mobutu, or any other Congolese 'in the pocket.' While we have consistently endeavored through counsel and advice to guide moderate elements along a reasonable path, they rarely consult us voluntarily regarding their prospective moves . . ."
>
> [U.N. Representative Rajeshwar Dayal] in an interview with the New York Times correspondent (not printed) broadly implied that he knew the U.S. was financing Mobutu . . .
>
> [U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold] told the American Ambassador to the U.N. it would be most helpful particularly if we could put some "fire" into Kasavubu [to help in forming a new government acceptable to parliament] so long as we could do it "delicately" and not "visibly" and so long as we "put nothing in his pocket"—an apparent reference to U.S. "covert" activities in Leopoldville.[21]

Among the "modest successes" of the Americans were the frustration of African and Congolese efforts to reconcile Kasavubu and Lumumba, and efforts by Congolese "moderates" to expand the base of Mobutu's regime.[22]

Leaders who were financed and counseled by the CIA also seem to have gone along with more forceful entreaties although their role has been obscured by the Senate Select Committee's report on the alleged assassinations of foreign leaders. The latter notes that Devlin "warned a key Congolese leader" about coup plotting by Lumumba and two of his supporters, and "urged arrest or other more permanent disposal of Lumumba, Gizenga, and Mulele"[23]—a good example of the linkage between CIA "intelligence" and "covert action" programs. But it fails to mention that Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga was in fact arrested by Mobutu and a decision was made to transfer him to his bitter enemies in Katanga. At the last minute he was released by sympathetic U.N. troops from Ghana.[24] Similarly, Devlin is portrayed as an "adviser" to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba on the day after Mobutu's coup. But there

[20] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, p. 109.

[21] "Analytical Chronology," pp. 46–47, 57–58.

[22] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 91–95; "Analytical Chronology," p. 57; Memorandum for Mr. Ralph Dungan, The White House, "Supplement: January 20 to March 6, 1961 to Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis," March 11, 1961, p. 1, NSF-JFKPL.

[23] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 18.

[24] G. Heinz and H. Donnay, *Lumumba: The Last Fifty Days* (New York: Grove Press, 1969), pp. 23–24, 61–62; see also "Analytical Chronology," p. 38 which refers to Gizenga's release by U.N. Moroccan troops.

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is no indication in the Senate report that Lumumba was arrested on the following day; he managed to escape his captors.[25]

In late November Lumumba left U.N. protective custody to try and return to his political base at Stanleyville. The CIA station worked with the Mobutu government to set up road blocks and alert troops to possible escape routes. After Lumumba's capture it appeared that the troops guarding him might mutiny and thereby return him to power, so he was transferred to Katanga where he was murdered, probably on the evening of January 17 or 18.[26]

The authors of the assassinations report failed to consider this powerful context of CIA political action and influence in reaching their conclusion that:

> Despite the fact that [Devlin] knew of a [government] plan to deliver Lumumba into the hands of his enemies at a time when the CIA was convinced that "drastic steps" were necessary to prevent Lumumba's return to power, there is no evidence of CIA involvement in this plan or in bringing about the death of Lumumba in Katanga.[27]

The CIA was subsidizing and advising (with "modest" success) the top Congolese leadership that decided to transfer Lumumba. It was a "Congolese government leader" who voluntarily informed Devlin of the plan. The CIA had been working with some of its political protégés—as well as other Congolese and a European—from August through November in efforts to assassinate or abduct Lumumba.[28] Its recommendation for "permanent disposal" of Lumumba's deputy had been followed by his arrest and a Congolese government decision to deliver him to his "bitterest enemies" in Katanga. Given this background of covert political influence including specific assassination plots, the CIA's failure to question its clients' plan to dispose of Lumumba must have appeared as an expression of tacit consent. In any case it is hard to avoid the judgment that it represented a definite complicity in murder.

Overt diplomacy made an essential contribution to the success of covert operations in this period. The United Nations controlled potentially decisive military and financial resources in Leopoldville. But its dependence upon American economic, political, logistic, and administrative support ensured these trumps would be used either directly in behalf of American objectives or indirectly in the manner of benign neutrality. Thus U.N. Representative Andrew Cordier did not discourage Kasavubu from his CIA-supported *coup* and probably gave it a decisive boost by closing the airports and radio station, preventing Lumumba from mobilizing his supporters. Having invoked the shibboleth of "law and order" this time, the United Nations fell silent and remained impassive when its military protégé, Mobutu, pulled off another CIA *coup* several days later. Although certain political and administrative changes en-

[25] Heinz and Donnay, *Lumumba*, pp. 22–23; "Analytical Chronology," p. 37; Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 17.

[26] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, pp. 48–49; Heinz and Donnay, *Lumumba*, pp. 69–78; 145–46.

[27] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Assassination Plots*, p. 49.

[28] Ibid., pp. 49, 16–48.

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abled the United Nations to assume a more evenhanded stance in the following weeks (for example, it offered protective custody to Lumumba before his escape and capture), it nevertheless gave considerable *de facto* support to the United States-sponsored Mobutu regime.[29]

The advent of the Democratic Kennedy administration did not bring any lessening of concern about Soviet exploitation of the Lumumbist movement. After all, Gizenga had set up a regime in Stanleyville that received financial and political support from the Soviet Union and United Arab Republic. But the Kennedy administration had more confidence than its predecessor in the perseverance of civilian moderates and it possessed a new sensitivity to African relations. It decided to bring about a legal parliamentary regime under Cyrille Adoula that would absorb Gizenga and his allies, and gradually to move the United Nations and reluctant NATO allies to deal with Katangan secession. Covert CIA and U.N. bribery of parliamentarians during the conference which eventually selected Adoula has been confirmed by a member of the American embassy and several unofficial sources, and received the following tribute in a CIA memorandum in President Kennedy's files: "The U.N. and the United States, in closely coordinated activities, played essential roles in this significant success over Gizenga." This document also revealed the CIA program for Adoula as of November 1961:

> The [State] Department, in conjunction with other branches of the Government [clearly the CIA] is endeavoring to help Adoula improve his political base of support and enhance his domestic power and stature. This activity is in the areas of political organization with connected trade union and youth groups, public relations and security apparatus.[30]

The propaganda component appears to have surfaced in mid-1964 when the Angolan leader, Jonas Savimbi, then resident in Leopoldvile, revealed the presence of an American public relations adviser named Muller in Adoula's office.[31] The prime minister's key political supporters, the Binza group, continued to receive CIA subsidies according to several diplomatic sources. In addition, political action funds were used to keep parliament in line and to launch RADECO, a pro-Adoula political party. Another example of uses of "intelligence" for "covert action" was provided by the CIA's discovery of a plot to assassinate Mobutu. The information was passed on to Mobutu whose gratitude was said to make him more receptive to CIA suggestions.[32]

Again conventional diplomacy was a crucial backdrop for covert action to stabilize a pro-Western regime. American support enabled the U.N. force to

[29] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 87–109.

[30] CIA memorandum, "Congo: United States Assistance to Adoula Against Gizenga," n.d., pp. 1–3, NSF-JFKPL. A CIA-embassy planned "psychological" campaign is referred to in Leopoldville to Secretary of State, October 2, 1961, NSF-JFKPL.

[31] Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 239–240.

[32] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 109, 208, 210.

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subdue Katanga secession, bringing new financial means and nationalist prestige to Adoula's government. U.S. economic aid, at first through voluntary contributions to the United Nations, then bilaterally, greatly increased the government's resources. A military assistance program of equipment and training started in 1963, in conjunction with Belgium and Italy. The American ambassador and U. N. representative took the lead in urging Adoula to purge his cabinet of Gizenga and remove him from the political scene (the Lumumbist leader had left the capital and remained in Stanleyville to reestablish his political base). The United Nations would collaborate in his arrest.[33]

After the subjugation of Katanga, Afro-Asian support for a U. N. military presence in the Congo flagged and the operation was phased out by mid-1964. Reacting against an increasingly narrow ethno-political regime, Lumumbist rebels—encouraged by Soviet and Chinese diplomats (including intelligence operatives) in neighboring countries—quickly spread across half the country and threatened the capital.

During the Johnson administration, the CIA conducted a major paramilitary campaign against the Kwilu and eastern rebellions for nearly four years. Covert action and planning focused mainly on direct combat operations and were coordinated with overt U.S. and Belgian military assistance in the areas of equipment and support functions. Thus in early 1964 a CIA front organization in Miami furnished Cuban exile pilots to the Congo government to fly armed Italian T-6 training planes against "Mulelist" insurgents in the western Kwilu Province. (The government had no pilots of its own.) In the spring, rebel advances in the east led to the dispatch of six U.S. Department of Defense T-28 fighter planes armed with rockets and machine guns, ten C-47 military transport planes, six H-21 heavy-duty helicopters, vehicle spare parts, 100 "military technicians" to show the Congolese how to operate and maintain their new equipment, and "several" counterinsurgency advisers for Congolese commanders. While Belgium sent pilots and maintenance personnel for the *noncombat* aircraft, the CIA obtained additional Cubans to fly the T-28 *fighters* under station supervision.[34] Following the fall of Stanleyville to the rebels in August, Secretary of State Dean Rusk approved an "immediate effort . . . to concert with [the] Belgians to help Tshombe [who had just replaced Adoula as prime minister with the backing of Kasavubu and the Binza group] raise gendarme-mercenary force along with bolstering whatever force there is to hold present strong points and to start rebel roll back."[35] Again the interdependent overt-

[33] Ibid., ch. 5 and pp. 204–207; G. Mennen Williams to George C. McGhee, "Steps Against Gizenga," December 12, 1961, Williams Papers, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter WP-NA]; Leopoldville to Department of State, December 23, 1961 and January 16, 19, 26, 1962; and Department of State to Leopoldville, January 12, 1962, NSF-JFKPL.

[34] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 226–230; Cyrus Vance to W. Averell Harriman, April 20, 1964, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter NSF-LBJPL].

[35] G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, memorandum, "A New and Longer Term Approach to the Congo," August 7, 1964 (with Addenda August 10, 1964), p. 1, WP-NA.

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covert pattern of support appeared. Four American C-130 military transports with full crews and parachutist "guard" arrived in Leopoldville, along with four or five B-26 bombers, ground vehicles, arms and ammunition. The Belgians also supplied equipment as well as 300 to 400 officers who assumed background roles of command and logistic support. Nearly all this overt assistance was in behalf of a 700-man force of South African, Rhodesian, and European mercenaries that did much of the fighting as "spearheads" of selected government troops. CIA Station Chief Benjamin Hilton Cushing told the Belgian commander that he was prepared to subsidize Tshombe's entire mercenary recruitment if hard currency were lacking (it was not). The agency did supply more Cuban pilots for the B-26s which joined the rest of the CIA air force in support of the mercenary advance.[36] (By January 1965, two additional T-28s were operating in the Congo as were three or four more B-26s apparently provided by Intermountain Aviation, a CIA proprietary.)[37]

As certain African countries began to ship arms to the rebels across Lake Tanganyika with apparent promises of Soviet replacement, the CIA engaged pilots and crews, reportedly South African, for patrol boat operations. A CIA front organization, Western International Ground Maintenance Organization (WIGMO) chartered in Lichtenstein, handled maintenance for the boats as well as the fighter planes with a staff of 50 to 100 Europeans.[38] The WIGMO mechanics and maintenance personnel enabled U.S. and Belgian military personnel to escape direct association with air and sea combat operations; they also represented an attempt by the CIA to get away from its increasingly visible Cuban connections.[39] Yet the CIA also formed a force of 17 to 18 Cubans for a possible operation to rescue U.S. diplomatic hostages, including CIA personnel, in Stanleyville. This objective was achieved on November 24, 1964, when U.S. C-130s dropped Belgian paratroops on the city. At that moment, the Cubans were accompanying a mercenary force just hours away, and prepared to act if the airdrop was canceled.[40]

By mid-1966 there were said to be 12 Cuban aviators and 100 other WIGMO personnel in the Congo,[41] but the paramilitary campaign ended, according to Special Group member Cyrus Vance, around mid-1967.[42] However, in July 1967 a mutiny of white mercenaries against the government raised a new threat of dismemberment and dangerous instability. Three C-130s with "sup-

[36] Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 239–243; Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1967* (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques [C.R.I.S.P.], 1969), p. 355; Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1965* (Brussels: C.R.I.S.P., 1966), p. 291.

[37] Leopoldville to Department of State, January 11, 1965, NSF-LBJPL.

[38] C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1965*, p. 248; *Congo 1966* (Brussels: C.R.I.S.P., 1967), p. 37; *Congo 1967*, pp. 350, 362, 510; *New York Times*, April 26, 1966, pp. 1, 30.

[39] For evidence of increasing Cuban visibility, see Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, p. 230, n. 47.

[40] Ibid., pp. 246–252.

[41] C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1967*, p. 362.

[42] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 155–56.

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porting personnel" were rushed in to fly armored cars and troops to battle. But senior congressmen, fearing a new Vietnam, forced President Johnson to withdraw two of the planes in August and the third in December.[43] Johnson also issued an order that the United States "would not again get so involved in Africa except out of the most overwhelming necessity."[44] Still, according to a high State Department official and another diplomatic source, the temptations of covert action were strong enough to sanction a return of several Cuban combat pilots to the Congo in late 1967.

On the political action side, say reliable diplomatic sources, the CIA continued to assist the Binza group during the Tshombe era (1964–65). In view of a constitution that vested great power in the president's office, there was increasing competition between Prime Minister Tshombe and President Kasavubu, both of whom looked forward to a future presidency. The Americans were "concerned" when Kasavubu sought "an opening to the left" by dismissing Tshombe and appointing a government ready to consider not only the dismissal of mercenaries, but also the recognition of Communist China and improved relations with left-nationalist African states.[45] According to three informed individuals—a U.S. official then in Washington, a Western diplomatic Congo specialist, and an American businessman who talked with the returned CIA man, Devlin—the CIA was at least "involved" in the second Mobutu *coup* of November 25, 1965.

As the CIA-assisted repression succeeded, Mobutu began to consolidate his political and financial hold. Trained Congolese pilots started returning from European military schools. There seemed to be a decreasing need for covert action. A U.S. diplomat whose information has always proved reliable states that CIA political action payments to Mobutu ceased "at the end of the 1960s." Still, according to a State Department official and a foreign diplomat in Zaire, the agency was in charge of training Mobutu's personal bodyguard "during the 1970s." The diplomat personally observed that the CIA station chief, James Kim, continued to furnish Mobutu with "intelligence" regarding both African and internal political developments, and "tried to influence him" partly through such contacts as Dr. William Close, an American citizen who was Mobutu's long-time personal physician and political counselor. A 1967 White House memorandum referred to Close's letter to President Johnson "commending" him on his decision to send C-130s to the Congo that summer. It noted that Close "exercises considerable influence on President Mobutu, has been used by him as

[43] *New York Times*, August 3, 1967, pp. 1–2; Lyndon B. Johnson to Richard B. Russell and J.W. Fulbright, December 16, 1967, White House Central Files, LBJPL.

[44] Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 120.

[45] G. Mennen Williams to Robert W. Komer, The White House, memorandum, "Congo Situation," November 16, 1965, WP-NA; G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, briefing memorandum, "Congo Leopoldville's Position on Chinese Admission to the U.N.," October 26, 1965, WP-NA; Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence (CIA), intelligence memorandum, "The Situation in the Congo," August 26, 1965, NSF-LBJPL; C.R.I.S.P., *Congo 1965*, pp. 388–406.

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an emissary on many occasions, and has always been helpful and cooperative with our Embassy at Kinshasa."[46]

By 1975 when the political crisis in neighboring Angola exploded, the rationale for American support of Mobutu was no longer confined to the dangers of Soviet subversion in Zaire and its consequences for other African countries. As the deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs explained at a Senate hearing:

> Despite temporary aberrations [Zaire] has been a good friend to the United States. . . . We do have . . . a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu. At a time when our aid and advice were critical to the development of Zaire, he was good enough—and I might say wise enough—to accept our suggestions and our counsel to the great profit of the state. . . . [There is] a basic commonality of attitudes and policies in foreign affairs [between our two countries].[47]

Given such outstanding reliability Secretary of State Kissinger was reportedly "banking" on Mobutu "to oppose Moscow's interests" in Africa generally and "to further Washington's interests in various international forums"—particularly those where the United States was being assailed by Third World forces.[48] Since Zaire was to bear much of the burden of anticommunism in Africa and moderation in the Third World, a high State Department official noted "a thrust" in Washington to bolster the country "in the hope that it could extend its hegemony throughout the continent."[49] In the same vein, CIA Director William Colby designated Zaire "a future regional big power."[50] The Republican administration was also sensitive to growing U.S. economic interests in Zaire including over $200 million in direct private investment with more planned, and a deepening involvement on the part of private and public creditors. Of concern to the United States, remarked the deputy assistant secretary, "are not only Zaire's stability and development but also the security of three-quarters of a billion dollars in U.S. investments, loans, and contracts and our access on favorable terms to Zaire's mineral resources."[51] For all these reasons the United States rushed to Mobutu's aid in 1975 when copper prices and government revenues fell, debt repayment problems with U.S. and foreign creditors arose, popular discontent with a corrupt, irresponsible regime became increasingly overt, and Mobutu worried about the presence and example of a postcolonial, leftist regime in neighboring Angola. Abandoning its "low profile" in Africa, the administration provided more than $100 million in overt aid (nearly $30

[46] John P. Walsh to Walt W. Rostow, The White House, memorandum, "Reply to Letter from Dr. Close to President Johnson," August 25, 1967, White House Central Files, LBJPL.

[47] U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1975, pp. 3, 32–33.

[48] *New York Times*, September 25, 1975, p. 1 and October 16, 1975, p. 2.

[49] Ibid.; January 4, 1976, 4: 2.

[50] Leslie Gelb, "Should We Play Dirty Tricks in the World?" *New York Times Magazine*, December 21, 1975, p. 15.

[51] Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Security Assistance*, p. 3.

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million in military sales credits; $21.5 million in security supporting assistance for fiscal year 1976 and the transitional quarter; about $29 million in Food for Peace and Commodity Credit Corporation loans for fiscal year 1976; and a $20 million Export-Import Bank loan in process), and played an active role in the rescheduling of Zaire's foreign debt.[52] Covertly, one reason for the surprising CIA operation in Angola was to boost psychologically the Zairian regime, as we shall see later. It remained to be seen whether, in light of Mobutu's continuing precariousness, the Carter administration would expand CIA programs in behalf of either Mobutu or a replacement team. Ironically, Lawrence Devlin was now back on the scene as the American representative of U.S. businessman Maurice Templesman—a major supporter and beneficiary of Mobutu's regime. Devlin had risen to the top of the CIA's clandestine Africa Division before finding his upward mobility in the agency stalled. According to diplomatic sources, Mobutu relies upon him to make contacts with U.S. officials at moments of "misunderstanding" or strain between the two countries, and considers him a "second CIA" to keep an eye on the first one in the event of changing U.S. policies.

As we have seen, CIA covert operations and interrelated overt diplomacy played essential roles in the triumph of American-approved leadership. After 1967 they continued to sustain the Zairian government. Even though their immediate impact was probably not decisive, their retrospective and potential influence was undoubtedly intimidating. By 1975 Mobutu's external fears (and hegemonial ambitions)[53] and his internal difficulties had provoked an escalation of U.S. support that again threatened to become the arbiter of Zaire's political destiny.

Yet even this heavy external involvement might not have been sufficient had the Lumumbist opposition been more effective and its external supporters more vigorous. Lumumbism in its various guises was the most popular political force in Zaire during the early 1960s. While it has not been possible to take a public opinion poll in recent years, a serious potential for left-nationalist politics remains in various forms: a small, persistent rebel stronghold in the eastern Fizi-Baraka region (Popular Revolutionary party); the presence of ex-Katanga soldiers in Angola, reportedly radicalized by the Popular Movement of Angolan Liberation (MPLA) which recruited them when Zairian troops intervened in the Angola civil war; the emergence of certain military officers with "progressive" views; and, above all, the increasingly overt expression of popular discontent. But the Lumumbists had difficulty in creating a reasonably unified political movement. While fomenting rebellion during the 1960s, they were unable to overcome political, ethnic, and social divisions to forge a strong, modern organization for revolutionary warfare, although the Kwilu Mulelists, Popular

[52] Figures obtained from the Zaire desk of the Agency for International Development (U.S.), Washington, D.C., February 1977; see also Emma Rothschild, "The Politics of Debt," *New York Review of Books*, June 24, 1976.

[53] For influence in Angola and especially in oil-rich Cabinda Province.

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Revolutionary party, and later perhaps the ex-Katanga soldiers in Angola progressed further along these lines.[54] Also, considering the scale of U.S., U.N., and Belgian involvement only the Soviet Union among the pro-Lumumbist powers had the capacity to bring to bear an effective external counterweight. But the Soviets assigned Africa a low strategic priority, and until June 1964 African support of the United Nations operation presented serious political and logistic obstacles to a unilateral Soviet role. Furthermore, the Soviets were skeptical about the trustworthiness and political effectiveness of some of their newfound Zairian friends. For example, in October 1961 the American embassy reported to Washington: "There is evidence some disillusionment among Communist bloc and neutralists with Gizenga's force and effectiveness." The embassy also communicated this piece of relevant evidence:

> Canadian [Consul General] Gauvin whom we have found to be accurate well-informed colleague showed Embassy officer today telegram reporting ninety minute conversation with Canadian Charge Rahman who has represented Soviet interests Congo since expulsion Soviet diplomats. Rahman indicated Communists have given up Gizenga as third rate theorist.[55]

In 1965, even Ché Guevara and his band of more than 100 Cubans in the Eastern Congo were said to be disillusioned with the rebel forces.[56]

Covert Action in Angola

Until 1975 Portugal refused to follow in the path of peaceful European decolonization of black Africa. President Salazar told the American ambassador in 1961 that the "only nationalism" in Angola and Mozambique "was Portuguese, deriving from centuries of close association with Portugal."[57] This dogma was enforced by the suppression of any political activity that seemed to have a modern, African nationalist tone.

Influenced in part by the achievement of independence in the neighboring ex-Belgian Congo, various clandestine Angolan movements participated in the violent revolts of February and March 1961 in Luanda, the capital, and the northern section of the country. The Portuguese responded to these poorly prepared uprisings with a veritable blood bath. However, as we have seen, the liberal Kennedy administration had decided to fight the cold war with a new emphasis upon Afro-Asian sentiment. Thus the United States voted for the March 1961 U.N. resolution calling for self-determination in Portuguese Africa.

[54] On the Mulelists, see Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, pp. 215–17. The judgments about the Popular Revolutionary party and Katangan soldiers are based on interviews with U.S. diplomats and scholarly observers.

[55] Leopoldville to Department of State, October 14, 1961, NSF-JFKPL.

[56] Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1974), p. 139.

[57] Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 15, 1961, NSF-JFKPL.

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In July Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams exhorted his colleagues:

> Angola has become for much of the world, as Berlin is for Europe, the center of the great battle between freedom and oppression. . . . Angola in the eyes of much of the world is the test case of America's commitment to freedom. . . . The unacceptable alternative is to temporize and see Soviet Communism come on the scene as the spurious and cynical champion of "freedom" for Portuguese Africa.[58]

With National Security Action Memorandum No. 60 of July 14, 1961, the United States launched a quiet diplomatic campaign, including promises of economic aid, to persuade Portugal to institute reforms leading "eventually to self-determination."[59] Military assistance and sales to Portugal were restricted to materials filling "actual needs of Portuguese NATO forces remaining in Europe," and commercial arms export licenses were screened for items "not clearly for NATO needs." Overt support for the Angolans themselves included an emergency food and humanitarian assistance program for the estimated 125,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire and a preuniversity training program for Portuguese Africans at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania.[60] By May 1963 the latter had provided scholarships to twenty-four students, nine of whom were Angolan.[61] Finally, as Secretary Kissinger acknowledged, the United States soon began to supply covert "financial, nonmilitary aid" through the CIA to Holden Roberto, the leader of an Angolan political movement based in Zaire.[62] As early as April 1961 the American embassy in Leopoldville was in close contact with Roberto. When the Portuguese foreign minister privately accused "U.S. services" of being involved with "Portugal's enemies," the State Department ordered the embassy "to initiate no further contacts with Roberto unless otherwise instructed," although he still could be seen at his own request.[63] For Secretary of State Rusk, Roberto came to represent the "moderate" alternative to the opposing "de Andrade extremist group tied to Moscow."[64]

In contrast with Zaire, overt support for America's favorites was limited by the persistence of colonialism and the military importance of a Portuguese air

[58] *Report of the Chairman of the Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa*, July 4, 1961, pp. 1–3, NSF-JFKPL.

[59] L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, The White House, memorandum, "Task Force on Portuguese Africa: Chairman's Report on Actions Taken," July 31, 1961; Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 15, 1961, p. 3; both in NSF-JFKPL.

[60] L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, "Chairman's Report"; Robert S. McNamara for the President, memorandum, "Portuguese Use of Military Equipment in Angola," August 25, 1961; William H. Brubeck for McGeorge Bundy, memorandum, "Report on Lincoln University African Student Center at the Conclusion of Its First Year," July 16, 1962; all in NSF-JFKPL.

[61] G. Mennen Williams to W. Averell Harriman, May 2, 1963, p. 3, WP-NA.

[62] Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, p. 8.

[63] Lisbon to Secretary of State, May 1, 1961; Department of State to Lisbon and Leopoldville, May 10, 1961; Lisbon to Secretary of State, May 20, 1961; all in NSF-JFKPL.

[64] U.S., Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Angola," April 3, 1962 (U.S. and Brazilian officials), p. 2, NSF-JFKPL.

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base to the United States. The diplomatic effort rapidly ebbed, leaving covert action an isolated and ineffective strand of U.S. policy. Already in December 1961 Assistant Secretary Williams was complaining that "the importance to the United States position of the Azores Air Base" had resulted in "too great constraints" against "a full and open statement of our arms policy towards Portugal," and protesting "our inability to hold a 'press backgrounder' on Angola" and "[the] witholding [of] public mention of our Lincoln University training program."[65] By mid-1963 Williams observed that, "responding to Portuguese sensitivities . . . we have softened our approach during the past year."[66] This was evident in the failure to maintain a consistent and anticolonial position at the United Nations, to "expand modestly" on "the very limited contacts we have with Portuguese Africans," and to "give assistance to Portuguese African refugees and students."[67] Roberto himself wrote to President Kennedy in December 1962 complaining about these developments.[68]

With Portugal steadfast and the United States fainthearted, Roberto depended increasingly upon the hospitality and assistance of the Zairian government. Of course top Zairian leaders were on the CIA payroll and their relationship with Roberto could only be enhanced by the sense of a common benefactor. But the Zairians also had independent interests of their own. For instance, Prime Minister Adoula was a close friend of Roberto and worried that the Angolan would be "pushed aside by less moderate [forces]" and Adoula would "find himself with [a] Communist-oriented government in exile" in Zaire.[69] Apparently acting on its own initiative, Zaire permitted Roberto's Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) to send men and material over the Angolan border and established a training base at Kinkuzu where Algerian-trained Angolans instructed the GRAE army, which was supplied with Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan weaponry.[70] According to Professor John Marcum, Adoula even financed Roberto out of his own funds when necessary.[71] Zaire's decision in 1963 to recognize the GRAE as the sole legitimate Angolan nationalist movement seems to have been taken against the advice of Assistant Secretary Williams and the American embassy. At this moment the State Department was encouraged by the efforts of the Soviet-assisted MPLA "extremists" to diversify their international backing:

> U.S. has been under impression GRAE and Roberto represented a pro-Western stand in resistance movement. . . . MPLA has received Communist support and has some Communist sympathizers in it. However in the last ten months some extreme leftists have

[65] G. Mennen Williams to Walt Rostow, December 13, 1961, pp. 1-2, WP-NA.
[66] G. Mennen Williams to W. Averell Harriman, May 2, 1963, p. 1, WP-NA.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Holden Roberto to the President, December 19, 1962, NSF-JFKPL.
[69] Stanleyville to Department of State, March 28, 1964, p. 2, NSF-LBJPL.
[70] G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, December 18, 1963, WP-NA; John Marcum, "Three Revolutions," *Africa Report* 12 (November 1967): 9-10.
[71] John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 1, *The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 259.

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> been removed. Recent expulsion da Cruz and Migueis and Neto visit U.S. and Western Europe last year indicate MPLA seeking contacts with West. U.S. policy is rpt [sic] not to discourage MPLA (Neto-Andrade faction) move toward West and not to choose between these movements. Difficult to assess degree of support each group has in Angola [and] how flexible groups would be in dealing with Portuguese.[72]

The Department was also concerned that Zairian recognition would lead to a diplomatic break between Zaire and Portugal and prevent "meaningful talks" between the Portuguese and their nationalist opponents.[73]

The inadequacy of a largely covert, financial, and nonmilitary U.S. role was underlined at the end of the year when Roberto appeared to the American embassy in Leopoldville to be "considering basic reorientation Angolan nationalist policy in favor closer cooperation with Communist bloc."[74] Roberto's labor adviser, Carlos Kassel, approached embassy officers with the information that:

> Since Roberto's recent return from New York he had found him changed man . . . completely disillusioned with western, and specifically U.S. policy on Angola. He was convinced that the U.S. would never jeopardize its military ties with Portugal and that, in last analysis, it was U.S. military aid to Portuguese that enabled them to hold Angola.[75]

At Kenya independence ceremonies in Nairobi, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi was supposed to have offered Roberto "large-scale military aid," and a visit to Peking by a GRAE delegation was envisioned. Kassel himself was instructed to "establish contact" with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.[76] At this point, the Zairian authorities themselves came under attack by Chinese-encouraged rebels, and "indicated their concern re Chicom [Chinese Communists] involvement with Angolan nationalists, and stated that Chicom technicians would not be welcome in [Zaire]."[77] Yet the United States and Zaire remained concerned that Roberto "might soon be ousted by extremists . . . mortgaging their future to the Communists," and ultimately reaching "a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one."[78]

Given the constraints on overt diplomacy and the liberals' preference for nonviolent nationalism, Williams could only suggest, in May 1964, that new and expanded covert political action programs be launched in Angola and Mozambique. The assistant secretary's proposal seems, in retrospect, to have been

[72] Department of State Circular to All African Posts, July 4, 1963; July 17, 1963; both in NSF-JFKPL.

[73] Department of State Circular to All African Posts, July 4, 1963, p. 2, NSF-JFKPL.

[74] Leopoldville to Department of State, December 30, 1963, p. 1, NSF-LBJPL.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Department of State to Lisbon, January 17, 1964, p. 5, NSF-LBJPL.

[78] G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, "Portuguese African Territories: Action Memorandum," April 29, 1964, p. 1, NSF-LBJPL.

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rooted in some wishful thinking which failed to take account of the difference between Portuguese and other European colonialisms in Africa:

> We believe that the nationalists should alter their present [violent] tactics and concentrate their energies, with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This organization should be based on non-racial principles. . . . Inside the territories [it should conduct] political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination.
>
> The difficulties involved inside the territories are not underestimated: how to reorient the whole strategy and tactics of an organization which until now has been patterned on the Algerian rebellion and has concentrated on violence; how to overcome the insistence of extremist and pro-Communist elements to step up terrorism; how to organize an effective, resourceful, secret and extensive underground network; how to undertake strikes and other public demonstrations in the face of the ubiquitous and ruthless Portuguese secret police; how to obtain widespread public support in the face of fear of retaliation against the civilan population, etc.
>
> Nevertheless, violence has paid off. Moreover . . . by and large the newly emerging nationalism, particularly in Africa, have won their independence through broadly based political and nonviolence movements that won indigenous and then worldwide backing.[79]

The fate of Williams's proposal is not known.

Later on, during the Johnson administration, even covert assistance took on an air of ambivalence. CIA funds continued to flow to Roberto: according to a former official of the State Department's African Bureau, doubts about Roberto's "leadership quality" were not sufficient to jeopardize "our historic relationship." On the other hand, Marchetti and Marks state—and two former officials confirm—the United States decided to sell Portugal twenty B-26 bombers for use in her African territories. CIA employees delivered seven planes to Portugal before they were arrested by U.S. Customs personnel in a bureaucratic snafu.[80] This break with the last vestige of overt pressure on Portugal—the arms embargo—was protested in vain by Williams.[81] While the specific motivation for this sale is not known, there is some evidence that it *might* have had to do with the provision of certain facilities for Polaris submarine forces by Portugal.[82]

In spite of having gained recognition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964, the GRAE remained largely dependent upon one African coun-

[79] Ibid., pp. 3-4, 7-8.

[80] Marchetti and Marks, *CIA and Cult of Intelligence*, pp. 155-57.

[81] G. Mennen Williams to Mr. Kitchen, September 17, 1965, WP-NA.

[82] Lisbon to Secretary of State, July 31, 1964, NSF-LBJPL, reveals that the United States asked Portugal for "early action" on its request for LORAN-C facilities for Polaris submarine missiles. The installation of a Portuguese complex was considered "exceedingly important" for missile accuracy and "redundancy of navigational aids" for Polaris submarines and an eventual multilateral force. The American ambassador to Lisbon believed that any agreement was "likely to be a straight quid pro quo deal" involving U.S. military equipment for the war in Africa.

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try, Zaire. The Mobutu regime provided limited funds and weapons. More important, the Mobutu regime arrested Roberto's internal opposition and imprisoned them at the Kinkuzu base, and it continued an earlier policy of denying the MPLA access to the Zaire-Angola border, the most suitable frontier for guerilla operations.[83] Nevertheless, the Soviet-assisted MPLA was finally able to mount revolutionary warfare from bases in Congo-Brazzaville and, most significant, Zambia. By 1969 the latter operations were "rated by the Portuguese as the most effective guerilla force they face,"[84] and Roberto was increasingly accused of lassitude and *embourgeoisement*.

Although Roberto's group had a much smaller ethnic base than the MPLA, it was less inclined to create a multiethnic organization and conduct guerilla warfare outside its own ethnic redoubt. In contrast with the MPLA, Roberto's elitist political model, which one scholar aptly described as "an extension" of Zairian politics, excluded such other basic elements of successful anticolonial warfare as modern political education rooted in concrete problems and reliance on the armed masses.[85] In 1971 the OAU withdrew recognition from his movement.

Both overtly and covertly, U.S. policy in Southern Africa moved even further away from African nationalism during the Nixon and early Ford administrations. Conservative Republican policymakers found it convenient to accept such assumptions as: "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them"; and "Violence in the area will not increase greatly because the blacks recognize the military superiority of the whites, and will not risk their security in confrontation."[86] From these they drew the policy implication that the United States could adopt "a general posture of partial relaxation [of restrictions on dealing with the white regimes] balancing our relations in the area by compensating for—rather than abandoning—our tangible interests in the white states." In the case of Angola, this meant "avoiding pressures on the Portuguese," particularly "as the Azores negotiations come forward."[87] Hence the Republican administrations eased the arms embargo on Portugal by exempting nonlethal equipment that had dual civilian and military uses such as Boeing 707 transport planes.[88] And, according to intelligence sources, CIA covert action subsidies for Roberto were scaled down to "minimal" payments of about $10,000 per year for "intelligence collection."

[83] Marcum, "Three Revolutions," pp. 11, 14, 16; Davidson, *Angola's People*, p. 242.

[84] Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *National Security Study Memorandum 39: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976), p. 153.

[85] Davidson, *Angola's People*, pp. 216–244; Marcum, "Three Revolutions," pp. 10–12; John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (April 1976) : 410–412.

[86] El-Khawas and Cohen, *Memorandum 39*, p. 105; Henry A. Kissinger for the President, memorandum, "Decisions on Southern Africa Policy," January 15, 1970, p. 2.

[87] Kissinger for the President, "Decisions on Southern Africa Policy," p. 3 (Approved by President Nixon); Henry A. Kissinger for the President, memorandum, "Policy Issues Regarding South Africa and the Portuguese Territories," January 15, 1970, p. 4.

[88] Kissinger for the President, "Policy Issues," pp. 4–5; El-Khawas and Cohen, *Memorandum 39*, p. 47.

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With the decline in American support, Roberto's movement came even more under the influence of Mobutu whose dependence on the United States in the early 1970s had somewhat diminished. Zaire took the initiative in training and supplying Roberto's forces, and putting down a mutiny of 1,000 GRAE troops in 1972.[89] Zaire's importance rose further in 1974 when a revolutionary military government in Portugal commenced decolonization and Roberto's historic opportunity seemed to have arrived. Mobutu had followed Nixon to China in 1973 and, in turn, prepared the way for a subsequent visit by Roberto. Between May 1974 and October 1975 the Chinese, previously unsuccessful in exploiting divisions within MPLA and GRAE, provided approximately 120 military instructors for Roberto's forces—now called the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)—in Zaire. The Chinese also trained an estimated 5,000 FNLA troops and equipped them with small arms (Soviet-made AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and light mortars). Mobutu intervened with President Spinola in a vain effort to procure Portuguese recognition for MPLA dissident Chipenda who later joined the FNLA.[90]

By January 1975, when the Portuguese set up a transitional tripartite coalition government in Angola, the FNLA assisted by the Chinese and Zairians, had a large edge over the Soviet-aided MPLA in troops trained or in training, amount and quality of military equipment, and the number of nearby foreign advisers. The third major group, Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), though rooted in Angola's largest ethnic group, suffered from parochialism and opportunistic leadership, and had a very small and poorly armed force.[91] According to American diplomats in Luanda, the MPLA did not achieve parity in military resources until late spring. Nevertheless, a CIA proposal to bolster Roberto with $300,000 in political action funds was approved by the 40 Committee and President Ford in late January. (The CIA's request for a $100,000 subsidy to Savimbi was rejected.) An official of the 40 Committee recalls that the "basic concern" in this decision was not to respond to the Soviet-assisted MPLA but rather to "bolster psychologically our immediate ally," Zaire. Thus U.S. covert and overt "successes" in Zaire were now leading toward further intervention in Angola.

Elsewhere Gerald Bender has shown that *after a couple of rounds of Soviet-Cuban and U.S.-Zairian-South African escalation, the MPLA did not have a significant advantage in military supplies and training, but its political and organizational superiority helped it drive the opposition from Luanda, Cabinda, and key southern ports and district capitals.* As Bender also indicates, the 40 Committee approved a $14 million, two-stage program of arms and other aid to

[89] Davidson, *Angola's People*, pp. 226–227; John Marcum, "The Anguish of Angola: On Becoming Independent in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century" (Presidential Address, Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, San Francisco, Calif., October 29, 1975), p. 17.

[90] Senate African Affairs Subcommittees, *Angola*, pp. 184–185; John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," p. 410.

[91] Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, p. 191; Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," p. 410.

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Roberto and Savimbi on July 17, and President Ford signed on July 27.[92] An additional $10.7 million was approved in early September.[93] Secretary Kissinger's public statements and interviews with two members of the 40 Committee suggested a threefold objective of covert action: to avoid a precedent of Soviet expansion that could lead to pressures—and accommodationist tendencies—elsewhere in the world; to work with the "moderate" anticommunist leaders of Zaire and Zambia who feared the consequences of a Soviet-assisted MPLA victory on their own political positions; and to prevent Soviet- and MPLA-assisted black extremists for making gains in Namibia, Rhodesia, and the rest of Southern Africa.[94] The second concern, for Zaire and Zambia, was highlighted in administration briefings to congressional committees at the end of July. Considering the relative depth of the past U.S. commitment to Zaire, and published remarks by Kissinger aides, it is reasonable to suppose that Zambia was of secondary importance.[95]

Unlike the Zaire operations of 1964–67, U.S. military aid was *entirely* covert in nature although CIA Director Colby warned that the chances for exposure were "considerable."[96] Kissinger justified the attempt at total secrecy by referring to legal obstacles to military assistance to insurgents, especially through neighboring states, and by contending that overt aid could have led to an "unmanageable" and "open" confrontation with the Soviet Union.[97] Still, legal barriers might have been surmounted and the risks of disproportionate Soviet reaction to some overt aid lessened if Congress and the public had been as supportive as in the days of the Zaire rebellions. Indeed the secretary himself pointed out that Soviet and Cuban intervention was "an attempt to take advantage of our continuing domestic division and self-torment."[98]

Various American diplomatic sources provided the following breakdown and description of covert action expenditures by the middle of the fall 1975 (in millions):

$5.80	political action support
.50	other propaganda
.90	travel, miscellaneous
10.00	arms and equipment
.35	communications gear
5.40	shipping of arms and equipment
$22.95	

[92] Gerald J. Bender, "Kissinger and Angola: Anatomy of Failure," in Lemarchand, *American Foreign Policy in Southern Africa*, pp. 65–143.

[93] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, p. 152; "The Pike Papers" (House Intelligence Committee Report), *Village Voice Supplement*, January 1976, p. 37.

[94] Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, pp. 6–19.

[95] Ibid., pp. 46–47; *New York Times*, September 25, 1975, p. 1, and December 21, 1975, 4:1.

[96] The quotation is from an interview with an intelligence official. The substance of Colby's disagreement is conveyed in *Washington Post*, December 19, 1975.

[97] Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, *Angola*, pp. 20, 37, 40.

[98] Ibid., p. 15.

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Arms were provided to FNLA and UNITA both directly and through replacement of arms supplied by Zaire and possibly Zambia. The latter course had the virtue of speed and, by providing much non-American equipment, helped submerge the U.S. role. The first direct U.S. arms shipment went in C-141s to Zaire. It was thought that Mobutu would "know we were serious" when he saw the large planes. A propaganda campaign to expose Soviet arming of MPLA and embarrass the conduit countries was launched. Savimbi and Roberto received regular monthly political action payments for internal propaganda, organizational sustenance, etc. These subsidies and other monies were also used to hire white mercenary "military technicians"—former Portuguese sergeants, Brazilians, Frenchmen, and others. Although paid with CIA money, the mercenaries were not hired or directed by CIA personnel. The United States was covertly financing third country nationals as it had in Zaire, but this time the CIA did not take on as direct a supervisory role as in WIGMO. Instead the pattern was one that had been foreshadowed by the CIA's offer in 1964 to subsidize Tshombe's *own* recruitment of white mercenaries. As in Zaire, American CIA personnel were forbidden to give in-country military advice or training to their clients. However, according to American diplomats, United States CIA personnel did help assure the delivery of equipment airlifted from Zaire to their protégés in Angola. And two former CIA officials have acknowledged a limited paramilitary advisory mission in Angola under the guise of "intelligence gathering."[99] Finally, although the CIA ran its Angolan operation out of its Kinshasa station, there was also a CIA station in Luanda that "did intelligence collection feeding into FNLA and UNITA." Again "intelligence" was deeply entwined with covert action.

By mid-November the 40 Committee and the president had authorized a final dose of $7 million, making a total of $32 million for covert action in Angola during 1975.[100] However the arrival of South African combat troops to bolster the increasingly desperate FNLA-UNITA coalition had already begun to undermine both African and domestic tolerance for U.S. policy. The Soviets and Cubans were further encouraged by the *relatively* impressive performance of the MPLA, a group they had known and aided for more than a decade though not always without reservation. In these circumstances, so different from those that had obtained in Zaire, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided massive military assistance in the form of arms and troops. In late January, a congressional coalition of liberals and conservatives succeeded in stopping the covert action program. Shortly thereafter the South Africans, anxious to resurrect

[99] John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); see also *Sunday Times* (London), May 21, 1978, p. 9 for an interview with William Colby. Stockwell was the head of the CIA's Angola (Covert Action) Task Force in 1975-76 and Colby was the CIA director for almost all of that period. For an examination of Stockwell's argument, which includes additional details of CIA activities in Angola and confirms the above description, see Stephen R. Weissman, "Controlling Our Secret Service," *Africa Today* 25 (July-September 1978): 51-58.

[100] Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, p. 152.

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their policy of detente with moderate black Africa, also withdrew. The MPLA was victorious.

Patterns

The rationale, mechanisms, and short-term local results of covert action in Zaire and Angola bear comparison with similar U.S. efforts in other parts of the Third World. As in Vietnam, Laos, Chile, Cuba, etc., a prime motive of covert intervention was fear of external Communist subversion and its international implications. Each administration sought to deal with this fear in conformity with its own political ideology. Beyond this negative sort of preoccupation, the Mobutu regime was increasingly counted on to oppose Moscow's interests and advance Washington's in continental and Third World arenas. Zaire's position as a regional strong point for American policy—in many ways reminiscent of the Chilean "showcase" in Latin America—helped stimulate the abortive CIA paramilitary operation in Angola.

Together Zaire and Angola have constituted the terrain for a particularly wide variety of covert action techniques employed by the CIA in the Third World. These included: propaganda; manipulation of labor unions and student associations; subsidization of political leaders and parties, military and internal security functionaries, and *coup* makers; political assassination plots; technical assistance for a presidential bodyguard and security apparatus; provision of third country foreign military combat and combat-support personnel; supply of arms and related equipment. In addition, CIA "intelligence" activities were often difficult to distinguish from covert action since the political and military information gathered might be consumed by the CIA's local allies as well as U.S. analysts. And in a period of diminished covert action, "intelligence" support could help sustain a favorable disposition on the part of a Mobutu or a Roberto pending future occasions for clandestine struggle. Similarly the CIA "intelligence" program for the Chilean military during the leftist Allende government included the passing of antigovernment information to a Chilean officer, and was partly designed "to put the U.S. government in a position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution depending on developments within the country and the latter's impact on the military themselves."[101] Just as covert action support of Mobutu and Roberto escalated in the period of Angolan decolonization, so too did covert assistance to the Chilean military in the aftermath of the 1973 *coup* against Allende.

Covert action provided the most direct and aggressive U.S. assistance to political leaders in Zaire and Angola. But realization of its proximate objectives also depended upon: the degree of significant, often closely coordinated, *overt* support from the United States and other pro-Western countries; the relative ef-

[101] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Staff Report, Covert Action in Chile*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., December 18, 1975, pp. 28, 37–39.

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fectiveness of local political groups; and the scale of Soviet and other foreign Communist intervention. In Zaire, conventional U.S. economic and military aid, at first in cooperation with the United Nations and then with Belgium, created a powerful context for CIA manipulations. Although the regime foundered more than once, the more popular Lumumbists were unable to mount a well-organized challenge or to provoke a foreign Communist involvement commensurate with international aid to the "pro-Western moderates." The Soviets in particular were constrained by African resistance to intervention outside the United Nations and doubts about the political capacity of certain Lumumbist leaders. But in Angola things were different. There was a dearth of U.S. and other overt support for the FNLA against their colonial overlords, and even CIA assistance dropped off at the end of the 1960s. A burst of Chinese and CIA aid for FNLA-UNITA in 1974–75 produced a competitive Soviet effort in behalf of MPLA, whose political and military superiority was increasingly evident. This fact, and the ramifications of South African intervention, laid the African and U.S. domestic bases for a low-risk, decisive military thrust by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Elsewhere in the Third World the CIA's immediate achievements have been influenced by a similar set of factors. For example, in Chile covert and overt assistance to the centrist Frei government could not overcome the growing internal crisis that assured the election of leftist President Allende. Subsequently internal polarization exacerbated by diplomatic and CIA tactics, and the Soviets' unwillingness to provide massive financial aid, helped pave the way for a right-wing military *coup*. On the other hand, the Communist-led Vietnamese, backed by current and potential Soviet and Chinese aid, were able to stand off massive CIA and other intervention until the domestic support in the United States eroded.

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Legislative Liaison in the Carter Administration

ERIC L. DAVIS

The events of the past decade of American history, particularly the Vietnam War and Watergate, have resulted in what many observers see as a strengthening of Congress vis-à-vis the executive. A contemporary president who wishes to be perceived as successful, both by his professional colleagues in Washington and by public opinion nationwide, must be an effective legislative leader. What about Jimmy Carter's legislative leadership? How are the legislative liaison staffs of the Carter administration, both in the White House and in the executive departments, organized? What are some of the activities that these staffs perform? How do these patterns of organization and activity resemble or differ from patterns of legislative-executive relations in previous administrations? Can these patterns of legislative liaison account for the Carter administration's relative lack of legislative success as compared with its Democratic predecessors?

One of the primary data bases for this research is a series of interviews with participants in the legislative liaison process that were conducted during the summer of 1977. Almost all of those working in the legislative liaison office in the White House were interviewed. Furthermore, with one exception (the Defense Department), interviews were conducted with the assistant secretaries responsible for legislative liaison in each of the cabinet-level departments. Finally, several congressional staff members, particularly aides to the party leaders, served as informants. All those interviewed were assured anonymity.[1]

[1] A total of twenty-three interviews was conducted. A tape recorder was not used; rather, com-

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Organization of the White House and Departmental Liaison Offices

All presidents since Eisenhower have had a formal organization within the White House responsible for liaison with Congress. Furthermore, there has evolved a process of institutionalization in which organizational structures and behavioral patterns used by a departing administration have been continued by its successor's legislative liaison staff.[2] During the 1976–1977 transition, the Carter White House considered this option of institutionalizing methods of legislative liaison used by a previous administration. The previous administration in this case, however, was not the Ford administration, but the last Democratic administration of President Johnson. Thus, Frank Moore, Carter's director of legislative relations, consulted with his counterpart in the Johnson White House, Lawrence F. O'Brien, as well as with other members of the Johnson liaison staff.

The Johnson congressional liaison personnel advised Carter to organize the office the way *they* had—along lines paralleling the organization of the Congress itself. Not only should there be specialists for the House and specialists for the Senate, cautioned O'Brien and his staff, but there should also be further specialization to correspond to the particular regional and partisan blocs that ally to form coalitions in the House.[3] O'Brien also suggested that different liaison officers be responsible for each of the following three House groups: the traditional Southern Democrats of the older generation; those Northern Democrats, mostly from the cities, elected with strong party organization support; and those Northern Democrats dependent primarily on their own personal organizations for electoral support (those in this latter group often are more liberal and less senior than their big-city, Democratic colleagues). With the liaison office organized in this way, it was argued, each Democratic member of Congress would feel that he had a specific contact person in the White House who was sensitive to his concerns and the concerns of members representing similar districts. Furthermore, from the perspective of the White House, it was noted that this form of organization was conducive to legislative success, because it would enable the president's representatives to pay close attention to all of the many blocs that make up coalitions in Congress, and

plete reconstructions were written up immediately after the interviews. In a few instances in the paper, words have been omitted from interview materials to maintain the anonymity of the respondent.

[2] See Stephen J. Wayne, *The Legislative Presidency* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), chapter 5; and Joseph A. Pika, "White House-Congressional Relations: A Longitudinal Analysis" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1978).

[3] For more on coalitions in Congress, see John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," *American Behavioral Scientist* 17 (November-December 1973): 223–247; Barbara Hinckley, "Party as Coalition in Legislative Settings" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, 1975); and Hinckley, " 'Stylized' Opposition in the U.S. House of Representatives: The Effects of Coalition Behavior," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (February 1977): 5–28.

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because it had the most potential for assembling these various blocs into *majority* coalitions.

The Carter staff, however, did not adopt the suggestions of O'Brien and the others. To begin with, they felt that the blocs that existed in the Johnson era were now weaker and thus less powerful sources of voting cues for members of the Congress. More importantly, they believed that the substantial turnover in congressional membership resulting from the 1974 and 1976 elections had brought to Capitol Hill representatives and senators who were far more concerned with issues than were their predecessors. Thus, the Carter people attempted to structure their White House liaison office along issue lines. Instead of having specialists for the Senate and for the various blocs within the House, there would be specialists for energy issues, foreign policy issues, health issues, environmental issues, and so on.

This mode of organization along issue lines lasted for less than six months. At the beginning of the summer of 1977, a major shake-up occurred within the White House liaison office, involving personnel shifts as well as organizational changes. One liaison officer explained why the issue-based system was discarded.

> I don't think that the issue-based organization of the liaison office was a very good idea. Too many members simply fall through the cracks. You might be assigned an issue, and that issue might never come up during the entire two years of a congressional session. Also, with the issue-based system, you don't get around to talking to many members until it's too late. You won't talk to the lowest-ranking member of the Energy Subcommittee until you need his vote, and that's not when we should be talking with him. Our job is to serve the members' needs, to hold their hands, to stroke their egos. We have to do all kinds of little things with them that have nothing to do with issues. It's sort of like we're in the Green Stamps business. But we have to give out a lot of stamps before the members will trade them in.

Yet, upon dispensing with the issue-based system, the system of the Johnson administration was not brought back in its place. Rather, each member of the liaison staff decided to work closely with those members of Congress about whom he or she had acquired prior knowledge and with whom contacts already had been established. Although specialization along House-Senate lines was established, beneath that level there was no specialization at all. Each member of the White House liaison staff currently works closely with a range of members drawn from several blocs in the chamber for which he or she is responsible.

In most of the cabinet departments, however, the legislative liaison staffs are organized along issue lines. There are two principal reasons for this: department liaison offices are extensively involved in the process of policy formulation; and department liaison officers view themselves not only as lobbyists with Congress, but also as lobbyists within their departments. These reasons are related, and they can be discussed in more detail if we turn to a comparison of the departmental liaison staffs with the White House liaison staff.

At the White House level, there appears to be a distinct separation of roles

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between the Domestic Policy Staff, which is responsible for policy development and formulation, and the legislative liaison staff, which is responsible for presenting programs to Congress once they have been developed. Thus the Domestic Policy Staff is responsible for making preliminary contacts with committee members and staff on the substance of proposed legislation during the policy formulation process. For example, the health specialist on the Domestic Policy Staff is responsible for preliminary discussions with the committees concerned with health legislation. It is only after programs have been formally introduced on Capitol Hill that the legislative liaison staff becomes responsible for securing passage of these programs.

At the departmental level, however, the offices of the assistant secretaries for legislation are participants in the processes of program development and legislative liaison. For example, members of the staffs of the assistant secretaries for legislation in HEW and in Labor were key participants in the process of developing the administration's welfare reform proposals before they were submitted to Congress. Those same persons were subsequently key participants in the effort to obtain favorable congressional action on the welfare reform legislation.

The interviews indicated that there is definitely a difference in the role perceptions of the White House liaison officers and the departmental liaison officers. The White House lobbyists do not view themselves as primarily concerned with policy issues. As one White House liaison agent noted, "it helps for a congressional liaison person to know something about the issues he's talking about, to have a passing familiarity with them, but it's more important for him to have a sense of the politics of the issues and the politics of the Congress." White House lobbyists see themselves as facilitators of the president's program, not so much by convincing members of Congress on the specific issues, but by creating a climate of favor conducive to the president and his ideas. They hope to create this climate of favor without regard to specific pieces of legislation. The expectation is that through the creation of this favorable climate, members of Congress will give the president the benefit of the doubt and vote with him when the vote could go either way. These White House lobbyists, therefore, say that discussions with members of Congress on the substance of legislative programs is not very important to them and should be left to those at the departmental level. What is more important is making things easy for the president on Capitol Hill.

The departmental legislative liaison personnel, however, perceive their role as being one of considerable involvement throughout all stages of the policy-making process. They make contributions to both the decisions on the substance of programs and to the process of lobbying the programs through Congress. Indeed, many of these departmental liaison personnel believe their involvement in all stages of the policy process makes them more effective than the White House personnel. One departmental lobbyist used the following analogy to explain why he considered himself especially influential in the policy process.

> Actually, I think of our job as congressional liaison to be very similar to that of a sales-

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> man for a shirt company. When the salesman goes out to the field, he has to represent his company to the customers. But when he comes back to the factory he has to represent the customers to the company. He has to be able to tell the product development director, "Look, we could sell X number more shirts if they were cut differently, or if they were made from a different fabric." Well, what we do here is quite the same thing. When we're up on the Hill, we have to sell the department's programs. But when we come back here, we have to be able to tell the policy people in the department what members of Congress are thinking about, so we can put together policies that will go someplace in the future.

Having this dual role orientation is what has led most of the assistant secretaries to organize their offices along issue lines. It is only such an issue-based organization that will provide their staffs with the informational resources needed to be effective and successful participants in the process of program development within the departments. If their offices were not organized along such issue lines, many of the assistant secretaries believe, they would be viewed as merely "political operators" and thus would have little influence over substantive decisions within the department.

Finally, it should be noted that these differences in the organization and roles of the White House and departmental liaison offices offer some interesting comparisons with previous administrations. In the Johnson and Ford White Houses, there was extensive participation by the congressional liaison staff in the process of policy formulation, a phenomenon probably not unrelated to the many years those two presidents spent on Capitol Hill. During the Carter and Nixon administrations, on the other hand, there was only very little consultation with the liaison staff before programs were submitted to Congress. In addition, the department liaison staffs under Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all were arranged basically along issue lines. But the real influence of these staffs on policy decisions varied considerably: the Ford administration resembled the Carter pattern of devolving much of the responsibility for policy formulation to the departments; the Johnson and especially the Nixon years were characterized by most major policy decisions being made by White House staff.

Coalition-Building Activities of the Legislative Liaison Staffs

The major task of executive branch legislative liaison personnel is to build successive majority coalitions to support the elements of the administration's legislative program at the various stages of the legislative process. This section of the paper will focus on some of the strategies and tactics through which the Carter administration's liaison personnel attempt to achieve this goal. Most of our attention will be devoted to the White House liaison office, but some considerations will be given to the activities of departmental liaison personnel as well.

First, it should be noted that the White House liaison office has few resources that it can use in this coalition-building process. The office has a small

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staff—only seven professionals working with Congress on a day-to-day basis.[4] Furthermore, as noted above, the members of this staff tend not to have substantive expertise in any of the areas in which they are attempting to see legislative programs passed. Finally, since few members of Congress were elected or reelected in 1976 on Jimmy Carter's coattails, loyalty to the White House as a result of electoral dependence is minimal.

Perhaps the most important resource that the White House liaison office can have is to be perceived, throughout the Washington community but most particularly on Capitol Hill, as having close ties with the president himself. In fact, it can be argued that Frank Moore, the office's director, was selected for his position because he was Jimmy Carter's own man, not dependent on or loyal to any other political figure. Moore was the target of considerable criticism during the early months of the Carter administration, primarily because of his alleged lack of knowledge of the folkways of Congress, but as one departmental liaison noted:

> Frank got a bad rap when he came to town. . . . What a president needs in that job is someone who's his own man, someone who has the president's trust. And I think that's what members of Congress want to see there too. Larry O'Brien didn't know much about Congress either [in 1961], but he was JFK's man. The same goes for Moore. He was a country boy coming to a fast town, so he turned a lot of people off. But he's a lot smarter than he's given credit for.

Although Moore himself did not have extensive Washington experience, three of the five assistants he hired in January of 1977 had served either as congressional staffers or lobbyists or both. In addition, two more congressional staffers joined the White House lobbying operation in the summer of 1977, at the time of the organizational changes referred to earlier. As in previous administrations, liaison staffers tend to come predominantly from Capitol Hill backgrounds, even if the directors of liaison, the O'Briens and the Moores, do not.

While Moore himself is generally perceived by members of Congress to be close to President Carter, such perceptions are not always held with regard to the members of Moore's staff. Some members of Congress believe that Moore's staff cannot speak for the president, cannot make commitments in his name. They believe that the staff is distant from the president, even more distant, in fact, than was Nixon's liaison staff.[5] And, indeed, most of the subordinate members of the liaison staff do not interact directly with the president very often. Rather, they communicate with him through Moore. This is

[4] The small size of the liaison staff is not unique to the Carter White House. During the Kennedy and Johnson years there were rarely more than six lobbyists on the staff, and Nixon and Ford never had more than ten liaison agents on their staffs at any one time.

[5] In a city in which proximity to power means a great deal, many observers in Washington have noted that the Carter liaison staff, with the exception of Moore and his immediate staff, is housed in the East Wing of the White House. Previous presidents had housed the liaison staff in the West Wing.

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quite different from common practice during the Johnson administration, for example, when the president met on an almost daily basis with all of his White House lobbyists. Some of the difference certainly can be accounted for by President Johnson's greater interest in the details of legislation and the legislative process than is the case with President Carter, but this perceived distance of the liaison staff from the president does mean that the staff has correspondingly less weight and influence on Capitol Hill. This, in turn, means that the staff has fewer resources available to it for the task of building majority coalitions.

The current White House liaison staff appears to place less emphasis on its role as the catalyst for cooperative lobbying relationships than did its predecessor in the Johnson White House. During the Johnson years, the White House worked extensively with the congressional leadership, the departmental liaison offices, and interest groups. In addition, the Johnson liaison staff placed great emphasis on using various exchanges of benefits with members of Congress to create a climate of opinion on Capitol Hill that would be favorable to the president and his programs. The Carter staff makes somewhat less frequent use of these tokens of exchange.

To begin with, the White House liaison officers appear to make a distinction between different types of benefits that can be exchanged with members of Congress. In the first category are those benefits of which the liaison staff would like to make more use, but, for various reasons, finds it difficult to do so. The most important benefits in this category are appointments to patronage positions. One White House liaison officer described some of the difficulties faced by the liaison office because of the office's relative inability to make use of patronage as a token of exchange.

> With patronage, there have been a lot of problems. First of all, there's simply a lot less patronage to go around than there used to be. If you look at the plum book that was put out for John Kennedy in 1961, it was a couple of inches thick. The plum book that we had was maybe one-fifth the size. It's not that the jobs that used to be political were converted to civil service. That would have raised too many eyebrows. What they [the Ford administration] did was take a political job, abolish it, and create a new civil service job. The job description had all the proper civil service code words in it, and it said nothing about being involved in political work. What happened, though, is that the guy who lost the political job got the new civil service job. So, in the Department of HEW, there's 135,000 employees, but the president and Califano together could make only 115 appointments. In the city of Chicago, in all the regional offices, there are 80,000 federal employees. Do you know how many appointments we could make there? Five. That's not even one appointment for each Democratic House member from the city, much less the rest of the state, or the Democratic senator from Illinois.

Thus, the liaison officers in the White House would have preferred to have a greater number of patronage appointments to use as a means of obtaining the support of additional members of Congress. In addition, in the first few months of the administration, some of the liaison officers believed that the presi-

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dent himself was not making as effective use as possible of various minor tokens of exchange—tokens collectively referred to as "small potatoes" by Larry O'Brien. These tokens include invitations to social events at the White House, appearances by administration officials at congressional fund-raising events, rides on Air Force One, pens from bill-signing ceremonies, and so forth. Individually, none of these tokens means very much. But, a number of them, taken together over the course of a congressional session, can be extremely useful in creating a favorable impression on the members of Congress.

There is not all that much that the White House liaison office can do to increase the supply of patronage positions available to members of Congress. But, in recent months, more systematic attention has been paid to using the various "small potatoes" to create on Capitol Hill a climate of favor toward the president. For example, all House Democrats are now invited on a regular basis to a series of social-political evenings with the president and his senior staff at Blair House, across the street from the White House. The president is making a concerted effort to have private meetings not related to any particular bills with members of the House and Senate. Moore's office coordinated the speaking schedules of administration officials for the 1978 congressional campaigns, and administration resources were poured into the districts of those members who supported the administration on roll-call votes.[6]

There is a second major category of benefits used by previous administrations in their attempts to build legislative majorities which is employed only infrequently by the Carter administration. This category is the project grant—the dam, the reclamation project, the new federal building, and so forth. Previous presidents of both parties have attempted to influence the awarding of project grants to the districts of members of Congress either to reward loyal supporters or to obtain favorable considerations for administration legislative programs in the future.[7] Project grants, however, are rarely used for these purposes by the current administration. In fact, President Carter's decisions to terminate a number of water projects on a so-called hit list at the beginning of 1977 and to veto the fiscal 1979 public works appropriation bill led to considerable consternation on Capitol Hill.

One White House lobbyist expressed an attitude toward the use of project grants as tokens of exchange which was typical of the views of his colleagues.

> This president just does not believe in project grants. If the president found out that there was a member of the White House staff who traded a dam for a vote, that would certainly be the last time a trade would be made. Besides, those projects are getting more controversial back home. They might be approved by a majority, but there's an intense minority, of environmentalists, or whatever, who don't want

[6] For more on the Blair House meetings and the liaison office's plans for the 1978 congressional elections, see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 25, 1978, pp. 520–521.

[7] For a discussion of the use of water projects in this way, see John A. Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation 1947–1968* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 146–147.

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> them built. And those people can cause problems for a congressman back home. So members don't find big projects as important to them as they used to. . . . I think the younger members of Congress, in particular, don't find water projects, or dams, or bridges, or highways, as important as their older colleagues.

This perception indeed may be correct, but there are numerous members who still believe in the utility of these project grants to show their constituents that they are able to obtain benefits for the home district in Washington.[8] By providing these members with fewer project grants than in the past, the White House runs the risk of alienating them. And many of these members who view the project grants in a positive light are those who, despite the recent changes in the distribution of power within Congress, are the more senior members who can be quite influential with respect to the success or the failure of the president's legislative programs.

Exchange of benefits is certainly not the only coalition-building strategy that can be used by the administration in its attempts to build legislative majorities.[9] Much trading must be done on credit; and it is often unclear, both in the administration and in the Congress, specifically when compensation is expected in return for particular action. Thus, other coalition-building strategies must be used in addition to that of exchange. Still, Carter's reluctance to make use of the exchange strategy means that the administration must place additional emphasis on these alternative coalition-building strategies.

One of the most important cooperative lobbying relationships, from the point of view of building presidential majorities in Congress, is that which occurs between the White House legislative liaison staff and the departmental legislative liaison staffs.[10] If the work of building legislative majorities is skillfully divided between the White House and the departments, individual members of each liaison staff can work on those pieces of legislation on which their own particular talents and skills can be put to the most effective use. What this means in practice is that the less controversial bills, those on which most of the final decisions are made in the committees, would be the responsibility of the departments, while those bills that receive considerable attention on the floor because of their more controversial nature would be the responsibility of the White House lobbying staff. With such a division of labor, White House lobbyists would not needlessly expend their resources on issues that are not worthy of presidential attention.

There is an important difference between the White House-departmental lobbying relationship today and the nature of that relationship in earlier administrations. During the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations,

[8] See Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

[9] This point has been further developed in Stanley Kelley, Jr., "Patronage and Presidential Legislative Leadership," in *The Presidency*, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 268–277.

[10] A report on the department legislative liaison staffs is contained in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 4, 1978, pp. 579–586.

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the selection of departmental legislative liaison personnel was heavily influenced, if not controlled, by the White House. These presidents wanted to have a government-wide lobbying "team" supervised by the White House. If necessary, they would "parachute" lobbyists selected by the White House into the departments. President Carter, however, at least in his public statements, has stressed the importance of reducing the influence of the White House staff within the executive branch, and of devolving authority and responsibility down to the departmental level. The current practice, therefore, is for the departmental secretary to appoint his or her own liaison officers without White House involvement.

However, this method of personnel selection occasionally has led to the allegation that departmental lobbyists are working too much for their own department's positions and not enough for the administration's positions. As one White House lobbyist noted:

> Say a department or an agency is in a fight with OMB. [Office of Management and Budget] as a new policy is being put together, and the department or agency loses. But the agency is then responsible for most of the liaison work on the Hill. Whose position do the agency liaison people present to the Congress, their own, or the administration's? Or say someone introduces an amendment to the Transportation Appropriations Bill to add a billion for something or other. The Transportation liaison man is asked what the administration's position is. He says "OMB is against it." He doesn't answer the question directly, but the message gets out that the department was for it, but lost to OMB. So, since most of the liaison work is done by the departments, administration positions may get changed during the liaison process.

Such questions about the loyalties of the department liaison staffs are not raised very often. When they are raised, however, they are considered to be very serious. More often, though, the White House lobbyists perceive the departmental lobbyists as their partners or assistants. Another White House liaison agent noted:

> [The departmental lobbyists] do almost all of the errand running. If a congressman calls me up with a problem, I'll hand it off to Dick Warden [at HEW] or Harry Schwartz [at HUD] or whoever's responsible for it. Sometimes I'll tell the department person to get back to the member, and to tell him I told you to call him back. Other times, I'll ask the department to give me the answer, and I'll call the member back. It all depends how we stand with that member at the given time, and what he needs from us and we need from him soon.
>
> In addition to doing that, they can help us, and other departments, out on bills with members they have special relationships with. Jack Stempler [at Defense] may not care very much about [election day] voter registration, but if he calls up Congressman "Bombs Away" and tells him he thinks voter registration is a good thing, that congressman's going to be very likely to vote for it. After all, this is Stempler from the Pentagon calling, not Joe Califano or Pat Harris. So we've asked each department to give us a list of ten members they have especially good relations with, members they can call on things outside their own department's business. This also knits the

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> department liaison people closer together, and makes members see the administration as a team is behind a particular program.

It may be somewhat farfetched to expect that a member of Congress will vote for a particular issue simply because a departmental lobbyist with whose position he is sympathetic on departmental issues contacts him. Still, attempting to construct such cross-departmental lobbying alliances does mean a reduction in the amount of its own resources the White House must expend on the issue.

It also should be noted that the White House has tried to take advantage not only of the resources provided by the department lobbying staffs, but also by some of the cabinet secretaries themselves. Secretaries such as Adams of Transportation, Califano of HEW, Bergland of Agriculture, and Harris of HUD frequently were asked to call members of Congress whom they knew from their previous Washington experience, and not only on bills from their own departments. (These secretaries did not always respond to such requests as promptly and as completely as the White House would have liked.) The extensive congressional experience of Vice-President Mondale has also been a resource often drawn upon by the White House liaison staff. In fact, Mondale and his vice-presidential staff were primarily responsible for coordinating administration efforts to have the natural gas pricing compromise approved by the Senate in the last month of the Ninety-fifth Congress.

So far, we have been discussing the perceptions of the departmental lobbying efforts on the part of the White House. How, on the other hand, do the departmental lobbyists view their White House counterparts? Let us begin by continuing to discuss cross-departmental lobbying. One departmental liaison staffer believed there should be more cross-departmental lobbying than there already is:

> [Cross-departmental lobbying] is done, but I would like to see more of it. Maybe what should be done is that the Pentagon guy and the HEW guy should go to see the member of the Armed Services Committee together. The Pentagon guy can hold the member's hand while the HEW guy talks substance.

While a majority of the departmental lobbyists believed in the utility of inter-departmental liaison efforts, some departmental liaison personnel believed that they should not waste their own department's resources on lobbying for other departments' bills. The following is a typical sentiment expressed by such an assistant secretary.

> So far, I've established good relationships with many members of Congress, but those relationships exist because I'm interested in _____ and those members are interested in _____. I don't think my calling up and saying you should vote against the Clinch River project is going to make any difference in terms of changing the way that member's going to vote. He'll still need me and I'll still need him for the department's own business, regardless of how he votes on Clinch River.

Perceptions of the White House lobbying effort in general, and of the weekly meetings of the departmental lobbyists with the White House lobbyists,

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also were mixed. First, some assistant secretaries saw the White House liaison staff as too small and too concerned with "putting out fires" to be of much assistance in their long-term efforts to build majorities behind the department's legislation.

> Ninety percent of what's said at those meetings is of no interest to us at all.
>
> We have very good ties with the people on the Domestic Policy Staff who work on this department's legislation. We actually don't have that much to do with the White House liaison staff. They have Friday afternoon meetings for all the liaison people, but it seems all that is discussed there are energy and dams. They simply don't have the time or the personnel to work on our legislative programs.
>
> The White House liaison office is too small to be of much assistance to us. They don't know anything about the substance of this department's legislation. They have to handle the whole government. They can be useful working with the leadership and the committee chairmen on scheduling, but that's about it.

On the other hand, some departmental liaison officers spoke very highly of the White House lobbyists.

> I've never had any bad relations with them. Whenever we've asked them to help us out, they have, and the rest of the time, they've stayed out of our hair. For example, at the end of this week, the Senate committee is going to mark up the department's appropriations bill. There are a lot of very important issues raised in that bill, particularly after the House got through with it. So I sent a memo over to Moore, telling him what our problems were, who had to be called, and what had to be said to them. And they did everything I asked them to.

Still, it appears that the cooperative relationships between White House and departmental liaison personnel are less robust and well developed today than in earlier administrations. In earlier administrations, the liaison system was viewed as a hierarchical one, with the White House on top and the departments below. Today, the organization is perceived in flatter terms. And, as such, it is more difficult for requests to be followed through and to determine where authority lies. What also results is that both the White House and the departmental lobbyists must expend more of their resources on maintaining this rather amorphous structure, and fewer resources on actually communicating with Congress, than was the case when the hierarchical structure was used.

Working in conjunction with departmental liaison staffs is a potentially productive cooperative lobbying technique available to the White House legislative liaison staff. Additionally, in its attempts to conserve its own resources only for those contingencies deserving of presidential attention, the White House liaison office can participate in cooperative lobbying activities along with interest groups. Again, however, relations between the Carter White House and interest groups, at least in terms of building legislative majorities, are less well developed today than they were in earlier administrations.

Many of the traditionally Democratic interest groups were not active supporters of Jimmy Carter during the campaign of 1976—particularly during

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his primary campaign for the presidential nomination. In addition, there have been some policy conflicts between the White House and some of these traditionally Democratic groups—labor, urban, and Jewish groups in particular. This absence of political or policy ties between the White House and these groups means that the coalition-building resources of interest groups are less available than they otherwise might be to the White House. Without these close relationships with the legislative staffs of the interest groups, the White House has less accurate information about the voting preferences of members of Congress; some members, although unwilling to commit themselves to a White House lobbyist, are willing to declare their preferences to an interest group lobbyist. This information is now unavailable to the White House, and thus the White House must expend more of its own limited resources to acquire information that otherwise could be obtained through only one telephone call to an interest group lobbyist.[11]

A final form of cooperative activity necessary to the White House in its building of majority coalitions is to establish and maintain good relations with the Democratic congressional leadership. Again, this technique seems to be used by the Carter White House less frequently than by its predecessors. However, this appears to be a consequence less of failings on the part of the White House than of the presence of new congressional leaders who have changed perceptions of their roles. Although Speaker of the House O'Neill does view facilitating the passage of White House legislative programs as an important part of his job (as evidenced by his establishing special committees to consider the president's energy and welfare legislation), he is constrained by the recent changes in the distribution of power within the House—changes that have made power and responsibility available to a far larger proportion of the House membership than was the case in the past. In addition, Senator Byrd, the majority leader, appears to emphasize defending the integrity of the Senate in the institutional sense and keeping the Senate moving in the procedural sense, rather than any substantive goals.

These developments in both chambers mean that the Democratic leadership is less available to the White House as a resource in obtaining favorable decisions about the scheduling of legislation than was the case during the Johnson years, for example. O'Neill is more constrained by his rank-and-file in making decisions about the scheduling of bills, and Byrd has made the Senate less permeable to White House influence than it was at the time when Lyndon Johnson was president and Mike Mansfield was majority leader. The consequence of both of these developments is that the White House has suffered some embarrassing defeats on the floors of both houses, because legislation was voted on before

[11] Special Assistants Midge Costanza and (later) Anne Wexler have been responsible for coordinating so-called White House public liaison activities with interest groups. However, their activities have been focused primarily on building support for administration programs at the grassroots level, not in gathering the detailed legislative intelligence information from interest groups' Washington staffs that can be so valuable to the White House liaison office.

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majorities could be assembled in support of it. Those defeats, in turn, at times have led members of Congress to perceive the White House liaison staff as inept. This perception of ineptness makes it all the more difficult to obtain votes in the future.

The consequences of the lower rates of utilization of these cooperative lobbying mechanisms, and what appears at times to be less than skillful use of them when they are employed, is that more demands are placed on the president himself. And, indeed, both newspaper reports and interview evidence indicate that Jimmy Carter makes a great number of calls to Capitol Hill, asking members to support him on particular roll calls. While hard empirical evidence on the number of calls made by different presidents is not presently available, one conclusion can be stated with some assurance: the value of presidential calls, although an effective resource, can be reduced rapidly if employed too frequently. And the mode of operation of the current White House liaison office, with the lack of emphasis on either exchange of benefits or on cooperative lobbying relationships, indicates that there is a great danger of this diminution of value of presidential calls occurring at the present time.

Explanations for the Carter White House's Relative Lack of Legislative Success

What explanations can be offered for the relative lack of success of the Carter White House in obtaining approval of its legislative programs? Do the organization and methods of operation of the liaison staff make any difference to White House legislative success?

First, it should be noted that any Democratic president elected in 1976 would have had a difficult time obtaining easy passage of his programs from the Ninety-fifth Congress. There have been many changes in Congress recently, especially in the House, among which the most important are: decentralization of power and diffusion of authority away from committee chairs; fewer "bellwether" members; the ability of members, because of their skillful use of the various advantages of incumbency, to make a distinction between their behavior on the floor in Washington and their behavior back in their home districts; significant growth in the size of the congressional staff; and the institutional role orientation of many members increasingly being one of opposition to the White House.[12] All of these changes would have made it difficult even for a possible "Washington insider" president such as Hubert Humphrey or Henry Jackson to obtain passage of his legislative program. Some of President Carter's problems, therefore, can be traced simply to organizational and personnel changes in Congress that make that body less amenable to White House influence than it was during the Great Society period of the mid-sixties, for example.

[12] On changes within the Congress, see Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (New York: Praeger, 1977); on patterns of interactions between representatives and their districts, see Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1978).

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Still, however, there is a more fundamental reason for President Carter's difficulties on Capitol Hill. One of the principal reasons for the current administration's lack of success in coalition-building on Capitol Hill is that the White House has had great difficulty in realizing that congressional politics *is* coalition politics and that members of Congress will not automatically jump to the support of White House programs, even if they come from a Democratic White House and reflect the work of the best experts in the field. Congressional majorities must be constructed, with the aid of interest groups and the leadership, by working with the various geographical, partisan, and other blocs discussed earlier in this paper.

For the most part, those in key positions in the Carter liaison office worked on the Carter campaign, both the campaign for the nomination and the general election campaign against President Ford. Furthermore, many of these key liaison personnel have a Georgia background. This is important because President Carter won the Democratic nomination in a rather unique way. Because of the new rules for the selection of Democratic delegates, Carter basically won the nomination without having to build a coalition. He did not have to make side-payments to any of the major groupings within the Democratic party—the so-called McGovernites on the left, the so-called Wallaceites on the right, or the large bloc of centrist Democrats typified by the congressional leaders in Washington.[13] Nor did alliances have to be made with many of the Democratic interest groups, particularly with the labor unions.

It can be argued that this approach to the construction of a majority was influential in the thinking of the Carter staffs when they arrived in Washington at the beginning of 1977. Since they did not have to engage in bargaining to get the nomination or to win the election, they would not have to engage in bargaining or exchange to get their programs passed on Capitol Hill. Because they did not recognize the importance of coalition-building through brokerage, they did not, at the very outset of the administration, make an effort to establish cooperative lobbying relationships with the other important participants in the legislative process. Since these relationships were not established, the White House had to rely on its own resources to obtain legislative successes. These resources were not sufficient; legislative defeats resulted. And these defeats fed upon themselves, creating the image of ineptitude on the part of the White House. This image of ineptitude, in turn, inclined members of Congress to be less willing to rely on White House judgments and less willing to accept White House analyses and proposals on important issues.*

[13] A similar point is made in Nelson W. Polsby, "Coalition and Faction in American Politics: An Institutional View," in *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), pp. 103–123.

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Advising the President on Enrolled Legislation: Patterns of Executive Influence

STEPHEN J. WAYNE
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The decision to approve or disapprove bills and resolutions passed by Congress is an important presidential function, one that brings the executive into the final stages of the legislative process. This decision is not perfunctory. From Washington's administration to 1978, there have been 2,379 vetoes with 610 since the Truman administration alone. Only 90 vetoes have been overridden by Congress.

There have been various studies of presidential vetoes. Their number, their form, their rationale, and even the constitutional power to veto itself have been subject to scrutiny.[1] Few studies, however, have concentrated on the process by which the president makes his decision,[2] and none has analyzed that process

[1] Joseph A. Condo, "The Veto of S. 3418: More Congressional Power in the President's Pocket?" *Catholic University Law Review* 22 (Winter 1973): 385-402; Louis Fisher, *The Constitution Between Friends* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Carlton Jackson, *Presidential Vetoes, 1779-1945* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1967); Jong Lee, "Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon," *Journal of Politics* 37 (May 1975): 522-546; Richard A. Riggs, "Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto Power," *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 6 (Spring 1973): 735-759; Harry C. Thomson, "The First Presidential Vetoes," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 8 (Winter 1978): 27-31; Clement E. Vose, "The Memorandum Pocket Veto," *Journal of Politics* 26 (1964): 397-405.

[2] Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidential Clearance of Legislation" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,

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from the perspective of how executive branch advice affects presidential actions. This article provides such an analysis. Its objective is to test an empirical model of executive action based on the recommendations of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the department(s) most affected by the proposed bill (lead agency), and other concerned executive departments and agencies.

The Enrolled Bill Process

These executive branch recommendations on legislation are made in the course of an advisory process that has remained relatively stable since its development during the Franklin Roosevelt administration. Facsimiles of all legislation passed by Congress are routinely sent to the Office of Management and Budget (before 1970, the Bureau of the Budget) while the parchment original, the one that contains the signatures of the presiding officers of both houses, is carried by special messenger to the White House. The Legislative Reference Division, a small unit within OMB, immediately refers copies of the facsimile bill to executive departments and agencies affected by, or having an interest in, the legislation. These departments and agencies are usually the same ones with which the Legislative Reference Division worked in the central clearance process at the beginning of the legislative process.[3] Simultaneously, the Legislative Reference Division solicits the opinions of budget examiners within OMB whose programs are involved in the legislation. Each of the agencies normally has forty-eight hours in which to prepare a recommendation for presidential action and a statement providing the rationale for its recommendation. Not all departments and agencies provide such statements, but those that have a primary interest in the legislation usually do. Agency recommendations to veto are normally accompanied by veto messages that the president can use if he vetoes the bill.

It is expected that agencies will reflect their own interests in their advice to the president. They enjoy the autonomy to do so. In those instances, however, where agencies do not view their interests as being directly affected by the legislation, they may voice no objection, defer to another agency, or simply take no position.

The Legislative Reference Division then collects the recommendations and prepares a cover memo for the president. This memo briefly describes the pur-

1950). Stephen J. Wayne and James F. C. Hyde, Jr., "Presidential Decision-Making on Enrolled Bills," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1978): 284–296.

[3] Central legislative clearance, which has also preserved its same general form since the Roosevelt administration, requires all executive agencies to submit proposed positions on legislation to OMB before such positions are transmitted to Congress. It is the function of OMB to determine the relationship of the agency's proposed position to the program of the president. The position may be cleared without change, cleared with changes, or disapproved. For further information on this process see Neustadt, "Presidential Clearance of Legislation"; Stephen J. Wayne, *The Legislative Presidency* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 70–100; James F. C. Hyde, Jr. and Stephen J. Wayne, "White House-OMB Legislative Relations," in *Readings on Presidential Policy-Making*, eds. Steven Shull and Lance LeLoup, forthcoming.

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pose of the bill, lists the department and agency positions, indicates the OMB recommendation, and discusses the major issues of the legislation. The cover memo and the accompanying statements of the departments and agencies are then forwarded to the White House not later than the fifth day of the ten-day period within which the president must act.[4]

From the Truman administration to the mid-1960s, Legislative Reference's enrolled bill file constituted the bulk of the information at the president's disposal when he considered the legislation. Although the file was reviewed in the White House, it did not receive in-depth scrutiny. The White House staff lacked the size and expertise to undertake this task except in rare instances.

Within the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), Legislative Reference enjoyed considerable clout during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy years. Staffed by career civil servants and operating with relative independence from the budget director, the division drew on the expertise of the budget examiners in effectively determining the BOB recommendation, summarizing the critical issues, and reviewing executive branch views in its enrolled bill memo to the president. In effect, it operated as a staff arm of the White House.

Commencing in 1965, major decision-making components within BOB and the White House began to evolve, although the procedures for collecting department and agency advice remained essentially the same. In the White House a trend toward an enlarged and more formalized policy staff that had begun in the Johnson administration was greatly advanced by the early 1970s. The assistant to the president for domestic affairs, who also supervised the policy staff, assumed major responsibility for the enrolled bill process.[5] Theoretically, he reviewed and signed off on all enrolled bill recommendations before they were sent to the president. In practice, however, only the most controversial bills were examined. Most attention focused on those bills in which executive branch opinion was divided or unanimous in recommending a veto.

The domestic policy staffs were organized along subject matter lines. Their size permitted greater expertise and time to be devoted to enrolled bills than was possible in the pre-1965 period. Moreover, the establishment of an internal distribution list within the White House assured consideration of political factors from a variety of quarters. Beginning with the Nixon administration the congressional liaison office was regularly consulted on all bills.

[4] The ten-day period commences when the legislation is officially received by the executive clerk in the White House. During occasions of extended foreign travel for the president or in cases of very long and complex bills, after its passage legislation may be held in the Congress until the president and his staff are able to consider it. This can be done by either of the presiding officers of the Senate or House simply withholding his signature from the parchment original. Legislation requires the signature of both presiding officers before it can be formally presented at the White House. Although delays are not standard practice, they have occurred from time to time and do provide the ten-day period with some flexibility.

[5] This description concerns legislation that is primarily domestic in character. The reference to the policy staff is to the domestic policy staff. Since 1960, bills involving national security questions have been sent to the president's adviser for national security affairs in addition to the regular distribution list within the White House itself.

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This increased White House scrutiny seemed to have two major effects: a greater amount of information and politically based points of view at the president's disposal; and a shift of key presidential advisement closer to the Oval Office. White House advisers presumably were more influential by virtue of the way the process was structured and sequenced. Their recommendations were made last but appeared first in the file the president received. Since all recommendations were confidential, the departments and agencies did not know what White House advisers or OMB, for that matter, had recommended.[6] Under these circumstances and within the time constraints imposed by the ten-day period, appeals were difficult. The White House cover memo which summarized the OMB summary and included White House opinion was the one the president was likely to read most thoroughly most of the time. It was shorter and its format was tailored to his wishes.

Despite this enlarged White House staff role, there were also changes within OMB that worked to preserve its influence. Four new positions were created at the top of the OMB organizational structure and staffed by political appointees. Titled program associate directors, they were given authority in budgetary, legislative, and management matters within broad, though distinct, subject areas. Working closely with their opposite numbers on the domestic policy staff, these associate directors became involved in the formulation of enrolled bill recommendations as part of their ongoing legislative responsibilities. The director and deputy director of OMB also participated more regularly in determining the office's recommendations.

As a consequence of these structural changes, OMB's advisory mechanism seemed to be more sensitive to political factors and, conversely, less oriented toward making its recommendations solely on the substantive merits of the legislation.[7] In short, during the 1965–1976 period, the process seemed to become more politicized, with the president's policy aides appearing to exert a greater influence.

Data and Methodology

The data for this study come from page one of the enrolled bill memorandum the Office of Management and Budget prepares for the president. The first page of this memorandum contains a variety of information, including a listing of the congressional sponsor of the legislation, a synopsis of the purpose of

[6] Knowledge of recommendations related to the order in which advice was given. OMB was aware of department and agency recommendations but generally not those of the White House staff. The latter had the advantage of knowing all executive branch recommendations. The head of the policy staff and, of course, the president had complete access to all White House recommendations although other aides could usually obtain this information if they desired.

[7] The thesis that OMB became more politicized during the Nixon and Ford presidencies has been advanced by Hugh Heclo in his article, "OMB and the Presidency—The Problems of Neutral Competence," *The Public Interest* 38 (Winter 1975):80–98; and Hyde and Wayne, "White House-OMB Legislative Relations."

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the bill, and a brief discussion of its origin and impact on the president's program. It also summarizes department and agency recommendations and OMB advice (see Appendix).

We have compiled the recommendations made in every enrolled bill memorandum prepared by the Legislative Reference Division for the Nixon presidency and through June 30, 1976, for the Ford presidency. We focused on these presidencies because they were recent, because they were Republican, and because they were saddled with more liberal, Democratic Congresses. Although we expected the ideological and partisan factors to maximize the veto situation, we found that the vast majority of enrolled bill recommendations were unanimous to approve the legislation. In such cases, the president's choice is not difficult; he almost always goes along and signs the bill into law. We found only one instance in which he did not do so.[8]

We eliminated all unanimous recommendations to approve legislation from our study. Lacking controversy, these recommendations dictated positive presidential responses. In a statistical sense there was no variance, nothing to explain. However, we did include unanimous recommendations to veto because they indicated controversy and did not always induce a particular presidential response. Thus, our universe consists of all enrolled bill memos in which there was at least one recommendation to veto. We consider these bills "controversial" in the sense that a difference of opinion existed between the executive branch and the legislature and often within the executive branch itself. This difference could only be resolved by presidential action.

During the frame of analysis, January 1969–June 30, 1976, there were 238 of these controversial bills.[9] President Nixon acted on 144; President Ford, 94. Sixty percent of this legislation originated in the House of Representatives and almost 75 percent was sponsored by Democrats. Most of the enrolled bills were public (90 percent) and almost twice as many were passed during the second session of the Congress than the first. Sixty-four percent of these controversial bills were ultimately approved by the president.

We employ nominal level statistical measures in our analysis. Departments and agencies couch their recommendations to the president in a variety of ways: approval, no objection, disapproval, defer (to some other agency), and no position. For the most part, we have reduced this advice to three categories: approval, disapproval, and defer. Almost all of our statistical analysis concerns the approval and disapproval categories. Bar graphs are used to present the distribution of the data.

In our analysis, we are primarily interested in what the executive branch recommends and what the president does. Since presidential action is the final

[8] In 1974, Congress passed legislation to name the United States Court House and Federal Office Building in Grand Rapids, Michigan, the Gerald R. Ford Federal Building. Despite unanimous approval within the executive branch, Ford vetoed the bill on January 4, 1975, on the grounds that no other federal office building was named for a sitting president. The veto message thanked Congress for its sentiment but cited precedent as reason for the president's action.

[9] During this same period, a total of 2,868 bills and resolutions became law.

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step in the enrolled bill process, in this study we view the president's decision as a dependent variable while executive recommendations to the president are considered independent variables.[10] OMB's advice is seen both as dependent on department views and an independent influence on presidential action.

Three analytic sections follow. The first examines the relationship between presidential actions and the recommendations of lead agencies (those most directly affected by the legislation),[11] all other agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget. The second illustrates these patterns by focusing on the recommendations of three departments: Agriculture; Health, Education and Welfare; and Interior. The final section contrasts the actions of Presidents Nixon and Ford on enrolled bills. Here we examine patterns of executive branch recommendations and presidential decisions over the time frames of individual Congresses. In this way, we illustrate the cues that each president may have considered in making his judgments on enrolled bills.

Presidential Cue Taking: The Lead Agency and OMB

The recommendations of all departments and agencies on all bills are not equally important. Next to OMB, the lead agency tends to be the most important: Non-lead agencies that are asked to make recommendations seem to have relatively little impact on OMB's advice or presidential action.

The lead agency recommended presidential approval of legislation more often than OMB. For our sample, the lead agencies advised the president to approve 56 percent of the controversial legislation compared to 34 percent for OMB. The reason that lead agencies are more favorably disposed toward the legislation is that they often have a direct stake in it while OMB usually does not. Legislation that extends agency jurisdiction, enlarges its staff, expands its budget, or enhances its influence is likely to be supported by its beneficiaries. When OMB as an executive branch agency is affected in this manner, it too can

[10] As students of formal modeling know, any recursive model somewhat oversimplifies reality. Ours is no exception. Other linkages might be incorporated within the model, such as between Congress and the White House, or some linkage might be considered reciprocal. For example, the president's own position, if known, might at times influence the recommendations of departments and agencies. We concede, therefore, that more elaborate models might eventually be developed. However simplistic, models are useful in making explicit the underlying behavior and relationships that are being examined. On the whole, we believe that this model accurately depicts the interrelationships among OMB, the lead agencies, and the White House—the principal actors in the enrolled bill process. The model's ability to predict accurately ultimate disposition of legislation will serve as its own test of validity. We anticipate refinements in the model as additional information from more presidencies is examined and as more is learned about White House decision making.

[11] In most cases, there is only one lead agency. In a few cases, there are several. Determining the lead agency is relatively easy. The subject matter of the legislation normally falls within the jurisdiction of a single department or agency. In some cases, the agency is even mentioned in the bill. In addition, OMB normally lists the lead agency's recommendation directly after its own in reporting the advice to the president.

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be counted on for support. For OMB, however, other presidential interests normally predominate. Charged with budget preparation, legislative clearance, and management oversight, its orientation is to recommend the approval of legislation that conforms to the president's budget estimates and program objectives and to oppose legislation that does not. Having the president as its principal client has placed OMB in a unique position to claim a presidential perspective and to resist outside pressures, pressures to which other executive departments and agencies must be responsive. OMB has traditionally been concerned with maintaining precedent and avoiding exceptions to the rules. As a consequence, it has earned the reputation as the agency that says no.

Despite being insulated from some of the political pressures that affect the rest of the executive branch, OMB is not totally indifferent to the views of other departments and agencies. Making decisions on the merits of legislation requires considerable substantive knowledge, the kind lead agencies with a stake in the legislation are likely to offer in support of the recommendation. Rarely can OMB afford to disregard completely this knowledge and advice in favor of its own expertise. Our data indicate that when the lead agency recommended that the president approve the legislation, OMB approval recommendations rose from 34 to 45 percent; when the lead agency recommended a veto, OMB veto recommendations rose from 66 percent to 75 percent. Thus, OMB appears to be influenced, at least to some extent, by lead agency advice.

Since presidents usually approve acts passed by Congress, it is not surprising that when both the lead agency and OMB supported the enrolled bill, the president almost always approved it (96 percent). Lead agency support alone was frequently compelling. Presidents approved 79 percent of the bills that lead agencies recommended be signed. OMB's approval was an even more certain indication that Presidents Nixon and Ford would approve the legislation. In 95 percent of the cases in which OMB advised approval, the president approved the bill. In fact, during the six and one-half year period that we studied enrolled bill recommendations, the president vetoed only four bills that OMB had supported!

While OMB's advice to approve seemed to be regarded as an all-clear signal at the White House, an OMB recommendation to veto was taken only as a warning. If reinforced by other executive agencies, notably the lead agency, this warning tended to induce a negative presidential response. Of all the legislation in our universe of controversial bills, presidents vetoed only 36 percent of it. When both OMB and the lead agency advised disapproval, however, presidential vetoes rose to 63 percent. When a majority of the other agencies also opposed the legislation, this percent increased still further (75 percent). Clearly, the key to presidential vetoing seemed to lie in the threshold of executive opposition. The greater that opposition, the more likely the president would veto the bill *so long as OMB had opposed it.*

The most difficult situation for the president and his staff was when the lead agency recommended approval and OMB disapproved. In such situations

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Presidents Nixon and Ford tended to follow the lead agency, signing 65 percent of the bills that fell into this category. Their sensitivity to political pressures seemed to account for this tilt in favor of legislation. The percentages of presidential responses to different patterns of lead agency and OMB approval and disapproval recommendations are presented in Figure 1.

The Impact of the Departments of Agriculture, HEW, and Interior

Some agencies have been more successful than others in convincing the president to follow their advice. A variety of factors have contributed to this success: public and congressional support of the department and its programs; the size, prestige, and political muscle of its clientele; the persuasiveness and supportiveness of its secretary and other political appointees; and the reputation, expertise, and skills of its career civil service. The policy preferences and political sensitivities of the president and his staff also have an effect on which recommendations are followed and which are not.

Assuming the level of agreement among an agency, OMB, and the president on enrolled bills to be a reflection of a department's persuasiveness, we examined the recommendations of three departments: Agriculture; Health, Education and Welfare; and Interior. These departments were chosen for several reasons: their views on legislation were solicited on more enrolled bills than were other departments and agencies, except, of course, OMB; their needs, objectives, and policy preferences bore differing relationships to Nixon's and Ford's legislative programs; their clientele varied in their support of each president; and finally, the personality, reputations, and "clout" of their secretaries were different. Agriculture had a secretary who was influential and clientele who were unified and generally supportive of presidential policy. HEW changed secretaries frequently during this period and was only occasionally viewed as being "close" to the president. In addition, HEW's clientele were less unified and less important (some might even say hostile) to the president's program. Interior fell between these extremes. Both presidents enjoyed backing from Interior's user and producer groups but had less support from that department's consumer and conservation interests.

FIGURE 1

Agency Advice and Presidential Actions



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We expected to find the highest levels of agreement among Agriculture, OMB, and the president and the lowest levels among HEW, OMB, and the president. These expectations were only partially borne out by the data. Both OMB and the president, in fact, were more often in accord with the Department of Agriculture than they were with either the Departments of Interior or Health, Education and Welfare. However, most disagreement developed between Interior and OMB. Presidential support was approximately equal for HEW and Interior.

Agriculture had the most success with OMB and the president but only when it made recommendations as a lead agency. When it did so as a non-lead agency, its ability to influence the president appeared to be no greater than HEW, Interior, or for that matter, other non-lead agencies. This supports our proposition that the recommendations of non-lead agencies were not a particularly important influence on presidential actions regardless of the prestige of the agencies or the subject matter of the legislation.

Agriculture was more favorably disposed to legislation than were most other lead agencies. It advised presidential approval two-thirds of the time on this controversial legislation compared to 56 percent for all lead agencies (51 percent for HEW and 65 percent for Interior). This relatively high approval rate for Agriculture undoubtedly contributed to that department's success in getting the president to accept its recommendations. It is easier to persuade a president to sign legislation than to veto it. Agriculture's strong and relatively cohesive clientele could also be counted on to apply significant political pressure, usually to approve the bill. Finally, OMB evidenced a slightly higher level of agreement with Agriculture on recommendations to approve (56 percent) than it did with lead agencies in general (45 percent). This level of agreement undoubtedly also contributed to the president's inclination to approve Agriculture's legislation. Both OMB and the president agreed with Agriculture's recommendation to veto 88 percent of the time.

It is probably not surprising that HEW under two Republican presidents was less positively disposed toward controversial legislation than was Agriculture, since both Nixon and Ford were suspicious of and objected to high-cost social-welfare programs at the national level. What is somewhat surprising, however, is that HEW was almost as supportive of controversial enrolled bills as were lead agencies as a whole. The department obviously had to try to be responsive to the views of the presidents as well as to its more liberal clientele.

Presidents Nixon and Ford agreed with HEW's recommendations to approve 78 percent of the time and with its recommendations to veto 47 percent. These percentages were also similar to the average level of presidential agreement with all lead agencies. OMB, however, evidenced a somewhat lower level of agreement with HEW than it did for other lead agencies, perhaps reflecting the budget agency's sensitivity to high-expenditure legislation and its skepticism of the cost-effectiveness of large social programs.[12]

[12] The department's disagreement with OMB on enrolled bill recommendations may also

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OMB tended to be even more negative on legislation affecting Interior. The president, however, was more supportive. The budget agency's highest level of agreement with Interior came on recommendations to veto; conversely, the president's greatest support came on recommendations to approve. This pattern of agency advice and presidential action suggests that the Department of Interior did not possess much influence with either OMB or the president. Unlike Agriculture, which enjoyed success with both OMB and the president on both its recommendations to approve and disapprove, Interior was successful only when its recommendations accorded with the typical inclination of OMB to say no on controversial legislation and the president to say yes.

The reasons for presidential support and OMB opposition seemed to correspond to the nature of the legislation with which the Department of Interior regularly dealt. Many of the so-called pork barrel bills came within its purview. The department and the president could be expected to be sensitive to the political pressures for approving this legislation; OMB, as guardian of the president's budget, would not nearly be as sympathetic.

The confrontation between OMB and Interior highlights some of the tension that can and often does exist between lead agencies and OMB. OMB is supposed to take the president's program into account. However, despite its so-called politicization, OMB and the president were clearly not on the same wave lengths for much of this controversial legislation. Moreover, as lead agencies, these three departments tended to be more successful than OMB in convincing the president to support their recommendations. Put another way, OMB was not able to sustain its negative recommendations against these three lead agencies most of the time, and in the case of Interior, it was not able to sustain it even with the department's support.

Variations in Presidential Behavior

In reaching their decisions on enrolled bills, Presidents Nixon and Ford differed in the weight they placed on the recommendations of individual agencies. As indicated in Figure 2, Nixon was somewhat more likely to follow the lead agency's positive recommendations than was Ford. He signed 83 percent of the bills approved by the lead agencies compared with 74 percent for Ford. On the other hand, Ford was more willing to concur with OMB's negative advice. He vetoed 56 percent of the legislation OMB advised him to compared with 41 percent for Nixon (not shown in Figure 2).

We would hypothesize that Nixon's larger policy staff increased the political sensitivities and technical capabilities of the Nixon White House and, conversely, decreased its dependence on OMB's analysis and perhaps its

indicate that OMB's politicization during this period has been exaggerated. To say it simply, OMB obviously took different (and presumably less partisan) factors into account in rendering its recommendation to the president on HEW legislation.

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FIGURE 2

Agency Advice and the Separate Actions of Presidents Nixon and Ford



incentive for following OMB's recommendations. Ford, on the other hand, had a smaller domestic policy staff, one that had experienced considerable turnover during the 1974–1975 period. As a consequence, he and his aides had to rely more on OMB. They saw it as the one agency that could be counted on to take a presidential perspective, albeit with a naysaying orientation.

OMB's negative recommendations increased as each administration progressed. While President Nixon vetoed only 26 percent of OMB disapproval recommendations during the Ninety-first Congress, he vetoed 46 percent during the Ninety-second Congress and 63 percent in the Ninety-third. President Ford vetoed 51 percent and 68 percent, respectively. It stands to reason that Republican presidents saddled with Democratic Congresses would have become more receptive to OMB's veto recommendations as their honeymoon with Congress ended and the time for the next election neared.[13]

While OMB's increased negativism and the nearness to the next national election may help explain Ford's greater inclination to veto legislation, another factor, greater agreement between lead agency and OMB, also may have

[13] When a president faces a Congress dominated by the opposite party, differences in legislative judgment between the White House and the Congress will be most at variance as the time for the presidential election nears, and to a lesser extent, as the time for the off-year congressional election approaches. With a Republican in the White House who is more conservative than a Democratic majority in Congress, the expected pattern of behavior would be increased presidential vetoing, especially in policy areas that the president had chosen to differentiate his position from the opposition's in Congress. OMB could be expected to reflect these presidential policy positions, so its veto recommendations should increase over time.

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contributed to the same result. As shown in Figure 2, there were more instances in which both lead agency and OMB lined up against legislation in the Ford administration than in the Nixon presidency. This unity of opposition made it easier for Ford to go along with negative recommendations.

Naturally, we would not expect increased presidential vetoing to occur if one party controlled both the presidency and Congress. On the contrary, we would anticipate less vetoing closer to the election and, relatively speaking, more in non-election years when the political ramifications might not be as severe. The political environment combined with the president's inclination undoubtedly affects advice he receives, probably more so as the election approaches, and especially, if the president is a candidate. Despite their own interests, agencies directed by political appointees who have a personal stake in the outcome of the election are not oblivious to the president's political and policy needs.

Conclusion

The decision to sign or veto legislation is vested in the president alone, yet its exercise has become a function of the institutionalized presidency. Touching relevant bases obviously enhances the president's perspective, alerting him to a wide range of substantive and political issues. It also serves another purpose. It extends the parameters of policymaking, thereby giving executive departments and agencies and even members of Congress an input. To public servants and legislative representatives, anxious to maintain their own credibility and desirous of affecting policy judgments, such an input is considered very important.

From the president's point of view, the inputs are not equal. OMB has consistently enjoyed greater influence than any other executive agency. The reasons for this influence relate to OMB's position, its orientation, and its resources. OMB runs the process and prepares the basic enrolled bill memo. It is a presidential agency, cognizant of the president's policy objectives. OMB applies these objectives in making its recommendations. Moreover, it has the benefit of other agency views and a fairly large staff of its own. Naturally, presidents and their policy aides have turned to OMB for cues.

During the Nixon and Ford administrations, an OMB recommendation to approve generally signaled the absence of major problems. With OMB support, the odds became heavily weighted in favor of presidential approval, regardless of what others recommended. OMB's advice to veto, on the other hand, did not have as predictable a presidential response. The reason probably is the presumption in favor of most enrolled bills. Nonetheless, an OMB veto recommendation remained the important danger signal that alerted Presidents Nixon and Ford and their policy aides to look closely at other cues, most particularly the position of the lead agency. The expectation that the lead agency would support the legislation suggests why lead agency negative recommenda-

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tions combined with OMB's advice to veto were such powerful influences on presidential behavior.

If the two main cues (OMB and the lead agency) were not lined up in the same direction, the president's choice was much more difficult. Nixon's and Ford's major problems stemmed from split recommendations in which the expectation of lead agency approval and OMB disapproval was realized. Under these circumstances, which occurred with considerable frequency on the controversial bills we examined, there were few other executive branch cues. The views of other agencies may have been considered but unless their interests were central and their arguments compelling, they were apt to be discounted. This suggests the situation in which the president's own domestic policy aides were apt to be most influential.

In cases of split recommendations, one basic trend stood out. Enrolled legislation was given the benefit of doubt. Presidents Nixon and Ford signed almost two-thirds of the legislation that fell into this category.

We conclude that the strong association between lead agency recommendations, OMB advice, and presidential actions on controversial legislation indicates that much cue giving and taking does occur within the executive advisory mechanism. Thus, not only does the president not decide in a vacuum, but also the White House policy staff does not exert countervailing pressures. The White House may take sides, but it rarely goes it alone. More often than not, its recommendations are shaped by other executive advice, most notably OMB and the lead agency. This is why it is usually possible to predict a high percentage of presidential actions on enrolled bills simply from a knowledge of lead agency and OMB recommendations.

Of the three departments we examined, Agriculture seemed to be in the president's camp politically and ideologically. Its clientele in the executive and on Capitol Hill coincided most closely with the president's electoral constituency. The department's advice was seriously considered and usually followed. Interior and HEW had less success, especially on their recommendations to veto. The nature of the legislation, its public impact, and its political consequences may have had something to do with both presidents' inclinations to approve bills these departments opposed. Even OMB was unable to persuade the president to veto bills that Interior had recommended be disapproved, although the joint opposition of HEW and OMB was usually sufficient to induce a negative presidential response.

The ebb and flow in the recommendation patterns between OMB and the agencies illustrate some of the checks and balances within the executive branch and also help explain the differences in President Nixon's and Ford's reaction to enrolled bills. That Ford was more negative than Nixon owes primarily to OMB's increased negativism during his administration and the greater unanimity on the veto recommendations between OMB and the lead agency. Also Ford's smaller and less influential domestic policy staff was not in a position to challenge OMB as had Nixon's staff under John Ehrlichman. There were, of

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course, other factors: the nearness of the 1974 congressional election to his succession to office; the size of the Democratic majority in the 1974–1976 period; the Reagan challenge and the necessity to appeal to a more conservative Republican constituency; and the president's own policy views.

In generalizing about the Nixon-Ford experience, we would hypothesize that presidential decisions on enrolled bills seem to be governed by two instincts: to rule and to win. For presidents faced with an opposition Congress, these instincts lead to different decisions over time. To govern, presidents have no choice but to cooperate with Congress. Otherwise, policymaking becomes a hollow exercise with little chance of success. But to run for reelection and support the election of members of the president's party involves taking stands that are consistent with the party's political constituency. In certain situations, vetoing encourages this, probably more so with a Republican in the White House and Democrats in the majority in Congress. By saying no to Democratic legislation, Republican presidents can reassert the purity of their policy views while at the same time, declaring their independence from Congress.*

* The authors gratefully acknowledge the research support received from The George Washington University Committee on Research.

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APPENDIX
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill H.R. 8000—Tort claims suits

Sponsor—Rep. Celler (D) New York

Last Day for Action

June 5, 1961—Monday

Purpose

A very concise statement in 1-2-3-4-style of the principal features of the enrolled bill. Usually not more than one or two sentences. Comments, views, issues, agency differences, urgency, etc., should go into the two following sections.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget	Approval
Department of Justice	Approval (Signing statement attached)
Postal Service	Approval
Department of State	No objection
Department of the Treasury	No objection
Department of Commerce	Disapproval (Veto message attached)
Department of the Interior	Defers to Justice

Discussion

The discussion should be as brief as possible and yet contain the essential background and basic data that the president should have in deciding action on the bill. If pertinent and significant, such matters as the following should be covered here: origin of the bill; differences, if any, from the administration's proposal; changes in policy or deviations from established policy; important agency comments or differences; significant provisions of the bill; estimates of costs or savings, and relationship of the budget; references to any attached draft veto message, memorandum of disapproval, or signing statement.

Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

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The Senate Reorganizes Its Committees, 1977

JUDITH H. PARRIS

The first internal reorganization of the United States Senate in three decades was approved on February 4, 1977.[1] Unlike President Carter's attempts to restructure the executive branch, the Senate's internal changes attracted relatively little attention outside that chamber. This article chronicles the reorganization and discusses three broader isues: Why was the effort successful? What were its effects? Does reorganization matter?

Restructuring the Senate was one response to contemporary congressional frustration. "The roots of reform," Charles O. Jones has written, "are to be found in how the members look at themselves and their perceptions of how others look at them."[2] During the past decade, many senators found their institution personally inconvenient and less effective than they thought possible. Polls told them that the public held Congress in low esteem. At the same time, the congressional workload spiraled continuously upward.[3] To strengthen their

[1] Academic writing on the committee system is extensive; the House, rather than the Senate, is the main focus. See particularly Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); George Goodwin, Jr., *The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970); William L. Morrow, *Congressional Committees* (New York: Scribner's, 1969); and Norman J. Ornstein, ed., "Changing Congress: The Committee System," *The Annals* 411 (January 1974). For analysis of the effort to reorganize the House's committee system in 1974, see Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress Against Itself* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

[2] Charles O. Jones, "Will Reform Change Congress?" in *Congress Reconsidered*, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 252.

[3] In 1947, the Senate was in session for 807 hours; in 1975, for 1,177 hours. In 1947, there were 138 roll call votes; in 1975, 611. In 1947, the average senator served on 2.4 subcommittees; in 1975,

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capacity to act as effective representatives and national policymakers, advocates of change sought to improve congressional resources and procedures.[4]

Origins

In the Senate, inner rumblings about the committee system surfaced at ad hoc hearings on the seniority system held by two junior senators, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., and Fred Harris, in January 1971. Extended hearings on possible congressional reforms were held by Senators Mathias and Adlai E. Stevenson III two years later.[5] Following his election in 1970, Senator Stevenson found the Senate to be irrationally structured and scheduled, as well as biased against newer members in terms of power resources. To pursue those issues, he agreed to head a special committee of the majority caucus, and thereafter introduced a resolution to create a select committee to investigate the committee system. Senator Bill Brock, also elected in 1970 and an outspoken advocate of structural reform in Congress,[6] sponsored a similar resolution. Neither measure passed the Ninety-third Congress, but the two senators lined up fifty-five cosponsors and on March 11, 1975, introduced Senate Resolution 109, calling for a temporary select committee to diagnose a wide range of complaints about the Senate's committee system. The resolution lay dormant in the Rules Committee for nearly a year. But during that time the Senate approved a remarkable list of other internal changes, including modification of the filibuster rule, opening of legislative markup sessions to the public, election of committee chairmen by secret ballot in the majority caucus, provision of additional committee staff, and establishment of a temporary Commission on the Operation of the Senate. Reform gained momentum. Supporters of reorganization, who numbered more than half the Senate, were aggressively insistent. "We're not asking, we're demanding," Senator Stevenson said in their behalf.[7] Senate Resolution 109 was adopted on March 31, 1976.[8]

14.3. In 1947, there were 232 people on standing committee staffs; in 1975, 1,277 people. U.S., Congress, Senate, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, *The Senate Committee System: Jurisdictions, Referrals, Numbers and Sizes, and Limitations on Membership*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, First Staff Report, pp. 6–7. Hereafter cited as First Staff Report.

[4] On congressional "reassertion," see particularly Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*; Louis Fisher, *President and Congress: Power and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1972), idem., *Presidential Spending Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), and idem., *The Constitution Between Friends* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., ed., *Congress Against the President* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1975); and Norman J. Ornstein, ed., *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

[5] "Senate Rules Hearings to Discuss Seniority System," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 30, no. 49 (December 2, 1972): 3094; "Reform: Senate Prestige, Effectiveness at Stake," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 30, no. 50 (December 9, 1972): 3128–3129.

[6] See Bill Brock, "Committees in the Senate," *The Annals* 411 (January 1974): 15–26.

[7] Bruce F. Freed, "Study of Senate Poses Challenge to Panel," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 33, no. 50 (December 13, 1975): 2717.

[8] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 122, no. 47, March 31,

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As the putative leader of the new select committee, Senator Stevenson spoke on the floor about improving the Senate's policymaking process. Pointing out that committees' jurisdictions were set forth in the thirty-year-old Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, he noted that since then issues had changed, the structure of the executive branch and the House had evolved, and the role of legislative bodies had shifted. Subcommittees had proliferated, he said, and the lack of jurisdictional realignment meant that "we sometimes end up reinventing the wheel simultaneously in different subcommittees. And we often end up dealing with parts of an issue with no mechanism to put the parts together."[9]

Strategically, it was evident that the best opportunity for reform would come before the Senate reorganized at the outset of the Ninety-fifth Congress in January 1977. The leadership of both parties would be changing. New senators would lack vested interests in the existing system. But action in January required specific proposals before adjournment in the fall of 1976.

The Select Committee Investigates

The first tasks were organizational. Democratic members of the Select Committee were announced April 1; Republicans, April 6.[10] The combined group was no mirror image of the Senate. As compared with proportions of the full membership, it overrepresented senators with an interest in change and underrepresented those seeking to retain their own power. The Select Committee had six Democrats and six Republicans; the overall Senate ratio was sixty-two Democrats and thirty-eight Republicans. In seniority, members of the Select Committee were relatively junior, with median continuous service between five and seven years, as contrasted with the median of nine years for all senators. The only committee chairmen on the Select Committee (other than Senator Stevenson) were from two of the less powerful committees: Frank Moss of Aeronautical and Space Sciences and Gaylord Nelson of Select Small Business. Nor were the committees equally represented; the Select Committee had no members from Foreign Relations, Judiciary, Rules and Administration, Joint Atomic Energy, Joint Defense Production, Joint Taxation, Joint Library, or Joint Printing. Significantly, however, five members of the Select Committee also served on Finance.

1976, S4737. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Legislative Authority for the Select Committee on Small Business, Proposed Select Committee on Committees: Hearings on S. Res. 104 and S. Res. 109*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976; see also, idem., *Establishing a Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System: Report to Accompany S. Res. 109*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, Report 94-722.

[9] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 122, no. 47, March 31, 1976, S4735-36.

[10] Democratic appointees were Senators Stevenson, Lee Metcalf, Gaylord Nelson, Lloyd M. Bentsen, Lawton Chiles, and Sam Nunn (later replaced by Frank Moss). Republican members were Senators Brock, Clifford R. Hansen, Barry Goldwater, Bob Packwood, Pete Domenici, and Jesse A. Helms.

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In an open organizing session held April 29, the Select Committee acknowledged its prior leadership by electing Senator Stevenson and Senator Brock as chairman and cochairman, respectively. The Select Committee also adopted procedural rules and extensively discussed priorities. It agreed to aim at interim recommendations concerning fundamental structural arrangements by November 15. Other issues went on the agenda for the second phase, with a final report scheduled for February 28, 1977.[11]

The Select Committee sought assistance, counsel, and understanding, particularly within the Senate. The staff conducted exhaustive structured interviews with representatives designated by the chairmen and ranking minority members of each committee. Details of each committee's work and attitudes about possible changes were catalogued. Close liaison was maintained with the Committee on Rules and Administration, which had legislative jurisdiction over reorganization proposals. Chairman Stevenson and the Select Committee's staff director, Kenneth E. Gray, each addressed the influential weekly breakfast meeting of committee chairmen's representatives. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress was commissioned for extensive assistance. Further perspective was provided at a seminar and dinner in June for a diverse group of experienced Washingtonians, including Representatives Richard Bolling and William A. Steiger, veterans of the House Select Committee on Committees. And one of the Select Committee's staff wrote an article soliciting assistance from political scientists interested in Congress.[12]

The Select Committee's first staff report, which was completed just before hearings in July, dealt with committees, subcommittees, assignments, jurisdictions, and possible alternatives.[13] In a "dear colleague" letter, Senators Stevenson and Brock noted the following "alleged problems": too many assignments, unequal workloads, jurisdictional overlap, underused committees, a poorly organized system, and wasteful scheduling.[14] The average senator, according to the staff report, served on twenty committees, subcommittees, boards, and commissions.

Only thirteen witnesses appeared at the July hearings, thus suggesting that reorganization was not being taken very seriously. Of those who did participate, most witnesses and Select Committee members expressed support for fewer committees and subcommittees, fewer assignments for members, functional organization of jurisdictions, and rotation of committee members.[15] Witnesses included ten senators, mostly Republicans and junior Democrats, and

[11] U.S., Congress, Senate, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, *Senate Committee System*, Hearings, 94th Cong. 2d sess., July 20, 21, and 22, 1976, pp. 182–95. Hereafter cited as July hearings.

[12] Roger H. Davidson, "Senate Reorganization Study Calls on Political Scientists," *PS* 9 (Summer 1976): 288–89. Response to the call was negligible.

[13] U.S., Congress, Senate, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, First Staff Report.

[14] Dear colleague letter dated July 9, 1976.

[15] July hearings, p. 98.

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only one committee chairman, Senator Moss. The sole public witness, Common Cause's president David Cohen, supported reorganization.

No witness appeared in opposition to the idea of reorganizing the Senate's committee system.

With no red or even amber light flashing, the Select Committee proceeded to consider specific proposals. At its direction, the staff fleshed out details of Starting Points I, II, and III for organizing the system: modification of the existing thirty-one-committee system; a functionally organized twelve-committee system; and a system of five overarching management committees with sixty standing subcommittees.[16]

A clear signal that some action on reorganization was realistically possible came in a floor statement by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield on September 8. Using material prepared by the Select Committee, he listed possible recommendations, including rotation of memberships and chairmanships and a substantial reduction in the number of committees. Senator Mansfield also pointed out that although the Select Committee lacked the power to report legislation, it would be possible under the rules for any senator to move immediate consideration of its recommendations in January without referral to committee.[17]

At further hearings September 14 and 15, discussion centered on three possible new committees: national security, science and technology, and energy. Reaction to the proposed consolidated committee on national security from key members of Armed Services and Foreign Relations was strongly negative. Criticisms included prospective workload, disparate responsibilities, the lack of existing jurisdictional overlaps, the desirability of different viewpoints on the issues, and opposition of other committee members. The chairman of the Space Committee, Senator Moss, presented a Starting Point IV, also endorsed by Senator Goldwater, the Committee's ranking minority member, that called for fifteen committees, including a panel on science and technology. Creation of a committee on energy was endorsed by Senator Hubert Humphrey and representatives of Congress Watch and Friends of the Earth.[18]

In seven days of open markup sessions, the Select Committee drafted its recommendations, beginning by general agreement with Starting Point II, the twelve-committee system, thus opting for modification, rather than radical restructuring, which simply lacked support both inside and outside the Senate. The Select Committee recommended major changes: extensive functional consolidation of jurisdictions; reducing the number of committees from thirty-one to fifteen; limiting senators to membership on three committees and five sub-

[16] The second staff report was published in U.S., Congress, Senate, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System. *Senate Committee System*, Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., September 14 and 15, 1976, Part 2, pp. 179–222. Hereafter cited as September hearings.

[17] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 122, no. 134, September 8, 1976, S15366.

[18] As in July, senators suggested a wide range of further changes. See September hearings, *passim*.

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committees; restructuring each senator's chairmanships to a maximum of one full committee and one subcommittee of each committee; authorizing creation by resolution of ad hoc committees with legislative authority and the multiple referral of bills by motion; streamlining scheduling procedures; fixing responsibility in committees for comprehensive policy oversight in specific areas; and mandating continuing review of the committee system by the joint leadership.

The Select Committee's consensus was generally harmonious. Senators Moss and Goldwater lost their bid for a science and technology committee; primarily for that reason, Senator Goldwater did not sign the committee report. All other committee members signed it. Although visibly unhappy at the time of the decision, Senator Moss wrote in individual views that he regarded the Select Committee's consolidation of jurisdiction over science and technology in the new Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation as "the next best thing."[19]

The main jurisdictional changes from Starting Point II revealed some patterns of power. Maintaining separate Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees resulted from opposition to their consolidation by the existing committees. Separate committees on energy and on the environment were created partly because environmentalists opposed their merger, contending that environmental concerns would be subordinate to those of energy producers, and partly because merger would eliminate a major standing committee, either Interior or Public Works. All jurisdiction proposed to be shifted out of the Finance Committee in Starting Point II was restored; members of that panel opposed the shifts, and no one had recommended changing the Finance Committee at the hearings. Science and technology were moved from the Environment to the Commerce Committee, which already had, and wanted to keep, substantial jurisdiction in those fields. (Also, Senator Moss was a member of the Commerce Committee.) After consideration of various options, small business was moved to the Agriculture Committee with the agreement of Senator Nelson, chairman of the Select Committee on Small Business and a member of the Stevenson committee.

The Select Committee's recommendations took legislative form as Senate Resolution 586, which Chairman Stevenson introduced October 15. Having a concrete proposal and accompanying report greatly strengthened prospects for reorganization in January. The resolution provided a threat, if necessary, of direct action on the floor.

Political prospects for the recommendations got a boost in the November elections. Three standing committee chairmen whose panels were slated for abolition—Senators Gale McGee of Post Office and Civil Service, Vance Hartke of Veterans' Affairs, and Frank Moss of Aeronautical and Space Sciences—were

[19] U.S., Congress, Senate, Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, *First Report, with Recommendations: Structure of the Senate Committee System: Jurisdictions, Numbers and Sizes, Limitations on Memberships and Chairmanships, Referral Procedures, and Scheduling*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, Report 94-1395, p. 204.

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defeated. Senators McGee and Hartke were expected to oppose the abolitions vigorously.

And eighteen new senators were elected, the largest freshman class in twenty-eight years.

As it became increasingly likely that reorganization would be taken up in January, public interest quickened. Editorial comment was mostly favorable. Active opposition came in letter-writing campaigns, phone calls, and visits from veterans, the elderly, and small business people, whose clientele committees were slated for consolidation. Significantly, labor did not regard its interests as threatened and hence did not actively oppose Senate reorganization as it had reorganization of the House committees in 1974.

To take advantage of the opportunity for change, support from the Senate leadership was necessary. On December 9, Senators Stevenson and Bob Packwood (who had replaced the defeated Bill Brock as cochairman of the Select Committee) met with three key members of the Rules committee—Chairman Howard W. Cannon and Senators Robert C. Byrd and Robert P. Griffin, the prospective floor leaders.[20] It was agreed that the resolution providing for reorganization would be referred to the Rules Committee for hearings and reported by January 19, with no new committee assignments until after reorganization was completed, and no cloture or other rules changes that might be subject to a filibuster. That decision made it clear that there would be a reorganization in January. At issue were the jurisdictional details.

On the first day of the Ninety-fifth Congress, January 4, 1977, Senator Stevenson introduced Senate Resolution 4, which incorporated the Select Committee's recommendations. By unanimous consent, it was referred to the Rules Committee under the conditions agreed to on December 9.

The new senators protested the effort to make them wait to get assignments. On January 5, the Democratic Conference adopted a resolution giving each freshman two "unalterably temporary" assignments, made by lot, to expire the day that the Senate completed action on reorganization, and with no seniority or rights to future assignments.

The Rules Committee Modifies

The proceedings in the Rules Committee were extraordinary. At stake was everything that Senate committees do. Beginning with Senators Stevenson and Packwood stating the case for Senate Resolution 4, thirty-nine senators appeared in hearings held on January 5, 6, 7, 10, and 13. All expressed support for the resolution except, in most instances, where it affected them directly. In contrast to the Select Committee's hearings, at which only three interest groups appeared, representatives of veterans, small business, the elderly, native

[20] Senator Byrd was indeed chosen as majority leader; Senator Griffin unexpectedly was defeated by Senator Howard Baker.

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Americans, public employees, the construction industry, the U.S. Labor party, and Congress Watch testified.[21]

During the hearings, Majority Leader Byrd arranged two lengthy private meetings with the committee chairmen at which Senator Stevenson was able to convince the initially skeptical chairmen of the need for reorganization. Senator Stevenson pointed out jurisdictional issues and encouraged the principals to work them out in "gentlemen's agreements."

Markup in the Rules Committee, held in open sessions by a vote of 4 to 4 on January 14, came January 14, 17–19, 21, and 24. Senator Stevenson sat in on the sessions and at Chairman Cannon's invitation offered frequent comments.[22] On January 25, the Rules Committee voted 9 to 0 to report Senate Resolution 4 as amended.[23]

As reported, Senate Resolution 4 reflected scores, perhaps hundreds, of small decisions about committees, jurisdictions, assignments, scheduling, staff, and related matters. Most of the issues concerned jurisdictions—"who gets what." The most spectacular battle involved oceans. The original resolution put oceans in the Environment and Public Works Committee. Chairman Warren G. Magnuson and others from the Commerce Committe testified that they wanted to retain oceans but were willing to forego mass transit (previously in the Banking Committee but shifted to Commerce under the consolidation of jurisdiction over transportation) and highways (previously in Public Works but slated for Commerce for the same reason). The Rules Committee tentatively decided to leave the environmental aspects of oceans in the new Environment and Public Works Committee. At the next markup, Chairman Magnuson appeared unannounced along with four other members of the Commerce Committee—Russell B. Long, Finance Committee chairman; Ernest F. Hollings, Oceans Subcommittee chairman; Ted Stevens, assistant minority leader; and John A. Durkin—to let it be known that they still wanted oceans. "We feel very keenly about this," Senator Magnuson said.[24] The Rules Committee voted to give them back the jurisdiction. It also acceded to the intense case made by Senator Frank Church to assign jurisdiction over international economic policy to the Foreign Relations Committee, rather than the Banking Committee as proposed in Senate Resolution 4.

In such a setting, more than one person in attendance was struck by the extent

[21] Topically, the hearings ran the vast range of "turf politics" and other structural issues. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Committee System Reorganization Amendements of 1977; Hearings on S. Res. 4*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., January 5–7, 10–11, and 13, 1977.

[22] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Committee System Reorganization Amendments of 1977: Open Markup Sessions on S. Res. 4*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977. Hereafter cited as Rules Committee markup.

[23] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Committee System Reorganization Amendments of 1977: Report to Accompany S. Res. 4*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, Report no. 95–2.

[24] Rules Committee markup, p. 149.

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to which the Senate is a personal institution. As Roger Mudd told the audience of the CBS Evening News:

> Listen very carefully, and when you hear the Senate talking about moving, say, oceans, from Commerce to Public Works, you'll know that they're not just talking about salt water. They're talking about Ernest Hollings of South Carolina. Oceans is his subcommittee. And when they talk about highways, they're really talking about Lloyd Bentsen of Texas. Small business means Gaylord Nelson. Mass transit means John Sparkman. Nutrition means George McGovern. Someone said the other day each senator ought to be furnished a member impact statement, so he'd know whether to vote yes or no.[25]

Amendments in the Rules Committee relaxed proposed consolidations somewhat but did not change the fundamental move toward fewer committees and assignments. Five committees were restored: Veterans' Affairs, Small Business, Standards and Conduct (renamed Ethics), Joint Economic, and Joint Taxation. Veterans' groups waged a massive campaign to keep "their" committee; small business interests also were active. An independent committee on ethics was considered necessary in the post-Watergate era. Representative Richard Bolling, prospective chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, testified in favor of maintaining that statutory panel. Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee recommended continuation of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Senator Stevenson was willing to accede to the latter three decisions; he forcefully opposed restoration of the clientele committees. With Senator Stevenson's sanction, the Rules Committee also added two temporary committees to write a code of conduct for the Senate and to review national policy on Indian affairs. The Rules Committee authorized itself to make subsequent recommendations about Joint Library and Joint Printing, whose Senate members were drawn from the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee also relaxed proposed functional consolidations somewhat; for example, it divided jurisdiction over transportation policy among three committees instead of consolidating it in one. With regard to assignments, the Rules Committee added an optional fourth committee slot (the new Ethics or Indian Affairs committees), increased a senator's maximum number of subcommittees from five to eight (after rejecting further expansion of the limit), and exempted the Appropriations Committee from subcommittee assignment limitations to allow it the same structure as its House counterpart. The Joint Committees on Printing, the Library, and Taxation, as well as the temporary Committee on Code of Conduct, were exempted from the chairmanship limitation to allow

[25] Transcript of telecast January 18, 1977. While the Senate no longer is run by a political "inner club," it remains a small body with a clubby social atmosphere. See for example, Nelson W. Polsby, "Goodbye to the Inner Club," *Washington Monthly* (August 1969): 30–34. Still, the Select Committee voted in the presence of Frank Moss to propose abolition of the committee that he chaired, and the full Senate voted to end committees that George McGovern chaired and Quentin Burdick wanted to chair.

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standing committee chairmen to continue to head the joint panels and recognize the short-term status of the code-writing group.

Amendments in the Rules Committee also served to allocate resources more widely among senators. The committee approved an amendment introduced by Senator Dick Clark, stating the sense of the Senate that all senators receive one subcommittee assignment on a committee before any one senator received a second. (In the existing system, junior Democratic senators received subcommittee assignments left after senior Democrats had chosen. Republicans on many committees and Democrats informally on a few committees already used the system advocated by Senator Clark.) Also, under an amendment sponsored by Senator Griffin, the Rules Committee by a 5 to 4 vote added a provision authorizing the minority party to obtain, upon request, one-third of a committee's funds (other than those used for central administrative and clerical purposes) and other resources.

In other changes in Senate Resolution 4, the Rules Committee deleted the leadership's power to propose, under privileged procedure, ad hoc committees with authorizing jurisdiction, which was believed to encourage additional committees. It also authorized the joint leadership to propose multiple referrals of bills by privileged motion rather than by unanimous consent. Majority Leader Byrd favored both decisions. As reported, Senate Resolution 4 also mandated that the Rules Committee, in consultation with the joint leadership, review operation of the committee system as well as the Standing Rules of the Senate on a continuing basis and report its recommendations biennially.

Outcome on the Floor

By the time Senate Resolution 4 reached the floor, passage was almost certain. Much of what transpired seemed almost inevitable. Most of the drama concerned votes on retaining or abolishing three committees: Aging, Nutrition and Human Needs, and Post Office and Civil Service.

Debate began January 31; voting, the following day. In the first major roll call, the Senate approved, 90 to 4, Senator Church's amendment to restore the Special Committee on Aging. Under an amendment sponsored by Senator Stevenson, that committee's membership was reduced from twenty-three to fourteen, with a subsequent reduction to nine at the beginning of the Ninety-sixth Congress.[26] Since the Church amendment had more than half the Senate as cosponsors, a cutback in assignments was the most consolidation that Senator Stevenson could salvage.

The Senate voted outright to abolish a committee on February 2. Senator

[26] In fact, the committee was reduced to nine members at the beginning of the Ninety-fifth Congress.

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Quentin N. Burdick's modified amendment to maintain the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, of which he was scheduled to become chairman, was tabled, 55 to 42. Affected unions of government employees had tried belatedly to save the panel. Senator Burdick himself had not decided until mid-January to make the fight. Some of his advisers believed that the chairmanship had hurt, rather than helped, Gale McGee in his unsuccessful 1976 race for reelection.

The next day the Senate rejected, 49 to 44, Senator George McGovern's modified amendment to continue a nine-member Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs for two years. It was the only committee with an incumbent chairman to be abolished. However, it got a reprieve the following day, as the Senate approved an amendment sponsored by Senator Percy to continue through calendar 1977 a five-member Nutrition Committee—and its staff.

In one somewhat surprising development, the Senate struck a blow for its junior members on February 3, adopting a modified amendment sponsored by Senator Clark that established a limit of two chairmanships, committee or subcommittee, for each senator on major committees, plus one additional chairmanship on other panels. The amendment became effective at the beginning of the Ninety-sixth Congress. It means that senior members of the majority no longer will be able to chair major subcommittees in addition to a full committee. It may also mean consideration of some issues in full committee without referral to subcommittee.

Remaining amendments were essentially minor. In one of the more notable, the Senate approved, 74 to 20, Senator Herman E. Talmadge's amendment requiring committees to evaluate the regulatory impact of each measure they reported. The Stevenson forces anticipated that the evaluations would be perfunctory and hence harmless.

Several floor amendments were rejected. A proposal by Senator Clark would have required all committees to decentralize power by establishing at least three legislative subcommittees. The measure's principal target was the Finance Committee. In anticipation of this proposal, Chairman Russell Long had agreed to establish more subcommittees, thus giving other Democrats the forum of a chairmanship and all members additional staff. The Senate also tabled, 75 to 15, Senator William D. Hathaway's amendment to limit any senator to eight years of continuous service on a committee and rejected, 62 to 26, Senator Nelson's amendment to rotate committee chairmen after no more than six years of continous service. Also unsuccessful was Senator Walter Huddleston's amendment requiring an affirmative vote of two-thirds of senators present and voting to create a new standing committee. The Senate voted 70 to 10 against an attempt by Senator Jesse A. Helms to limit to 100 the total number of standing committees and subcommittees, with a chairmanship for each senator. And it tabled, 56 to 42, an amendment sponsored by Senator James B. Allen disapproving the president's recommendations for a federal pay raise, including a raise for the Senate.

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On final passage, only Senator Burdick voted against Senate Resolution 4; eighty-nine senators voted for it.

Why Reorganization Succeeded

Widespread skepticism about prospects for reorganization persisted almost until the eve of approval. Participants, as well as scholars, tend to assume that legislative procedures are static rather than dynamic. Hence some reflection is warranted on the reasons for the 1977 changes.

Arguably, four factors critically affect reorganizational efforts: the general climate of opinion; the extent of support for and opposition to the proposal's merits among those directly affected; the quality of leadership among advocates and opponents; and the effectiveness of their strategy and tactics. All these factors facilitated passage of Senate Resolution 4.

Undoubtedly, winds had been blowing in the direction of institutional change.[27] For more than a decade, the United States had been experiencing a new progressive era in governmental reform: restructuring presidential selection processes; carrying out internal legislative reforms; recasting the intelligence establishment; introducing revenue sharing and budgetary innovations; enacting sunshine laws and privacy laws. Moreover, and crucially, the short-term time was "right" in early 1977, with an influx of new senators.

The most important constituency for change was the senators themselves. Common Cause and editorial writers for the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Star*, and a few other publications solidly supported the Stevenson Committee's efforts; other public interest forces were either equivocal or silent. But a heterogeneous coalition of senators favored restructuring the Senate for a variety of reasons: modernization, efficiency, rationalization, benefits to junior senators, benefits to the minority, responsiveness, more limited government, a better public image, and making their own work more convenient and productive. Few senators (or groups important to them) perceived themselves as seriously affected adversely by Senate Resolution 4 as ultimately amended. Provisions that damaged vital interests of preëminent actors in particular subsystems had been deleted.[28]

Leadership is necessary to galvanize support. Senator Stevenson assumed responsibility for developing the issue, immersed himself in the subject, engineered a series of widely acceptable proposals, and proved convincing when it counted—particularly in marathon sessions with senior Democrats and in the Rules Committee and floor deliberations. Also crucial was the support of Senator Robert Byrd in establishing the Select Committee, reaching agreement for consideration of its recommendations, arranging the sessions with the com-

[27] For indications that this era may have ended, see Richard E. Cohen, "The Times Are A-Changing," *National Journal* 10, no. 1 (January 7, 1978): 30.

[28] On subsystems, see particularly, J. Lieper Freeman, *The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations* (New York: Random House, 1955).

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mittee chairmen, and expediting the proposal in committee and on the floor.[29] Similarly essential to success was the leadership of Chairman Cannon in agreeing to take up reorganization, building a consensus on the resolution in the Rules Committee, and managing it jointly with Senator Stevenson on the floor. In the Republican ranks, articulation of the need for reform by Senator Brock and active backing from the minority leader and GOP members of the Rules Committee were instrumental. For the most part, opponents were interested only in specific provisions of the proposals and not reorganization in principle. So long as veterans, for example, kept "their" committee, they did not oppose other changes. After Senator Church led successful campaigns to retain the Aging Committee and to keep international economic policy in Foreign Relations, he voted for Senate Resolution 4. The most thoroughgoing critique of the resolution came from Senator McGovern, who contended that Senate Resolution 4 proposed an efficiency inappropriate to a legislative body; but he, too, finally voted for it.

Effective strategy and tactics also are needed to turn support into success. The general approach of the Stevenson committee was "incremental idealism."[30] Its more specific strategy was, as Senator Stevenson put it, to ask for 150 percent in order to get as much as possible. The chairman and staff thought that the Bolling committee had bargained away too much in 1974 and were determined not to do likewise. Further grounds for success stemmed from Chairman Stevenson's known support from the floor and Rules Committee leaders and his willingness to work out reasonable accommodations. Another strength of Senate Resolution 4 was that it emerged from the Senate's committee system itself rather than a panel of outside experts.[31]

Structural Results

Leading newspapers covering the reorganization perceived only modest change.[32] The *Washington Post*: "The plan, not radical to start with, was

[29] Reorganization was one aspect of his overall determination to facilitate the business and improve the image of the Senate. In an interview six months later, Senator Byrd reiterated his support, adding: "I'd like to see the number of committees and subcommittees further reduced." Richard E. Cohen, "Byrd of West Virginia," *National Journal* 10, no. 34 (August 20, 1977): 1295.

[30] The phrase is that of Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 5-6.

[31] See for example, "Senate Operations Study," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 33 (1977): 790-92; "House Refuses to Consider Obey Proposals," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 33: 792-97.

[32] There were exceptions to the pattern of focusing only on the number of committees. See Michael J. Malbin, "You Can Please Some of the Senators Some of the Time. . . ." *National Journal* 9, no. 3 (January 15, 1977): 106-111; and idem., "The Shape of the Senate Committees . . . After the Long Battle Over Reform," *National Journal* 9, no. 7 (February 12, 1977): 258-59; Thomas P. Southwick, "Senate Defeats Allen Move to Kill Federal Pay Raise; Approves Committee Plan," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 35, no. 6 (February 5, 1977): 196-97; idem., "Senate Approves Committee Changes," ibid., no. 7 (February 12, 1977): 279-84; and idem., "Senate Com-

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TABLE 1

Number of Senate Committees, Subcommittees, Assignments, and Chairmanships, Actual and Proposed, 1976–78

	Committees	Sub-committees	Average Senator's Assignments	Maximum Chairman-ships
Actual 94th Congress	31	174	18	9
Select Committee Recommendations	15		8	9
Rules Committee Recommendations	20*		11**	3
Approved by Senate	21*		11**	6†
Actual January 1978 (95th Congress)	24††	117	11	4

*Plus Code of Conduct and Indian Affairs, scheduled to expire during the 95th Congress, and Joint Library and Joint Printing, whose future was to be determined by the Rules and Administration Committee.

†Exempts statutory joint committees whose chairmen came from standing committees, for example, Joint Library and Joint Printing.

**Indian Affairs and Ethics exempted from committee assignment limitations; Appropriations exempted from subcommittee assignment limitations.

††Plus Code of Conduct, which expired during the 95th Congress, and Nutrition and Human Needs, which expired as of the end of the 95th Congress.

shaved back both in the Rules Committee and on the floor."[33] The *Washington Star's* headline: "Mild Reduction of Committees OKd by Senate."[34] The *New York Times*: "Like a row of dominoes that topples from the movement begun by a single falling piece, the far-reaching plan to streamline the Senate by reducing its committees from 31 to 15 was knocked down last week by the pressures to reinstate a single committee: Veterans' Affairs."[35] A *Wall Street Journal* editorial observed: "What the Senate did with these proposals casts some light on whose ox one can safely gore these days."[36]

But the glass that is half empty is also half full; and to the thirsty, the latter is probably more relevant. The designers of Senate Resolution 4 sought and achieved incremental change, not a totally new, rational-comprehensive committee system.

The change was substantial. Tables 1 and 2 summarize main provisions. As of January 1978, the number of committees was reduced 23 percent. Abolished outright were the Committees on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the District of Columbia, Post Office and Civil Service, and the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System. Also terminated by the end of 1977

mittee Changes: Major Impact," ibid., no. 8 (February 19, 1977): 330–33; and idem., "Senate Reorganizes Its Committees," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 33 (1977): 781–90.

[33] Spencer Rich, "Senate Overhauls Committee System in 89-to-1 Vote," *Washington Post*, February 5, 1977, A-1.

[34] Walter Taylor, *The Washington Star*, February 5, 1977, A-1.

[35] "How Senate's Reorganization Plan Was Scaled Down," *New York Times*, February 10, 1977, p. 1.

[36] "Reorganizing the Senate," *Wall Street Journal*, February 9, 1977, p. 22.

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TABLE 2

Major Procedural Changes Proposed and Adopted in Senate Resolution 4

Proposal	Approved by—		
	Select Committee	*Rules Committee*	*Senate*
Ad hoc authorizing committees	Yes	No	No
Multiple referrals by motion	Yes	Yes	Yes
Computerized scheduling	Yes	Yes	Yes
Blocs of floor time and committee time	Yes	No	No
Time periods for committee meetings	No	Yes	Yes
Elimination of ex officio Appropriations members	Yes	Yes*	Yes*
Comprehensive policy oversight jurisdiction	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continuing review of the committee system	Yes**	Yes†	Yes†
Subcommittee assignment procedure	No	Yes	Yes
Minority staffing	No	Yes	Yes
Subcommittee chairmanship limits for committee chairmen	No	Yes	Yes
Regulatory impact statements	No	No	Yes

*Ex officio members permitted but with no voting power.

†Responsibility fixed in the Rules and Administration Committee in consultation with the joint leadership.

**Responsibility fixed in the joint leadership.

were the temporary Committee on Code of Conduct, the Select Committee on Nutrition, and the Joint Committees on Atomic Energy, Congressional Operations, and Defense Production.

Even further reduced was the number of subcommittees—by 33 percent. The most dramatic consolidation came in the Judiciary Committee, which reduced its subcommittees from fifteen to ten and in the process abolished its Subcommittee on Internal Security—a change that civil libertarians had been advocating for decades.

With fewer committees and subcommittees, senators had fewer assignments: an average of slightly less than eleven, a drop of more than one-third. Fewer assignments reduced potential conflicts in meetings, though probably not by one-third, since many of the abolished subcommittees had been relatively inactive. The limitation also tended to equalize senators' workloads as the range in number of assignments narrowed.

The reorganization also allocated responsibilities and resources of the Senate more evenly. Even though the number of subcommittees dropped, junior senators gained chairmanships. In 1976, only two subcommittees of standing committees were chaired by freshmen: Buildings and Grounds on Public Works and the Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Small Business (in the Congress

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that transferred authorizing jurisdiction to the Select Committee on Small Business). With the reorganization in 1977, seven senators became chairmen of subcommittees during their first year in the Senate. In the Ninety-sixth Congress, when further limits on subcommittee chairmanships of committee chairmen became effective, more such posts opened up for other senators. The provision concerning more equitable assignments to subcommittees has been widely adopted; at least five standing committees added it to their written rules in 1977, and others followed it in practice.[37] And Senator Griffin, author of the minority staffing provision of Senate Resolution 4, reported in July 1977 that "a number of committees are approaching the one-third minority staff allocation."[38]

Finally, jurisdictions of the Senate's committees were rationalized, although less than advocates would have liked. For example, President Carter's energy proposals entailed extensive jurisdictional bargaining. Ultimately tax issues were referred to the Finance Committee and the rest of the measure to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, provided that the latter consults with five other panels having partial jurdisdictional claims. This arrangment suggests the difficulty of establishing clear-cut functional categories. It also reflects the power of some committees and interest groups—in this instance, particularly the Finance Committee, which successfully resisted shifts of its jurisdiction, incuding tax-related matters.[39]

Does Structural Reorganization Matter?

Many people have proposed structural reform in Congress for many reasons. One objective has been institutional power—for example, to change Congress internally in ways that would strengthen Congress itself, or the presidency, or political parties, in national policymaking.[40] Another sometimes related motive has been ideological: to change Congress so as to encourage certain policy outcomes.[41] Still another objective has been to strengthen certain internal factions,

[37] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 123, no. 78, May 9, 1977, S7223.

[38] Ibid., June 14, 1977, S9677.

[39] Chairman Long did willingly relinquish jurisdiction over the Renegotiation Board to Chairman William Proxmire of the Banking Committee. Nor was senatorial jurisdiction over energy confined to the committee system. Senator Mathias, a member of neither Finance nor Energy and Natural Resources, held his own ad hoc hearings on energy at two cities in his home state of Maryland. Ibid., July 13, 1977, S11822-26.

[40] The typology comes from Davidson et al., *Congress in Crisis*, pp. 17–34.

[41] For leading institutional and ideological critiques of Congress, see: American Political Science Association, *The Organization of Congress* (1945); James MacGregor Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York: Harper & Row, 1949), and idem., *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Joseph S. Clark, *Congress: The Sapless Branch* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); and Alfred deGrazia, ed., *Congress: The First Branch* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1966).

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such as junior members or the minority party. And there has been the less controversial objective of greater efficiency in policymaking.[42]

In the 1977 reorganization, proponents' stated objectives were efficiency, more opportunities for "have-not" junior senators, and symbolic assertion of the Senate in national policymaking. Senators also had manifest interest in their spheres of influence. Policy objectives do not appear to have been an important motivation.

Whether reorganizations achieve their stated goals is a matter of considerable skepticism in Washington as in academia. Herbert Kaufman has expressed this viewpoint well in writing about administrative organization: "The profound, determinable consequences do not lie in the engineering realm of efficiency, simplicity, size, and cost of government. Rather, the real payoffs are measured in terms of influence, policy, and communication."[43]

By at least one measure, reorganization did make the Senate more efficient; it alleviated what senators considered wasteful scheduling because of too many committees, subcommittees, assignments, and meetings. And it certainly made substantial political difference. There was widespread understanding that the structural situation was not the only reason for the frustrations of senatorial policymaking; a heavy workload, ever-shifting issues, and the fundamental complexity of the policymaking process were also responsible. Unlike the other situations, however, the structures could be changed. Hence the urge to consolidate. The question became how to do it—a question with political answers and effects. In the Select Committee, the answers were essentially those of reformist senators; in the Rules Committee, those of the floor leadership and committee chairmen; on the floor, those of the full membership.

If the change is understood to be incremental, and if "efficient" is defined as "effective," then Senate Resolution 4 has had its benefits. For individual senators, it has offered more convenience: fewer time-demanding assignments and an overall scheduling system. Reorganization thus has fostered the "functional self-indulgence" of the Senate.[44] For the institution, reorganization has brought the greater effectiveness of improved scheduling and has enhanced the jurisdictional authority of the resulting committees and subcommittees. Modernization of jurisdictions has formally fixed important new responsibility for emergent policy areas. Designating explicit subjects of comprehensive policy oversight has encouraged imaginative senators to study major issues in full context. To be sure, exercise of these responsibilities depends upon motivation to

[42] Efficiency is not a universally agreed-upon goal for Congress. See for example, Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Advantages of Some Duplication and Ambiguity in Senate Committee Jurisdictions," in First Staff Report, pp. 171–86.

[43] Herbert Kaufman, "Reflections on Administrative Reorganization," in *Setting National Priorities: The 1978 Budget*, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 403.

[44] Jones, "Will Reform Change Congress?" p. 249.

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carry them out; but the new responsibilities, like party platforms, represent a political commitment.[45]

Of the political results there can be little doubt. Some committees gained major new jurisdiction: Energy and Natural Resources; Governmental Affairs; Commerce, Science and Transportation; Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; Rules and Administration. Existing power centers such as Finance, Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services resisted attempts at overt change; they won by not losing. The floor leaders gained new authority for referrals, scheduling, and continuing review. Despite initial misgivings of some, junior senators were major winners: two major committee assignments, plus a minor committee if desired; improved choice of subcommittees; more and better chairmanships. The minority party gained more committee staff and resources. The losers from reorganization were mainly those seeking continuation of committees that were consolidated. In some instances those ranks were very thin, as in the case of the Committee on the District of Columbia, most of whose residents prefer complete home rule to partial congressional governance. For the distressed, but relatively weak, constituency of the Nutrition Committee, designation as a subcommittee meant less staff but hardly less attention, given the same concerned chairman.

The Senate is not static; Senate Resolution 4 demonstrates some possibilities. Change was not easy; it required a swift, intensive effort. Nor were the results permanent; consolidations have already been relaxed somewhat. Actual assignments of the Ninety-fifth Congress permitted nine senators, in addition to exceptions stated in Senate Resolution 4, to serve on three major committees, while five served on two "third" committees.[46] The Senate has voted to permit senators to count the Budget Committee as a "third," rather than a major, committee.[47] The Rules Committee decided to continue the statutory Joint Committees on Printing and the Library, explaining that the House was unwilling to abolish them.[48] The Senate also agreed to reauthorize the Select Committee on Indian Affairs for two more years rather than terminating it on schedule at the end of the Ninety-fifth Congress.[49] And on January 23, 1979, the Senate approved resolutions enlarging several committees and further relaxing assignment limitations.[50]

[45] On the honoring of political commitments stated in party platforms, see Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), pp. 149–70, and idem., "Controls and Influence in American Elections (Even 1968)," *American Behavioral Scientist* 13 (November/December 1969): 223–28.

[46] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 123, no. 32, February 24, 1977, S3013.

[47] Ibid., June 29, 1978, S10103.

[48] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Report with Recommendations of the Committee on Rules and Administration on the Joint Committee on Printing and the Joint Committee of Congress on the Library*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Report 95–327, 1977.

[49] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 124, no. 168, part II, October 14, 1978, S18847.

[50] Ibid., 96th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 125, no. 5, January 23, 1977, S364–367.

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Perhaps the most important test of the Senate's commitment to its own institutional effectiveness will come in the provision for continuing review. Because of its orientation toward the personal in arrangements and the immediate in time, the Senate needs frequent reassessment of its structure. Much will depend on what senators and the public want, and what they are willing to pay for it. The rest is mostly statecraft.

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Taking the Long View: Rostow on Prospects for the World Economy

PETER B. KENEN

Professor Rostow's latest book, *Getting from Here to There*, is ambitious and optimistic.[1] It is also readable and challenging. Unfortunately, it is not entirely successful. It is ambitious because Rostow tries to do what no one else has done—to place in long historical perspective the international economic crises of the last decade, to project the implication of these crises to the end of the century, and to propose policies to deal with those implications. It is optimistic because Rostow argues that the crises reflect cyclical rather than secular tendencies and that there are ways to mitigate their medium-term consequences. *Getting from Here to There* is not entirely successful because Rostow's diagnosis is not completely persuasive, because his remedies are not articulated in enough detail for the reader to decide whether they are adequate, and because he pays too little attention to the lessons taught by recent attempts at economic reform, domestic and international.

The economic crises with which he is concerned—starting with the Indian crop failures of 1965–67 and including the worldwide inflation of 1972–73, the oil embargo and price increase of 1973–74, the deep international recession of 1974–75, and the slow recovery of 1976–77—have been given many interpretations. Some say these events represent the onset of the Malthusian crisis—the first tentative bumps of the ultimate collision between limitless human appetites

[1] W. W. Rostow, *Getting from Here to There: America's Future in the World Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978).

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and limited natural resources. On this view, we have soon to curtail our appetites or face global tragedy. Others say these crises are a bad patch in history, reflecting acts of God, OPEC, and others, but testifying only to the truth of Murphy's Law—if something can go wrong, it will. On this view, we have merely to wait out our misfortunes.

Rostow rejects these interpretations, advancing instead the suggestion that the crises mark a turning point in the long economic waves known as the Kondratieff cycle and named after the Russian economist who discovered them.

> My explanation for Kondratieff cycles would focus on the relative prices of food and raw materials on the one hand, industrial products on the other. Other forces were, evidently, at work; but, at their core, I believe that what we observe in these cycles are periods of relative shortage and relative abundance of food and raw materials. . . . If oscilliations in relative prices are at the heart of the matter, why were these cycles so long compared, for example, to conventional business cycles which averaged; say, nine years? The answer seems to lie in the fact that the opening up of new sources of food and raw materials required substantial periods of time—much more time than it takes to build a factory or house. The lags involved in responding to a relative rise in food or raw materials prices, and the fact that the response often required the development of whole new regions, led to an overshooting of world requirements and a period of surplus.[2]

On this interpretation, the explosion of wheat and oil prices a few years ago marked the start of the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing, announcing the advent of a long period in which raw materials, especially energy, will be relatively scarce.

Rostow goes further. In previous upswings, high prices for food and raw materials attracted adequate private investment in a new capacity, even though the process took much time. This time, however, there may be need for deliberate governmental efforts to redirect investment. This is, in fact, the central message of the book.

> The changes in thought and policy which this book commends are rooted in the empirical perception that the changed patterns of investment which are now required both for full employment and structural balance will not take place without the conscious intervention of public policy. We shall have to think and act on problems of supply as sedulously as the Keynesian revolution taught us to think and act on problems of demand.[3]

To this end, Rostow recommends indicative planning of the sort invented by the French, aimed at fostering capital formation, private and public, in the strategic sectors—energy production, agriculture, raw materials, transport, water development, pollution control, and research and development. It is not necessary, Rostow says, to establish a huge bureaucracy. The French did not. His affection for the French precedent, indeed, has more to do with the small size of the planning staff than with its accomplishments. He has very little to say

[2] Ibid., p. 22.
[3] Ibid., p. 53.

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about the methods of French planning and does not tell us whether or to what extent it was effective.

Half of Rostow's book is devoted to these issues of analysis and strategy. The other half examines the problems and prospects of the sectors involved in the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing. Space does not permit me to comment in detail on his treatment of each sector. I concentrate on one—energy production—to document my charge that the exercise does not quite succeed.

Although he is sharply critical of the president's energy policy, there is one point on which Rostow and Carter agree. The world faces an energy shortage. "There is some truth," he says, "in the statements of OPEC spokesmen that they merely forced the world community to face up to the realities of the energy situation."[4] In a fundamental sense, he goes on to explain, the price increase was justified: the landed price of OPEC oil approximates the marginal cost of Alaskan and North Sea oil. (This proposition, however, is trivially true. It would be true at *any* price of OPEC oil.) The solution, Rostow argues, is to increase the domestic production of fossil fuels and to invest heavily in nuclear power, while working as hard and fast as possible to perfect the ultimate response—an inexhaustible, pollution-free source of energy. The Carter administration, he complains, has put too much stress on conservation and too little on production.

Events and analyses, however, are beginning to challenge the premise on which Rostow builds his case. The high price of oil *is* calling forth additional supplies, not domestically but from other countries outside OPEC. It is doing so more rapidly, moreover, than had been thought possible by many observers, even those who forecast some expansion of supplies, and has begun a weakening of OPEC's economic power. The lags may not be half as long as those that underlie Rostow's explanation of the Kondratieff cycle; it may thus make good sense to emphasize domestic conservation rather than an all-out effort to increase production.

Furthermore, Rostow does not tell us how to go about expanding production. If his major premise is applicable here, higher prices would be helpful, though not sufficient. There must be something for the planners to do, but Rostow gives us only an occasional hint. There may be need, he says, for "some sort of subsidy" to encourage coal and shale production, and something might be made of the Rockefeller plan for a national energy bank.[5]

But these are not the gravest defects of the book. Its main fault is its failure to defend the fundamental premise of the book that the policies required to surmount the problems of the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing can be brought into being by democratic governments. Reviewing the frustrations of three presidents in their attempts to deal with the energy problem, Rostow concludes that there was a failure of will; the public was not ready to wage "the moral equivalent of war" on the energy problem. Urging action on his own policy agenda, he writes

[4] Ibid., p. 76.

[5] Ibid., pp. 83, 96.

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repeatedly, but elliptically, of the need for a new national consensus. Going further, he suggests that there can be progress in the international arena too—a resolution of the North-South confrontation—if governments display the will to act in their common interest.

True but trivial. The hard part is to generate consensus, especially in matters of economic policy, where almost every innovation will confer conspicuous gains on some at the expense of others and is apt to do so promptly, whereas the main aim of the innovation may not be achieved for many years (and may never compensate the losers completely).

Economists, including Rostow and this reviewer, view prices as the arbiters of resource allocation. Politicians and their constituents see prices differently—as arbiters of the income distribution. They care less about the "right" price (efficiency) than about the "just" price (equity). That is why it took so long for Congress to agree on natural-gas pricing and why much of the rest of the president's energy program was not enacted. The politics of distribution dominate the making of economic policy; those who call for new economic policies must confront that fact. Their proposals must be seen to be directly beneficial to a large part of the public—and the sooner the better.

The same sad truth holds internationally. The North-South confrontation will not be resolved by one-sided concessions. It was, indeed, the grave mistake of Third World leaders that they put their case in zero-sum terms. Some of what you have belongs to us, they said, and we intend to have it. The First World's governments could not concede demands like these, even if they were disposed to do so; their citizens, represented by their legislators, would have repudiated the concessions. The search for successful innovations in policy, internationally as well as domestically, requires the identification of strategies that promise to achieve their aims without threatening large losses for large numbers of players.

But Rostow does make one important point about the international situation. The United States has a crucial role to play in the resolution of global economic issues. It does not dominate the world economy. Nevertheless, it has still to supply the "critical margin," in that the behavior of the U.S. economy will decide between success and failure in dealing with the most important global problems. This is surely true of food. The United States cannot feed the world, but the long-run supply problem cannot be overcome without an expansion of U.S. production. It is equally true of energy. The United States may not be able to achieve self-sufficiency, but there is little hope of balancing demands and supplies at acceptable energy prices unless the United States slows the growth of its consumption and leads in the development of new technologies. It is also true in macroeconomic matters. Our growth rate, inflation rate, and exchange rate have profound effects on other countries. Rostow may be wrong on many points—diagnostic, remedial, and political. He is right on this one.

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Book Reviews

Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954–1960 *by Robert A. Divine. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 393 pp. $14.95.*

In this compact and highly readable volume, Robert A. Divine provides a comprehensive overview of the chronology and arguments surrounding the controversy over atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the crucial period between the first detonation of a thermonuclear device and the building of momentum leading to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. This fascinating story is punctuated by interinstitutional politics within the United States (particularly the Eisenhower White House), by the personalities that sought to reinforce various positions, and by the public and private argumentation that evolved. Divine's work is painstaking in detail, reflecting an exhaustive research effort. Referring to and quoting from the primary sources themselves, the author allows the primary actors to tell their stories and to relate their positions.

There are several strands that run through the debate, and Divine relates them all. The major theme, of course, is the controversy over fallout, and particularly the exposure to strontium-90 that weapons testing produced. On one side, the defense community and Atomic Energy Commission insist that testing was necessary for the national defense and that the dangers to public health were minimal. On the other side, distinguished scientists and commissions warn of the dire long-term genetic uncertainties that exposure to radiation created. One sees the scientific community deeply divided, with dispassionate analysis competing at times with empirically thin advocacy of the various positions.

Within this general, chronological framework are fascinating gleanings of what was to come in the arms control and strategic weapons debate. In the machinations over test cessation are the kernels not only of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but also the scientific and technical debate over both the Threshold and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. The "sticking point" of adequate means of verification clearly emerges in these discussions. At the same time, there runs covertly within the discussion the strands of development of the so-called neutron bomb or enhanced-radiation (ER) warhead. Although Divine makes explicit reference to the ER warhead only once (pp. 305–306), the entire debate over the

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development of a "clean" bomb, which was a standard argument of those advocating testing, and of the antimissile warhead are clear precursors of the current controversy over ER weapons.

There are several values to this work. At the most obvious level, the detailed chronology is a valuable reminder of a period that has all but faded from public memory. It is also a fascinating study of the politics of decision making. Much of the analysis focuses on President Eisenhower himself and the decisional cross-pressures to which he was subjected; the book is worth reading for that alone. Possibly the most basic value, however, is the instruction for those currently concerned with arms control efforts that this view of the first serious nuclear arms debate creates. Many of the problems of the 1950s continue to face arms control efforts with the exception of the fallout controversy. The absence of the radiation problem in and of itself leads to a somewhat somber lesson for arms controllers, because, as Divine concludes: "The horror of the hydrogen bomb was so great that most people could not face it directly. Yet try as they might, they could not ignore it. The testing issue gave them a way to deal with it obliquely" (p. 323). In a world where the potential result of unleashing nuclear arsenals literally boggles the mind, it may be that we also need an oblique way to face the horror.

DONALD M. SNOW
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View from the UN *by U Thant. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., 1978. 508 pp. $10.00.*

This book carries the subtitle "The Memoirs of U Thant." However, the author explains that it is not intended to be "a book of memoirs in the traditional sense of the term." Though it is a historical record of important events during the ten years U Thant served as secretary-general, it is not a complete record in that it deals only with certain selected questions in detail and treats other matters in general terms or not at all. Furthermore, it is a record written by an actual participant in the events described, and while his perspective was unique and entitled him to lay claim to impartiality and objectivity, he readily admits that he had a point of view "as a man, as a Burmese, as an Asian" (p. xvii), and as one imbued with a deep religious faith.

The book is of particular interest and value for the light it throws on U Thant's conception of his role as secretary-general, the manner in which he discharged his responsibilities (as he saw them) in dealing with the various crises that he faced, and what factors and considerations influenced his conduct. At the time of his election there was considerable concern among informed observers that the office had suffered irreparable damage as the result of the Soviet attack on Hammarskjöld and speculation as to whether his successor would be able to do more than perform the strictly administrative duties of his office. It soon became apparent, and this book confirms that conclusion, that U Thant was not prepared to accept that narrow definition of his responsibilities.

In answering the question "what is the secretary-general?" U Thant bluntly asserts

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that he "is more than the chief administrative officer of the United Nations" (p. 29). In reasoning reminiscent of that used by Dag Hammarskjöld to support his political role, U Thant uses Article 99 of the U.N. Charter to justify initiatives that the secretary-general may take in dealing with disputes and situations in which international peace and security are threatened. He indicates that because of his training, background, and U.N. experience, he always believed that the most important duty of the secretary-general in his political role was to harmonize the actions of nations, a conception which he thought fitted exactly Franklin Roosevelt's suggestion that the chief officer be called "moderator." U Thant readily admits that his background, more particularly his participation in the Belgrade Conference of nonaligned states of September 1961, influenced him to identify with the cause of "small nations, poor nations, newly independent nations, and nations struggling for independence" (p. 36).

In successive chapters, U Thant records specific crises that the United Nations faced during his term of office, and the role he played in handling them. This permits him to explain how in practice he applied his concept of the office to actual situations, and it also provides him with the opportunity to justify actions he took that he feels in many instances have been inadequately reported and unfairly criticized. It is clear from his own words that one major purpose of the book is to put the record straight.

One of U Thant's major frustrations and agonies was his inability to make an effective contribution to ending the war in Vietnam. While recognizing that disagreement among the major powers made it impossible for the U.N. to play a major role in the political settlement of the Indo-Chinese question, he nevertheless became convinced that he should make an effort to bring the fighting to an end. From his point of view, "the real issue of the war was not whether the political aims of U.S. policy were right or wrong; the issue was the American *conduct* of the war" (p. 58). In his view it was immoral to wage a war as this one was being waged by the United States. He was convinced that his 1964 initiative—a possible secret meeting of emissaries of Washington and Hanoi at Rangoon in Burma for a frank discussion—was rejected by the United States without the knowledge of President Johnson. It is clear from his account that a cessation of bombing was his principal objective, both on humanitarian grounds and as a necessary condition to peace talks, and that this was one reason why the 1964 initiative was not viewed favorably in Washington.

It was in his handling of the United Arab Republic's (UAR) request for the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1967 that U Thant came in for the greatest criticism by those generally supportive of the United Nations. For one inclined at the time to be critical of his quick yielding to Nasser's request, the case that he makes for so doing is very persuasive. He rightly points out that he received only minority support from members with contingents in UNEF for taking any other action, that if he had not reacted some of these member governments would have withdrawn their national forces on their own responsibility with disastrous consequences for the whole operation, and that the "good faith" accord, even if it constituted a legal commitment for the UAR, applied only when UNEF was operating under the General Assembly resolution of November 5, 1956, and not when it was acting under the later General Assembly resolution of February 2, 1957. He also suggests that if Israel had agreed to permit UNEF to be stationed on its territory under the 1957 resolution, the U.N. would have

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been in a stronger position in dealing with the UAR's request, and "the course of history could have been different" (p. 223).

U Thant's account leaves one with the feeling that for a secretary-general to be successful, even to a moderate degree, in the exercise of political influence, it is necessary that he be more than a humane, well-intentioned, decent, and politically experienced person. He must have the active support of major members or a substantial bloc of lesser members, and he must have the intellectual capacity and skill to use such sources of influence as are available to him to achieve practical results. Dag Hammarskjöld had these qualities to an unusual degree, but even he found in the end that support of a substantial part of the Third World might not be enough to balance the determined resistance of a superpower. U Thant was never able to achieve that measure of success when faced with major power resistance, but he undoubtedly succeeded in reminding the world of the importance of ethical values and fair play for the underprivileged and in pointing the way to what has become the major task of the United Nations, the improvement of the lot of the poor and the underprivileged.

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Leadership *by James MacGregor Burns. New York, Harper & Row, 1978. 530 pp. $15.00.*

Ours is a decade of crisis leadership and crises *in* leadership. Crisis is now a word for describing domestic and international events in Iran, the Middle East, energy, SALT, Rhodesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Moreover, these crises have revealed what most observers now call the "leadership crisis"—a failure of political leaders, in general, to satisfy the legitimate needs of followers *and* the ever increasing perception among followers that political leaders just "ain't what they used to be." Columnist Art Buchwald, for example, recently described a Martian visitor who upon demanding to see the leader of the United States, was told that we had no leader, but he could see the president.

In a timely contribution, James MacGregor Burns, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College, synthesizes twenty-five years of studying political leadership in his new book. For Burns, "the call for leadership is one of the keynotes of our time" (p. 451). Readers of Burns's earlier works, especially *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (1956), *Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership* (1965), and the Pulitzer Prize winning *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (1970), will not be disappointed with this provocative attempt to develop a general theory of political leadership spanning several cultures and historical periods.

Burns understands that the study of leadership is a tricky business and that many crimes have been committed in its name. Certainly our intuitive sense for what leadership is, or is not, lags far behind any systematic understanding of this most observable, yet least understood, phenomenon of political life. Part of the problem is conceptual: we have "no school of leadership, intellectual or practical" (p. 2). Lacking standards, we have not made intellectual distinctions between leaders and rulers, leaders and power-

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wielders, leaders and despots. "By clarifying the definition of leadership we can enormously broaden its utility as a tool for causal analysis and its potential for realizing model values and end-values" (p. 452). Burns defines leadership as a *process* whereby leaders induce followers "to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations—the wants and the needs, the aspirations and expectations—of both leaders and followers, and the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values and motivations" (p. 19). Leadership is nothing without its linkage to collective purpose and followership needs. "All leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders" (p. 18). Hitler is viewed as a despot, not a leader. In order to generate a theory of political leadership, Burns focuses on the role of power *in* politics, not the more traditional concern with politics *as* power. We are offered character sketches of Woodrow Wilson, Mahatma Gandhi, Nikolai Lenin, and Adolph Hitler: "The first two of these leaders in my sense; the third a leader whose theory of leadership had a fatal flaw, the fourth an absolute wielder of brutal power" (p. 27).

Burns borrows heavily from social psychology in offering a psychological theory of leadership based on an exchange of motives and values. Power and leadership are viewed not as "things," but as relationships: "We must analyze power in the context of human motives and physical constraints. If we can come to grips with these aspects of power, we can hope to comprehend the true nature of leadership—a venture far more intellectually daunting than the study of naked power" (p. 11). Burns identifies two *types* of leadership: transactional and transforming. "The essence of the leader-follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels of motives and power potential, including skill, in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose. The interaction, however, takes two fundamentally different forms" (p. 19). Transactional leadership is based on an exchange (economic, political) between leaders and followers but in which participant motivations remain unchanged. Transactional leadership can be viewed as the "stuff" of everyday political exchange. Transforming leadership is *moral* leadership combined with a fusion of purpose and vision between leaders and followers: "Such leadership comes when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality" (p. 6). Gandhi is the example given. Burns devotes several chapters to analyses of executive, legislative, and party leadership: "Party leadership is transactional, but it has vast transforming potential" (p. 343). "Legislatures cannot on their own exercise transforming leadership" (p. 368). "Executive leadership, to produce intended real change, must be solidly founded on power and principle" (p. 397).

I enjoyed reading this book and learned a great deal. I do, however, have a major reservation concerning Burns's explicit normative bias toward transforming leadership. While leadership, per se, may not be what it used to be, the same cannot be said for liberal academic polemics that seek a fusion of power and personality into a "good" leader. In the last paragraph of his book, Burns quotes approvingly Woodrow Wilson's call for leaders who would not *only* lead but "lift" people out of their everyday selves. "That people can be lifted into their better selves is the secret of transforming leadership and the moral and practical theme of this work" (p. 412). This bias only heightens the gap between promise and performance in leader-follower relations. Burns

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does not consider the possibility that politics may weed out "transforming" leaders, or that the political arena may be a stage for the release of emotionally destructive traits. Certainly the concept of transforming leadership is appealing, but the search may be comparable to the frustrations of Sisyphus. If, as Burns suggests, "the crisis of leadership today is the mediocrity or irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power" (p. 1), then no matter how much we learn about "leadership," the real problem is that politics itself may be the corrupting force of political leadership.

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American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964 *by William Manchester. Boston, Little, Brown, 1978. 793 pp. $15.00.*

For more than half a century, the dramatic figure of Douglas MacArthur has been a focal point of controversy and emotion. Beloved by his admirers, violently criticized by those who disliked or feared him, MacArthur epitomized the perennial civil-military struggle and the traditional conflict within the military between discipline and individualism. The son of a talented and flamboyant army general and a determined and domineering mother, he outdid the former in ability and conceit and looked to the latter for inspiration and the political influence that assisted his early rapid rise. He was an amazing, complex mixture of arrogance and servility, conservatism and innovation, sincerity and hypocrisy, phlegmatism and emotion, courage and weakness, and, above all, success and failure. Energetic and forceful, imaginative and articulate—a showman and leader par excellence—MacArthur rose to the top of the military profession only to see his political ambitions frustrated by men and forces whom, for all his brilliance, he never really understood.

The published literature about MacArthur reflects the general's erratic nature and polemical career. Much of it is unbalanced, either uncritical or accusatory, with very few attempts at objectivity. William Manchester, himself no stranger to controversy and controversial subjects, has made a major effort to provide a balanced and comprehensive study. His carefully structured, broadly based, and highly readable biography is ambitious in scope and thorough in coverage. Yet somehow it fails. Like its subject, the book is brilliant, fascinating, tremendously impressive—but flawed and ultimately unsuccessful.

American Caesar—the title suggests the tone and point of view—is at first impression a careful and evenhanded account. Manchester seems to have read everything published about his subject, weighed pro and con meticulously, and balanced his admiration for MacArthur with a critical exposure of the general's many faults and weaknesses. Yet his research is incomplete in many respects: he has used the records of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk and those of the United States Military Academy, but has shunned the National Archives and the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries; he has missed a number of important published sources, and relies too heavily on some that are unreliable. His documentation is perplexing and his footnotes often inflated. He has, moreover, accepted

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an interpretation of World War II strategy with which many would quarrel, and an equally debatable view of international politics in the postwar world. Within this framework, his narrative displays errors of fact, misleading analyses, and some rather dubious interpretations—not to mention questionable adulatory statements about the general that more than counterbalance descriptions of his defects and blunders. In describing MacArthur, Manchester has all too often adopted a point of view peculiarly MacArthurian.

Perhaps most distressing of all is Manchester's failure to recognize MacArthur's estrangement from and contempt for the values and system of both the military profession that spawned him and the country whose uniform he wore for most of his life. MacArthur may or may not have been "the most gifted man-at-arms the nation has produced" (p. 3), but he was certainly the most political and therefore the most dangerous. Like Caesar, he distrusted any authority beyond his own, especially that of civilian politicians, and believed that only he himself was capable of saving the nation. Manchester obviously sees the parallel, but it is not clear that he altogether appreciates the danger.

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America in Vietnam *by Guenter Lewy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 540 pp. $19.95.*

Americans have been remarkably willing to acknowledge guilt and error over their involvement in Vietnam, a disposition that has probably saved them from the psychiatric consequences their friends had feared. There has inevitably been some scapegoating, efforts to shift the blame from the American people to a secret conspiracy of government leaders, abetted by the best and the brightest of academic gamesmen. That the strategic calculations about Vietnam that led the United States into the trap were supported by Congress, the media, and "the articulate public" is one of the truths made clear in Guenter Lewy's examination of the record. He has used military and other sources not previously available and has recollected in greater tranquility than has hitherto been achievable.

Was the United States guilty of crime or error, or was the error of a proportion to be called criminal? Anyone troubled by those questions will find this examination exceedingly valuable. Unlike most of the advocates at the time, Lewy recognizes the need to live with conflicting evidence and mixed verdicts. He makes clear, for example, that the effort at Vietnamization did not work: "As with all American-assisted programs in Vietnam, implementation of the plans to improve police competence could never match conception" (p. 185). And yet there were successes in the land reform program he describes.

It is the critics of the war who perhaps come off worst in this reassessment. They exaggerated atrocities on one side. The bombing was bad but hardly "indiscriminate." The media were extraordinarily gullible. On the whole, United States military behavior, although by no means impeccable, was more in accordance with the laws of war than is usual. The assumption that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were liberators of a united people does not stand up very well. Lewy presents much evidence to conclude

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that the war was won by North Vietnamese armed force. The people, to protect themselves, sought shelter with winners. The South Vietnamese found little reason to die for their corrupt and inept government, but they were frightened of the Northerners. The United States did scuttle, but it is most unlikely that American military force could have changed the conclusion.

It was a truly American tragedy. Assuming superior virtue, the United States failed to support the Geneva agreements and embarked on the lonely effort to show that American imperial action was not like that of others. The intentions were not mean; they were of the highest morality, out of this world in fact. The North Vietnamese took a thoroughly unscrupulous view of the Geneva and other agreements, but they too had their higher morality. Then the United States set out to run a smart war, calculated and computerized, mechanically and socially engineered, with techniques for everything, including even those "hearts and minds." Lewy speaks of the unhappy results of "the American penchant for organizational tinkering." Foreign policy was calculated at times not only on the famous body counts but on projections of the fluctuations of American deaths per month. The decline of discipline in the forces was attributed to the replacement of "gladiatorial" officer types with the managerial nonparticipant in combat. Where error became crime may be in "the addiction to the opium of heavy weapons."

For the inquest on this tragedy it is useful to have the evidence of a scrupulous man like Guenter Lewy who recognizes that villains are not easily identified and that, in any case, we are looking at human error more than villainy, gross miscalculation rather than crime. Clearing away the distortions and fabrications of critics on the Left and Right, as well as of governments, should assist the inquest on how America really went wrong in Vietnam.

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A Dangerous Place *by Daniel Patrick Moynihan with Suzanne Weaver. Boston, Little, Brown, 1978. 297 pp. $12.50.*

As is his custom, Senator Moynihan has written, with the collaboration of Suzanne Weaver, his special assistant, a lively, ofttimes gossipy account of his turbulent short life of eight months as the permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations. The writing is in journal form, which is not conducive to the exposition of a coherent theme. Maintaining throughout that his stay marked a milestone in the conduct of American foreign policy, the book fails to convince that the Moynihan concept of confrontation in support of American values and ideals did in fact serve to promote or secure basic human rights and fundamental freedoms anywhere in the world.

Whatever the style he employed as the representative of a great power in the international body, Moynihan conveys throughout the book the notion that he, along with his several friends and colleagues, had discovered human rights as an element of American foreign policy and, but for him, the issue would somehow have gone unnoticed. In the Afterword he makes the following extraordinary comment about his own service: "Not until it was over did it turn out that we had changed the language of American foreign

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policy." Not a hint is given that the battle on behalf of human rights issues had been undertaken by many Americans at the United Nations long before he came to the scene, perhaps with less panache and, some would argue, perhaps with more success. For those who expect from *A Dangerous Place* a reasoned analysis of human rights issues within the world forum, there will be disappointment; to those readers who wish to know everything that went into the shaping of a notable political personality during the period concerned, there will be enjoyment from the volume.

The chapter dealing with passage by the General Assembly of the "Zionism is Racism" resolution is most instructive as to American policy and Moynihan's execution of it. Countering an initial strategy to ignore, and thus perhaps obviate the resolution, Moynihan chose to confront it in the Third Committee and with ever-increasing fervor thereafter. In this effort, he was joined by Israeli Representative Herzog who, according to Moynihan, also had initial instructions to ignore the matter as a piece of nonsense. While both men became heroes to their respective publics, they did not succeed in tabling or finally beating back the resolution. Moynihan acknowledges he chose to make a crisis out of the resolution on the theory that low-keyed opposition would have been appeasement. He never explains why the matter could not have been dealt with as countless scores of wrong, foolish, indeed "obscene," resolutions, to use his descriptive, have been handled in the United Nations by the United States and its friends; that is, stressing the unacceptability of the whole business by giving it short shrift and, in debate, making clear that the West will not support resolutions contrary to basic interests or beliefs. In this way, massive national displays of indignation would not have been necessary since the majority of nations supporting the resolution would have been deprived of a "victory." Moynihan's unarticulated premise is that a bruising fight is better than any other mode of operation, no matter that the standing of the United States is put at issue in a losing battle. He does not succeed in making the case that this approach, which may make us all feel better, actually advances American interests in the world.

For Moynihan, the essence of the foreign policy difficulties currently encountered by the United States derives from its failure of nerve; taking a strong stand in the United Nations on issues relating to human rights was the representative's attempt to display national character and strength of purpose. A failure of nerve may well characterize American military and political strategy today, but confrontation in a forum where the numerical majority is not often on the side propounded by the United States, of itself, will not assure the human rights of millions who are deprived of even the elementary right of personal security and freedom.

Human rights considerations as a part of American foreign policy must always be nuanced, since many issues are at stake in our relations with any country. The world is indeed a dangerous place, as Moynihan notes, but it is also a complicated place, and simply striking out to display our nerve, or our frustrations, will not alter, and may even negate, the protection of human rights on an international scale. There is something to be said on behalf of skillful diplomacy, practiced with an eye as to the possible, if indeed the aim of the exercise is the betterment of the human condition.

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Robert Kennedy and His Times *by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978. 1066 pp. $19.95.*

A decade ago, Arthur Schlesinger wrote a provocative essay in defense of the idea that writing about contemporary affairs properly belonged to eyewitness historians. He derided the contention that scholars who chronicled occurrences taking place in their own lifetime sacrificed objectivity and detachment to a greater extent than did historians who would write about the same period generations later. In clinching his argument, Schlesinger suggested that all recorded history is necessarily reconstructed from the vantage point of the present. Nevertheless, the task of the historian becomes exceedingly delicate when he has actively participated in incidents under investigation. In *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, the author acknowledges that his friendship with the protagonist "was one of the joys of my own life" (p. xiii). Having made this admission, Schlesinger offers a biography-memoir that is filled with few surprises, but which remains highly absorbing.

Schlesinger details the life and times of Kennedy in his customary lively prose. Drawing upon the personal papers of his subject as well as the archives of John Kennedy and to a lesser degree Lyndon Johnson, the author paints a warm picture of the private and public man. He supplements the written records with extensive oral history interviews of Kennedy's friends and associates. From this mountain of data emerges a very personal account of Robert Kennedy as a devoted son, brother, husband, and father. Tough but compassionate, Kennedy was a "true believer . . . a romantic stubbornly disguised as a realist" (p. 602). He moved freely between the worlds of rich and poor, black and white, naming several of his children after titans of American capitalism while at the same time championing the cause of the underclass. By the end of his life, this millionaire's son had grown to identify with the outcasts of the system that had made his family wealthy.

However, in dealing with the dark side of Kennedy's personality—the "bad Bobby"—Schlesinger loses some of his historical balance. The ends apparently dignified the means when Attorney General Kennedy authorized the FBI to wiretap Martin Luther King's telephones so that the civil rights leader's reputation presumably would be rescued from a spiteful J. Edgar Hoover; or when he approved a selective Internal Revenue Service audit of gangsters who hid their nefarious ventures behind legitimate business enterprises. It is unclear why Kennedy's moral zeal in exploiting the considerable powers of the Justice Department against hoodlums and Communists did not also extend to protecting civil rights workers in the South from blatant terrorism and harassment. Furthermore, Schlesinger does not explain satisfactorily how a Hamlet-like Kennedy chose to allow political considerations to delay him from entering the dump-Johnson campaign in 1967 at a time when he "cried . . . that what we are doing to the Vietnamese is not very different than what Hitler did to the Jews" (p. 824).

On other crucial matters of public policy the judgments are predictable. A consensus anti-Communist in the 1950s, Robert was not a McCarthyite; instead, he became disgusted quickly with the shabby displays of investigation and resigned from the Wisconsin senator's staff after six months of service. Still, the day McCarthy died, Kennedy noted the passing as "very upsetting to me" (p. 173). Schlesinger denies that the Kennedy brothers were knee-jerk cold warriors whose brinkmanship on behalf of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba was a foolhardy gesture. Although he agrees with revi-

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sionist criticism of counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam and of Kennedy sanctioned Operation Mongoose to topple Castro's rule in Cuba, Schlesinger tends to rate these programs as faulty in execution rather than in purpose.

On the whole, Schlesinger has written an engrossing account that enlarges our understanding of a fascinating political figure. Those who object to particular assessments will nonetheless recognize the skill with which the author argues his case. He uses his position as an insider to reveal the paradox of Robert Kennedy: a pragmatic crusader struggling to blend the romantic with the conventional.

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Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt *by Barrington Moore, Jr. White Plains, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1978. 540 pp. $17.50.*

This book attempts a comprehensive sociology of the sense of injustice. It is also, as its title suggests, a treatment of injustice itself, and hence of justice. It thus challenges the political theorist no less than the historian or social scientist.

The longest and best part of *Injustice* reinterprets the history of the German working class from 1848 to 1933. It is remarkable for its use of precious and neglected primary sources that enable us to see the workers' lot as they did. (The author also makes excellent use of assorted neglected governmental statistics.) Dr. Moore reaches some surprising conclusions. The proletarian presence in Germany was never as numerous as one might imagine; nor is a distinctively proletarian outlook as discernible. The workers seem for the most part to have reacted to events with common sense—at moments of the greatest provocation, with all the blind passion of common sense—and hence, one may say, conservatively. "Spontaneous conceptions among . . . workers . . . have been mainly backward looking" (p. 476). Again and again their anger failed to achieve an intransigent lucidity. Even in bloody 1920 "the mass of the workers were not at any point in a revolutionary frame of mind," but undertook revolution "as the only defensive move open to them in a very threatening situation" (p. 340).

The example of National Socialism, moreover, compels Dr. Moore to admit some reservations concerning the suitability of moral outrage to the creation of a more humane society. He is well aware, as he always has been, that this is no matter of Left and Right. All the same we may wonder why such considerations have not led him to examine more critically the moral status of "moral" outrage.

The chief theoretical interest of *Injustice* lies in its treatment of that subject. Dr. Moore hardly distinguishes this aspect of the work from its sociological one. "The central factual issue in moral relativism," after all, is "what observable agreement, if any, exists on the principles of social justice" (p. 437). In his search for such agreement he ranges widely among peoples, epochs, and social sciences. As regards the result, he professes to rest content with "a certain unity of . . . form" (p. 4), rather than insisting upon a more contentious substantive one. To this he seeks to join, to be sure, " a discernible historical drift

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in a certain direction" (ibid.). In any case a substantive principle of justice does in fact emerge from the inquiry.

Strangely, it is the one that he has held all along. Injustice is the presence (and so justice the absence) of unnecessary, socially produced misery. Dr. Moore can offer this as "pan-human" because some perception of gratuitous (that is, unjust) opposition to our interests is the crucial condition of moral outrage. True enough. But that is to say that every perception of injustice depends upon a prior notion of justice. Dr. Moore's definition abstracts from the diverse opinions that allegedly confirm it, and what it ignores are precisely their differences concerning justice. What is just, and what unjust, sacrifice? We beg this question by defining justice as the maximum feasible absence of sacrifice.

What, in other words, is "gratuitous" misery? Every endeavor exacts its toll, and the worthiest is not that which demands the least. Dr. Moore wants to tell us what is bad without having told us what is good, and then to define good as the absence of bad. His "pan-human" notion of justice remains a curiously bloodless one.

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Ethnic Leadership in America *edited by John Higham. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 214 pp. $12.95.*

This collection of original essays accentuates the role of ethnic leaders in raising the consciousness of their respective groups, in concretizing and focusing ethnic goals, and in articulating group demands to the wider society. These essays examine the basic concerns of various ethnic groups, especially the relationship between the United States and their homeland, their status in American society, including the critical issue of survival, and the internal integrity and unity of the group. In particular, the various authors either single out specific ethnic leaders for scrutiny, or discuss leadership tactics and goals in a more generalized fashion. Various themes, including consciousness raising, issues, goals, strategies, and ethnic style, permeate the essays, as ethnic leaders are portrayed in their attempts to change the status of their group either by utilizing the politics of protest or the politics of accommodation, or a blend of both tactics.

In the first essay, Nathan Glazer focuses on the Jews, explaining how they have been able to solve all but one continuing problem, the survival and security of Israel. Roger Daniels concentrates on the cultural isolation of the Japanese in this country, the control that the Japanese government attempted to exercise over them, and the heroic attempts of the Japanese, particularly in World War II, to prove their loyalty to America. In his essay on the Germans, Frederick Luebke explores the tragic effects of World War I and the subsequent split between those Germans who abandoned their ethnicity and those who attempted to preserve it. Nathan Irvin Huggins discusses the types of Afro-American leaders who emerged in the castelike system in the United States that systematically barred them from effective political coalitions. Robert Berkholder, Jr. analyzes the historical conditions that have produced and sustained factionalism and separation among American Indian leaders and their followers to modern times. In his essay on

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Eastern and Southern Europeans, Josef J. Barton discusses the emergence of communal and national leadership among Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Slovenes, Croatians, and Italians. Robert D. Cross traces the rise of the Irish, particularly through their religious and political leaders, to the election of John F. Kennedy. Finally, Sidney W. Mintz concludes with an analysis of the contributions of anthropology to an understanding of ethnic leadership.

With the present increase in ethnic consciousness in America, and the subsequent searching for greater information about "roots," this book is a timely addition to our knowledge of ethnicity. Not only is this collection of comparative essays highly readable and immensely informative, but the essays offer a new dimension in studies on ethnics through their emphasis on the role of leaders in the shaping of ethnic issues and in the advancement of ethnic groups in American society. Although basic concerns common to all ethnics are highlighted in the essays, each scholar captures the historical and cultural uniqueness of the ethnic group of which he writes through a study of its leadership. Previous ethnic studies have either tended to stress broad case histories, such as Frances Svensson's study on American Indians, or have been somewhat theoretical, such as Stanislaw Makielski's study on cultural politics of minorities, or have often concentrated on specific aspects of ethnic life, such as Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer's study on ethnic voting patterns. In short, this book provides new insights into ethnic groups in terms of both their past and present through the role of their leaders. It is a valuable addition in the continuing quest for knowledge about ethnic life in America, and this reader highly recommends the book to those interested in, or involved in, ethnic studies.

SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM
York College, City University of New York

Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process *by Walter J. Oleszek. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978. 256 pp. $4.75.*

This book argues that congressional rules and procedures play a significant role in shaping public policy and that efforts to change these rules frequently mask efforts to redistribute political power. These are insightful, if not distinctive, propositions. What is distinctive about this book is not its broad generalizations but its demonstration in unusual detail that these conclusions are soundly based.

Oleszek pays close attention to the connections between policymaking and legislative procedures. His work fills a chasm; the last book dealing with a similar topic was written by Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and published in 1967. Substantial structural and procedural changes in the Congress since then make a contemporary discussion most welcome. Oleszek's analysis is both timely and sound. His central arguments reflect the central thrust of research on the legislative process in Congress. His chapters on detailed procedures are outstanding; they reflect a firm grasp of labyrinthine processes. Oleszek has a talent for clarifying legislative complexity. In an era where detailed analysis of procedures is scarce, Oleszek's study is to be especially applauded.

This book is valuable to scholars and to undergraduates for different reasons.

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Undergraduates will profit most from clear, concise overviews such as that in chapter 2, "The Congressional Environment." Connoisseurs of legislative procedure will relish the detailed discussions as that in chapter 5, "House Floor Procedures." Students may gasp at this richness of detail, but they will appreciate such touches as the reproduction of an actual unanimous consent agreement in the Senate (p. 139) and the neat summaries of some procedural similarities and differences between the House and the Senate (see the tables on pp. 142, 148).

If the detail is sometimes beyond the interest of undergraduates to absorb fully, it will still be helpful for reference purposes and as background reading for simulation exercises.

A full explanation of why the Congress works, or at times does not work, demands attention to the procedures that Oleszek so aptly describes. There are times, however, when such an effort can tilt one away from more central concerns. In the chapter on legislative oversight, for example, the description of techniques is accurate and helpful, but the net effect may be to warp somewhat the reader's perception of why oversight does and does not occur. On such questions, an analysis of techniques and procedures clouds a picture that could made clearer by a focus on political context and member motivations.

Any analysis of the Congress that is so abundantly detailed faces the risk of events outracing the printing presses. For some examples, see the already outdated discussion of the postcloture filibuster (pp. 170–173) and the reference to the change in name of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (p. 184). This is not a criticism but merely a lament over the inevitable.

Walter Oleszek set out to enlighten us about a particular set of relationships. His success makes this a most helpful addition to the literature on the legislative process in Congress.

MORRIS S. OGUL
University of Pittsburgh

Race for the Presidency: The Media and the Nominating Process *edited by James David Barber. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1979. 205 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

With increased numbers of presidential primary elections, several political scientists have argued that the power to nominate candidates has been removed from party bosses deciding in smoke-filled rooms and redistributed to the electorate. In this collection of seven essays, Barber and his colleagues refute this. Instead, new actors—journalists—have emerged to make or break candidates during the primary season while claiming to inform the newly enfranchised electorate. The authors' conclusions are based on interviews with politicians, managers, and journalists, and perusal of numerous videotaped newscasts and newspaper clippings. Although these data are not systematically analyzed, they provide anecdotal evidence for the contributors.

The first essay, by Chris Arterton, focuses on the consequences (for the campaigns) of the perceived importance of news. Arterton argues that because candidates want

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to be deemed "serious candidates" or "front-runners" the media become the audience for campaigns. Campaign scheduling and organization is guided by the need to win the early primaries, thereby providing the first hard news of vote-getting potential. In addition the media shape the values of the campaign by creating a winner-take-all mentality, devoting more coverage to front-runners, and so forth. Case studies (actually illustrative examples) provide evidence for these contentions.

Arterton's second essay explores the Carter nomination through an information exchange model. He suggests reporters are captured by campaigners who simplify life on the campaign trail and who integrate reporters into the campaign. Reporters tend to lose their initiative and independence, retaining only the "press crisis" to put the campaign on the defensive. Arterton offers a solution to the press—rotate reporters to preserve their independence—but notes the problem of newcomers gaining access to staffers and candidates.

The third essay by Donald Matthews offered much hope by promising to discuss three questions: if observed media effects are covariation rather than causation; whether effects are manifest or latent; and whether effects are on processes or outcomes. These questions, however, are barely discussed. Instead, the essay focuses on aspects of the 1972 election (the desire of reporters to avoid predicting victory for losing candidates or underestimating candidacies, and, despite Arterton's observations, to avoid being captured by candidates) to provide a context for analyzing the 1976 election. Matthews's is the only chapter employing hard data to support the analysis.

William Bicker's piece explores news organizations rather than news content and reporters rather than campaigners. This descriptive essays cites the factors that made 1976 campaign coverage difficult: new rules for nominating; organizational aspects of network news divisions; and the development of polling capabilities. The chapter has an unusual perspective, but somewhat thin evidence. Moreover, the problems cited are not unique to election coverage but remain latent in news organizations. Finally, the chapter, while containing perspectives fresh to many political scientists, offers few observations not made already by newsroom sociologists and communications researchers.

The final three essays by Barber have one theme: "character" in the campaign. Offering a new twist on his presidential character work, Barber weaves the psychological needs of candidates with those of the journalist. In the first two character essays, Barber suggests that journalists take extraordinary license reporting on presidential character, striving to "psychoanalyze" without skills, and to write of presidential candidates as "personalities." Then Barber takes his own license to analyze journalists as frustrated Shakespeares (rather than frustrated politicians?) searching for dramatic plots and interesting scenarios while revealing details of the candidates' lives. Indeed, the essay explores reporters' character, emphasizing their needs, desires, and goals. Extensive examples in this essay, however, are removed from electoral politics (including evidence from *Roots* and the Vietnam War). Barber reads much into journalists' motives, but no doubt journalists do carry a particular vision of reality rooted in their own needs. Barber has no objection to those who "psychologize" well, but suggests that the emphasis of such analysis should be on the skills required for the presidency rather than personality. Evidence drawn from "Scoop" Jackson's personality coverage is particularly enlightening here. Perhaps Barber is a bit harsh, for it is not clear that journalists are responsible for a

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personality emphasis. We all search for gossip and the human dimension of politics (for example, *People* magazine and gossip columns in even the most respected newspapers), and journalists have something to offer because occasionally they see candidates with their guard down.

The final essay attempts to grapple with the problem of how the masses can be kept informed during campaigns. The old bugaboo is raised—do we offer what the audience needs, or what it wants? Barber argues that electronic journalists, as a new elite, particularly should be wary of their influence. This essay is a bit unfocused, holding out the promise of solutions to the classic questions, but offering none. Surely we know information takes time to gather and must fit audience needs. But what can be done?

Overall, the volume has some worthwhile contributions and innovative perspectives, but suffers from a problem common to collected essays: redundancy. Repeatedly Arterton, Matthews, and Barber offer examples of media preferences to report blunders and gaffes. Each author tells us that media interpretation of primaries defines success. Second, the absence of footnotes and references limits the utility of the volume for scholarly research. Indeed Arterton's remark that "we do not have an abundance of careful studies of the role played by mass media in either the electoral or government processes" (p. 3) reflects the contributors' limited bibliographic research. Since 1972, agenda setting and debate studies employing content analysis have examined these questions in depth. Finally, sociologists and communication researchers have a more profound understanding of politician-journalist symbiosis than reported here. More research would have helped. On the whole, however, where the essays (notably Barber's and Arterton's) are speculative they are provocative and stimulating reading.

ROBERT G. MEADOW
University of Kentucky

Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government *by James O. Freedman. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 324 pp. $15.95.*

Although what is called the administrative process began with the Constitution of 1789, except for those of the states administrative powers over persons and property affected very few people prior to the twentieth century. As the federal government lost its former character as primarily a customs and postal union with a common currency and citizenship with some unity in national defense and foreign relations, federal °administrative action more and more affected the daily and private lives of most residents. The consequences of the growth of governmental intervention and of a large bureaucracy to administer far-flung activities were to place severe strains upon a constitutional order geared to an agrarian and mercantile economy, to raise questions concerning the legitimacy of administrative procedures, and to contribute to a distrust of government by a public imbued with Thomas Paine's view of government as "a badge of lost innocence."

In a perceptive volume Professor James O. Freedman addresses these matters. The

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book is divided into three parts that treat the crisis of legitimacy, the relevance of administrative procedure, and the nature of the informal administrative process. Except for the first part, which deals with some of the political aspects of the issue, the author's approach is that of a competent scholar in administrative law.

Among the sources of discontent with administrative discretion are a hypercritical emphasis upon the separation of powers and a mystical reverence for the judiciary as the only branch of government that can render substantial justice, each of which has in turn contributed to the agencies' loss "of a measure of their capacity for effective decision making" (p. 27). Other contributing factors to the crisis of legitimacy are public concern with the bureaucracy, the dissatisfaction of persons who dislike specific programs, and more seriously the fears of those persons of what Manuel Cohen called "bureaucratic ossification" (p. 37). Skepticism of administrative expertise, doubts of administrative accountability, and misgivings about political independence contribute further to the erosion of public confidence in the bureaucracy. One of the better chapters in the book treats the differences in agency performance where comparisons are drawn between the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The former with its broad range of activity suffers by comparison with the latter with its very limited focus. Some attention is also given to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and its relatively limited authority.

From these general considerations the author moves to Part II which is a legalistic analysis of formal administrative procedure with especial emphasis upon the Office of Foreign Direct Investments, supported by discussions of relevant cases concerning other agencies with respect to impartial hearings and disqualification for bias. In this context the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act is important. The final part is devoted to informal administrative action with emphasis upon summary actions, their abuses, and the necessity for fairness, which cannot be insured by statutory standards, informal discussions, expedited hearings, or judicial review, but only by "the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state" as Edmund Burke put it (p. 225).

Altogether, Professor Freedman has written a good book on an important subject. That all parts of the volume do not always form a consistent theme arises from the reprinting of all or portions of five earlier articles. Given the scope of his subject, the author could not have addressed all the public's dissatisfaction with bureaucratic activities, the trivial nature of some actions, especially those undertaken by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the action of the Department of the Interior in placing a higher value upon the snail darter than upon a hydroelectric power dam, or HEW's concern about boys' and girls' choirs, to mention only three agencies; but perhaps it is the nature of some agencies to ignore the whales while pursuing the minnows, and perhaps concern with trivia is an occupational disease of administrators.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
University of Virginia

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Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice *by Charles E. Silberman. New York, Random House, 1978. 540 pp. $15.00*

Spurred by the nation's concern for crime and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's ample funds, the last ten years have seen an avalanche of specialized research on all aspects of crime and the criminal justice system. Silberman's book is an outstanding synthesis of that research product. Although he adds his own keen observations as a careful journalist, he has not undertaken original systematic research. Consequently, most of this book will be familiar to specialists in the field. But most specialists plow a narrower furrow than Silberman. The court specialist is likely to obtain new insights into the incidence of crime; the criminologist is likely to learn new facts about the operation of the court system; the cops-and-robber specialist is likely to leave this book with new information about the workings of the juvenile courts.

Silberman has read widely and well. He has not omitted any major work. He reports the investigations of others accurately and draws interesting connections between discrete research findings, which is one of the reasons this book is useful even for the specialist. It is highly recommended to the nonspecialist who wants to become conversant with one of society's major problems and our attempts to deal with it.

Even excellent books have limitations; this book has been so widely and rightly praised that I want to seize this opportunity to make two criticisms. The first concerns the book's conceptualization. It deals only with crime and justice in the United States. My own work has been similarly constrained. But crime is a universal problem, and justice wears many faces throughout the world. Much is known about crime and the criminal justice system of Western Europe; much could be learned from the problems of emerging nations and from socialist countries. A considerable body of research, for instance, exists on Japan's apparent lack of a serious crime problem despite its high level of industrialization and dense population. Israel has an extremely diverse population that lives under continuous tension. Italy has areas of both growth and decay, with deep poverty alongside ostentatious wealth. It is time that we examined such experiences in order to place crime and justice in a larger perspective. We need a companion volume to Silberman's to provide us a deeper understanding of criminal violence and criminal justice.

My second criticism is directed at his most original chapter, the one on race and crime. Silberman has been both praised and damned for explicitly addressing the causes for the disproportionate number of blacks among those arrested for violent crimes. I think he is right in concluding that it is not simply the effect of poverty or ethnicity but rather the result of the peculiar history of blacks in the United States. Blacks alone among American ethnics have been the object of individualized and institutionalized racism that, although declining, nevertheless has continued impact on black youth. His thesis is that crime among blacks is partly attributable to the decline of social controls by which racism inhibited black rage and the failure to develop substitute controls within the black community. However, he does not produce evidence to support this thesis. It remains an interesting speculation awaiting the ingenuity of the research community for empirical testing.

Silberman's major thesis, however, needs to be challenged. The criminal justice

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system, according to Silberman, can have little effect on the prevalence of crime. Therefore, it is foolish to expect even short-term dips in the crime rate as the result of large, new investments in policing, in judging, or in imprisoning criminals. Greater returns, he argues, can come from increased informal controls achieved by improved social conditions. Silberman is probably correct; nevertheless we need to invest in the criminal justice system in order to maintain the basic values that our society cherishes. Even if less capricious-appearing justice does not reduce crime rates, it may make us feel more confident about our ability to govern ourselves fairly. Even if better prisons will not rehabilitate many felons, they will debase us less as we parcel out punishment to those who deserve it. That in itself, in this reviewer's opinion, make those investments not only worthwhile but imperative.

HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University

The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower *by David Caute. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978. 697 pp. $14.95.*

David Caute has carved a worthy niche for himself as a historian of the European, notably the French, Left. Indeed, his *Communism and the French Intellectuals* and *The Fellow-Travellers* demonstrated a high level of analytical sophistication. Regrettably the major premise of *The Great Fear*—that under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower the United States suffered its greatest crisis in democratic values as anti-Communist posses terrorized the land—is merely ludicrous. The title in itself is bizarre: those who have read Georges Lefebvre's classic *La Grande Peur de 1789* will appreciate that equating our often squalid anti-Communist activities of the late forties and early fifties with the French experience of 1789 is analagous to comparing the Great Plague with Legionnaire's disease.

Indeed, there is a curious conceptual ambivalence in Caute's analysis. Unlike a number of contemporary authors who think that Communists were invented by "cold warriors" as a pretext for conquering the world, Caute is well aware that the difference between a Communist hunt and a witch hunt is that Communists, unlike witches, did exist, did operate espionage rings, and did justify the Stalinist hecatomb. I doubt if he would ever endorse Justice William O. Douglas's corybantic scream that the American government was "a police state in which all dissent is suppressed or rigidly controlled" *(Point of Rebellion,* 1970*)*.

Yet, perhaps because Caute has been endowed with the British and European, Left-intellectual tropism that the United States is immanently fascist, an oversized Weimar awaiting its Hitler, he has indulged in wild exaggeration. For the benefit of the young, I was there. The American Legion tried to get me fired in 1952 for referring to Joe McCarthy in a Philadelphia speech as "Stalin's secret weapon." The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was on my back because of my connection with the Fund for the Republic, the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Democratic Action, and others. I testified on behalf of the American Veterans Committee against a teachers' loyalty oath before a Pennsylvania legislative committee in 1952. I then ran for the school board in a

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noncollege community, was denounced as a "Communist dupe," and led the (losing) Democratic ticket.

Those interested in my reflections on American liberty at that time are referred to the *New Republic*, January 23, 30, and February 6, 1956. Interestingly enough, Caute never bothers to cite any material in this genre, and a number of us were, and are, compulsively dedicated to public polemics on current events. Instead he takes what might be called the Lillian Hellman route, devoting an astonishing amount of space to the lamentations of what Jim Farrell once styled "the league of frightened Philistines," the Stalinist and fellow-traveling members of the intelligentsia who were adversely affected by the black cloud of fascism. (I think Hellman had to fire a chauffeur and sell one villa.)

What happened was in fact a nasty bit of business in a very circumscribed sector of the population. I have argued since 1941, when the Smith Act was, to the delight of the *Daily Worker*, employed against the Minneapolis Trotskyists, that the statute violated the First Amendment. My political friends and I opposed the prosecution of the Communist party leadership and, to my dying day, I will argue that the Supreme Court in the *Dennis* case, sustaining the prosecution, wrote its worst holding since it upheld the wartime incarceration of 115,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans who had a far rougher trip than the Communists ever had. All told, exactly 140 Communists were imprisoned, either under the Smith Act or for contempt of Congress.

In short, Caute's ideological myopia leads him to believe that millions of Americans lived in fear of stalking vigilantes, the Smith Act, congressional committees, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Admittedly, morality is not quantitative *to the moralist*: the fact one Communist was jailed on a patently absurd rap was an outrage. However, *historians* must take a wider perspective. Did the fact we killed more French and Belgians liberating Europe than the *Wehrmacht* killed occupying it make the liberation immoral? Quite literally Caute has made a mountain out of a historical dunghill.

JOHN P. ROCHE
Tufts University

Emerging Coalitions in American Politics *edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. San Francisco, Calif., Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978. 524 pp. $6.95.*

Whatever happened to that stable democracy on the North American shores? Where are those people who had a genius for politics? And what became of their leaders—persons who were possessed of consensual values and the seemingly unique ability to produce fundamental changes while compromising at critical junctures? Where has the United States gone wrong? *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*, a collection of twenty-two original essays, is devoted to analyzing these questions.

Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset, this volume is organized so that it is useful in a number of different ways. It begins with five articles on the history of party coalitions in the United States. These are followed by two lengthy pieces on voting behavior—one on the 1976 election (using survey data), the other on the dimensions of party conflict since 1896 (using aggregate data). The third section examines the prospects of four groups in

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the party system as it is presently constituted (Catholics, Jews, white Southerners, and intellectuals). With the history, voting behavior, and group interests in place, there follows nine essays by political activists of various political stripes and colors. A concluding essay by Lipset does more than tie together the major themes of the volume. It provides an articulate argument for the advantages of the politics of compromise and for a system of nonideological, two-party competition.

> In a relatively stable America, the constitutional order will continue to prescribe a two-coalitions system, one which works best if the leaders of each recognize that ideological consistency must be downplayed, that coalition is synonymous with compromise, and that no minority faction in a multifactional situation can ever have its way (p. 462).

But which two parties? While the authors' preference for two-party competition is clear, the essays they present describe a weak and incoherent system of electoral competition. Increasingly, elections are controlled by the Democratic party. In this regard, the presidential arena underestimates the diversity of politicians traveling under the Democratic banner. That party, observes Everett Ladd in a most perceptive piece of analysis, "now control(s) by massive margins Congress, the state legislatures, the governorships, and various lesser offices—reflecting the breadth and inclusiveness of their coalition" (p. 89). A broad, inclusive, internally inconsistent conglomerate, the Democratic party now has outdistanced the Republican party in virtually every politically relevant group—among self-identified liberals and among self-identified conservatives, in both high and low income groups, among all educational groups, in every region of the nation.

The Republican party is at a critical juncture. Except at the presidential level, it seems unable to present a competitive alternative in the electoral arena. The continuing growth of conservative elements in that party seems to preclude broader appeals to voters—unless, as William Schneider notes, the dimensions of competition shift so that ideology itself is favored. It seems worth mentioning that the Republican party has been unable to attract Catholics in substantial numbers. Thought to be the soft-underbelly of the New Deal coalition, Catholics seem as firmly committed as ever to the Democratic party. This group, as Andrew Greeley describes in an extremely useful essay, is "still solidly within the Democratic coalition as far as the traditional economic issues and the somewhat less traditional rational and welfare issues are concerned" (p. 285).

So the Republican party seems to be a very limited force in American politics. On the other hand, the Democratic party, although a dominant force in the electoral arena, is unable to govern. Precisely because it draws support so successfully from such a diverse array of groups, it is unable to produce coherent policies.

The essays in this volume are useful in terms of their descriptions of how the current party system came to this unhappy impasse. The volume is weakest in terms of describing the prospects. In the design of this collection, Lipset left his problem to political leaders of various persuasions. The nine articles that compose this section are instructive, although not in the manner intended by Lipset. Taken together, these leaders provide painfully little insight into the prospects for coalition politics in the United States. Occasionally there is a haunting phrase, but there is nothing notable in their analyses—no sense of the elec-

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torate, no feeling for government or for policy. I fear that these nine essays may be more representative than Lipset intended them to be.

Emerging Coalitions in American Politics is an interesting and a useful volume. Its strong points rest on the history of party competition it provides, its analysis of current political behavior, and its discussions of group politics. It misses some discussion of the revolution in media campaigning, a discussion of political finance, and an analysis of nonvoting in contemporary elections. Obviously, Lipset has chosen to concentrate solely on the electoral elements of party competition. But it must be stressed that in its discussion of coalition politics this volume brings together the rigor and methodology of modern political science and combines them with a lively and probing interest in politics. This is a substantial achievement indeed.

PETER B. NATCHEZ
Brandeis University

The Constitution Between Friends: Congress, the President, and the Law *by Louis Fisher. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 274 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.95.*

Louis Fisher's latest work takes us through another survey of key jurisdictional disputes between the presidency and Congress. Unavoidably this means trodding upon some well-worn turf; few questions about American government have attracted more scholarly attention than has the theory and practice of national legislative-executive relations. Nor is it unusual to portray, as this book does, the system of checks and balances as a pliable arrangement, subject to changing interpretations and to the ebb and flow of the institutional tug of war. Fisher's exposition, however, is characteristically lucid, robustly documented, and grounded in much fascinating historical detail. Considering the modest length of the text, the account is also admirably comprehensive: from the debate in 1789 involving the president's removal power to the more recent confrontations over executive privilege, impoundments, and war powers, the book methodically reports almost all the important controversies surrounding the separation of powers. As a tightly packaged review of the issues—indeed, as a useful source on American constitutionalism generally—the book makes a valuable contribution.

More arguable is how much *The Constitution Between Friends* helps close the literature's traditional gap between American constitutional *law* and *politics*, thereby clarifying the ways in which political forces animate the basic legal debates.

At various points we are reminded that the powers of the executive and the Congress "blend" together a lot, cannot be "neatly divided," are hard to delimit "with any precision," and so on. Understandably, a consistent judgment about this well-known state of affairs is difficult to render. In places the author seems to suggest that the lines of authority are best left indistinct: though the governmental institutions are forever encroaching upon one another, "the political process" eventually rights imbalances (p. 248). If this is the case, however, the distinguishing characteristics of this "process," and how it ensures a "self-correcting mechanism" (p. 248), would seem to require a more sustained analysis

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than the book offers. There are significant descriptions of what happens—including, among a rich collection of other examples, a number of relatively under-studied developments, such as the evolution of new nonstatutory congressional controls over the bureaucracy, the ways presidents may exercise something close to an item veto on congressional spending, the growing direct congressional role in budget making for some agencies, and the like. But to *describe* is not always to *explain*; it is important and interesting to illustrate the system's capacity for equilibrium, but even more interesting and important to reveal *why* the capacity is operative. The result, otherwise, is to leave a thoughtful reader perplexed by some of Fisher's conclusions (as when it is asserted that in "extreme conditions it is better to let the president call upon his 'prerogative' without claiming the slightest shred of legal support, perhaps even admitting that his action violates the law" [p. 248]—a recipe sweetened, supposedly, by the author's assurances that "the burden is then on him [the president] to justify his decision and rest his case before Congress and the public" [p. 248]).

Elsewhere (presidential "prerogative" aside), a rather different perspective unfolds, namely, the need to contemplate sharper legal boundaries to executive power. Especially ominous for the system, Fisher holds, "is executive activity cut loose from legislative moorings and constitutional restrictions—presidential action no longer tethered by law" (p. 247). Shortsighted responses and political expediency ought not dictate presidential decisions: "Too often in the past the legal basis for action has been ignored in the eagerness for results" (p. 250). Granted. But a reader probing for insights into what impells presidents to stretch the "legal basis" of their authority—that is, of the political imperatives and inflated public expectations that can drive presidents to pursue near-term "results," even to the point of challenging widely recognized constitutional strictures—may come away from the book unsatisfied.

Similarly, another of the author's themes—"To remain consistent with the Constitution, executive authority and administrative discretion should be directed and channeled by legislative policy" (p. 247)—inevitably raises about as many questions as it answers. *The Constitution Between Friends* tends to follow some other critiques of Congress (Lowi's, for instance, in *The End of Liberalism*) in preferring that lawmakers enunciate their policy objectives more carefully so as to stem a drift toward governance by bureaucratic rulemaking and executive whim. In principle there is, of course, much to be said for this prescription. To political scientists, however, the intriguing job is to figure out why Congress has trouble stating legislative policy unambiguously. Fisher addresses the problem, but not at length. The reasons he mentions for congressional reluctance in writing explicit statutory language are: a felt need for flexibility, given an uncertain future; a lack of necessary expertise on the part of congressmen and their staffs to draft precise wording in highly technical areas; a desire to shift the "chore" elsewhere because specificity can be politically unrewarding; and finally, the complexities of developing "strict standards that would be workable" (pp. 27–28, 32). Of these explanations, the latter two would seem to warrant special attention—and, at least for the benefit of political scientists, more discussion than Fisher devotes to them. For if critics continue to bemoan the delegation of legislative responsibilities to administrators, they should also try to elucidate more fully the formidable array of political disincentives to legislative clarity; and perhaps more importantly, the fact that much of what the public demands (hence the

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Congress produces) in the form of government policies entails governmental tasks whose goals or standards are difficult, indeed often impossible, to define operationally. The issue then becomes not so much whether Congress *should* "direct and channel" executive functions more coherently, but increasingly, whether it *can* and *will*.

Even so, the book's shortcomings should not be overstated. *The Constitution Between Friends* is, after all, a short volume written about a very big subject, and in many respects it is more notable for all that the author has managed to include than for what he has regrettably omitted.

PIETRO S. NIVOLA
The University of Vermont

Poverty and Social Change *by Kirsten Grønbjerg, David Street, and Gerald D. Suttles. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1978. 248 pp. $16.00.*

If one needed a reminder beyond the coverage in the daily press of the difficulties involved in achieving reform of the welfare system in the United States, this volume provides such a jolt to the memory. This work grew out of a research project on welfare and poverty and reflects the collaborative efforts of three sociologists to understand the morass of programs, policies, and beliefs that constitute welfare in America.

The volume is an interesting admixture of social history and social science. It is chuck full of information; the "Chronology of legislation, publication and other events connected with welfare in the U.S. and selected nations" (pp. 173–207) is a valuable resource to a student of social policy. The nine chapters dip in and out of the major issues in the area, such as reform efforts, economic underpinnings, culture and life style of the poor, and bureaucratization of poverty programs.

According to the authors, the troika approach was not an easy one. Separate chapters were written independently and then revised. The approach was less than completely successful. Parts of the volume read like an annotated bibliography; others are analytical; still other chapters argue a prescriptive position. The reader finds it difficult to see common threads in the book. The authors have not communicated any agreement among themselves as to causes or cures for the dilemmas they detail.

Although the authors do utilize a number of separate literatures in their analysis, a number of "obvious" citations and issues are missing from the book. Indeed, the volume stands as a sad commentary on the fragmentation and isolation of the various social science disciplines. For example, Alfred Kahn's works on social services and poverty are not cited by the authors. Herbert Gans's community studies are not used, although his work on education is cited (p. 128). The discussion on the causes of poverty fails to confront the income-services controversy—a debate that has undergirded much of the national policy debate for nearly twenty years. Are people poor simply because they do not have money? Or are people poor because they have no money *and* do not have access to the infrastructure of the society? The debate is not simply of intellectual concern. The no-money proponents concentrate solely on income strategies as antipoverty methods. The no-access proponents advocate a mixed strategy, including services and poverty-

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program-like participation efforts in their programmatic bag. The controversy between the two groups continues to be played out in the debate over the Carter Better Jobs and Income proposal.

The volume argues that the American society has a seemingly insatiable penchant to displace, reorient, and frustrate attempts to reform welfare and assist the poor. Yet the authors find that "the idea of the welfare state has gained considerable if grudging currency in America" (p. 167). The authors detail four steps that must be taken to federalize and universalize effectively the welfare system; they say we must give up: the means test; the myth of group self help; reliance on state and local government; and the myth of the helping person. The authors seem to believe that moves along these lines constitute relatively modest efforts. One wishes that they had detailed the way that these steps could be taken and by whom. Changes in all four areas demand significant shifts in American economic and cultural patterns, perceptions, and beliefs.

Because this volume will be so useful as a reference work, the occasional errors in the detail of programs are troublesome. The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI, the federalized program of aid to the aged, blind, and disabled) is missing from the discussion although it was enacted in 1972. Instead, the obsolete state-run programs for these client groups are described. (When SSI is included in the chronology [p. 207], it is given the wrong name.) And sometimes the authors call the program of aid to families with dependent children its correct name—AFDC—and yet, other times, refer to it by its old name, ADC.

Despite these weaknesses, however, the volume will be useful to the wide range of individuals concerned about inequality, poverty, and social change.

Beryl A. Radin
University of Southern California

The Divided Left: American Radicalism, 1900–1975 *by Milton Cantor. New York, Hill and Wang, 1978. 248 pp. $11.95.*

This book is an interpretive overview of the American Left in the twentieth century. Cantor surveys in fine analytical fashion the various radical groups that have spawned ameobalike on the Left, and he deals sympathetically and intelligently with key personages such as Norman Thomas and Earl Browder. Cantor is too committed himself to be totally objective, but he does manage to avoid falling into the trap of partisan pleading. And his commitment happily means that this book escapes the blandness that pervades so much current historical writing.

Cantor, who has an engaging style, tries to answer the questions raised over a half a century ago by Werner Sombart (and cited all too often since then in many a lesser and more polemical work) as to why there is no socialism in the United States. Cantor is careful to avoid a single, all-encompassing answer to this question. Indeed, he makes it very clear that in his opinion such a simplistic answer would be inappropriate. Cantor touches on the much vaunted "American exceptionalism" as well as the notorious, divisive, bitter factionalism that has rent the American Left. But for him the emphasis

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must be on the social and economic realities of life in the United States. "Without seeking a holistic answer," he argues, "it seems reasonably obvious that American values and realities, and the working class perception of them, frustrated an effective socialist movement" (p. 6).

In highlighting the response (or perhaps it would be better to say lack of response) of the American working class to the pleadings and exhortations of various radicals, Cantor cannot quite bring order to the nasty chaos that marks and mars the history of the American Left during this century, but he does manage to create a framework that makes that chaos comprehensible and understandable. Drawing on both traditional sources such as Daniel Bell, Theodore Draper, and David Shannon, as well as more recent works by many scholars such as Irwin Unger, Frank Warren, and James Weinstein, Cantor weaves a fascinating, absorbing, and almost seamless synthesis that is both interesting and useful.

As with all such histories that are so broad in scope, it is possible to discover here and there an error. Cantor, for example, errs in indicating that *Daily Worker* editor Louis Budenz deserted the Communist party for Roman Catholicism after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939; that defection took place some six years later.

One can also take issue with some of Cantor's interpretations. He is hazy in his discussion of the organization, activities, and evolution of the unemployment councils in the early 1930s. Moreover, it seems to me, that in adopting the currently fashionable view of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II as an enfeebled, prostrate country and in effect laying the blame on the United States for the instigation of the cold war, Cantor simply ignored the whole range of sources available and opted for just one point of view.

However, given the scope of his subject, and the intelligence of thought and felicity of style brought to bear on it, Cantor's occasional error or controversial interpretation do not detract from the value of his work. *The Divided Left* is a volume in the "American Century" series and is obviously directed at the student market. But I am certain that *anyone* interested in American radicalism would benefit from reading Cantor's book.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

Television and Human Behavior *by George Comstock et al. New York, Columbia University Press, 1978. 581 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $9.95.*

This is a state of the art book. Paraphrasing the well-known Lasswell paradigm, it tells us for television viewing in the United States, who has studied what, in which way, for what purpose, and with what result. It does an excellent job in summarizing research findings of over 2500 books, articles, and reports. Unlike many books of this genre, it even gives readers guidance in understanding the reasons for disparate findings and helps them appraise the merits of various research projects.

The findings are organized under several headings, proceeding from broad views of the field to a focus on specialized audiences and effects. We first learn about the content of

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television fact and fiction broadcasts, how much time various audiences spend in watching them, and how families decide what to view. We discover what people get out of television viewing and what effect it has on their other activity schedules. These general chapters are followed by a discussion of the influence television has on the lives of children, with particular emphasis on the question of imitation of antisocial behavior. Like children, so women, blacks, the poor, and the elderly are heavy television viewers. The impact of the media on their lives, including the effects of stereotyped portrayals of these groups, form another large part of the report.

In a departure from usual practice, a single chapter looks at television's persuasive power in selling soap as well as political candidates and policies. The combination is successful and does not obscure the differences in the two types of sales. It does, however, detract from the discussion of television's important effects in producing cognitions and opinions. On the plus side, this chapter, unlike most of the others, pays adequate attention to the complementary roles of television and newspapers.

Finally, there is a chapter on the psychology of behavioral effects that should have come at the start, rather than the end of the book. The chapter presents an interesting model that is partly obscured by a great deal of dispensable jargon. Other parts of the book are clearly, though blandly, written. There is also an overview chapter at the beginning of the book that summarizes all major findings, and a concluding chapter that attempts to map out a program for future policy-relevant social science research.

When so many subjects are covered, it may seem ungracious to complain about omissions. But the title *Television and Human Behavior* implies that more should be involved than coverage of a limited array of individual behaviors by Americans exclusively. Human behavior encompasses the vastly important subject of collective behavior in various types of organizations. But we learn little or nothing in this book about research findings on how television affects the actions of labor unions, or transportation lobbies, or religious sects, to name but a few. Nor do we learn anything about the effects of the medium on such policy-relevant attitudes and behaviors as health practices, birth control, economic and social aspirations, consumer behavior, or energy conservation. The literature is sparse for these areas, but it does exist and deserves coverage in a compendium of this sort.

What this book does, it does well. Its shortcomings are sins of omission. It concentrates on those areas about which we already know most and where older, albeit less complete, compilations already exist. It neglects the areas about which we know least and which therefore deserve more attention. In light of this, the title is immodest. We can only wish that it had been otherwise and that future volumes will fill the gap.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

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The Capitol Press Corps: Newsmen and the Governing of New York State *by David Morgan. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1978. 177 pp. $14.95.*

It is rare that a foreign observer of American politics focuses his attention on the state level. David Morgan, a British political scientist, has done just that, however, in his analysis of media coverage of New York State politics in Albany during the mid-1970s. Through interviews with journalists, legislators, bureaucrats, public relations aides, and editors, and through a content analysis of the state's major daily newspapers, Morgan seeks to explore a number of fundamental questions about the role of the press in American politics. This empirical research is undertaken within the context of a rather sophisticated triangular model of primary and secondary political communications patterns developed by the author.

Throughout this work, Professor Morgan displays a subtle understanding of the real role of the media in a state capitol. He knows that legislators and bureaucrats often talk to reporters not to enlighten the public but to send messages to each other. He understands that a governor may publicly deplore the negative treatment given a state agency in the press while behind the scenes using this very publicity to move recalcitrant bureaucrats within the agency toward closer support of his programs. And he realizes that journalists, far from being Watergate-style investigative reporters, are greatly dependent upon official press releases so that they can give demanding editors a "day's copy for a day's pay."

It will come as no surprise to observers of New York State politics that the daily newspapers in Albany give much more room to state news than do dailies throughout the rest of the state. Albany is a company town, and state government is "the company." These same observers might be surprised to learn, however, that the *Daily News* devotes more of its space to news than does the *New York Times*, and that *Newsday*, on Long Island, had less news content in early 1975 than did any other major paper in the state (p. 19). (Surely, however, the 2.8 percent reported for column inches devoted to advertising in the *Daily News* is a typographical error!)

Generally, Morgan's respondents suggested that state news was downplayed outside of the capitol because of lack of reader interest. Recently published poll data, however, showed quite high citizen interest in news of this level of government. Perhaps editors are underestimating their publics in this area.

One of Morgan's major themes is that Governor Nelson Rockefeller had great success in coopting the news media, and that, after Rockefeller left state government in 1973, media-government relations in Albany became much less structured. If the author makes an error here, it is to imagine Rockefeller to have been more powerful than he really was, especially during his final two terms. By the late 1960s, countervailing power to that of the governor was developing in several institutions in Albany, and the press was no exception. Actually, though reporters who covered Rockefeller complained that he denied access and sought to manipulate them, they knew that his prominence helped them to command front page space in their home papers and, occasionally, across the country. Again, the symbiotic relationship between the press and the politician is illustrated.

Despite its overall value, some interesting themes were touched upon only lightly in this brief book. Professor Morgan recognizes the impact of the generation gap between

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younger reporters and older, more formally educated politicians and bureaucrats upon the reporting of New York politics. He fails to see, however, that the practice of regularly reassigning young reporters after only a few years in Albany denies the press the institutional memory it needs to cover state government properly. No newspaper is guiltier of this than the *New York Times*, which uses the state capitol as a reportorial training ground. Success there means an assignment in Washington or abroad; failure means continuation in the Albany assignment. Little wonder that reporters, intent upon their own careers, develop little expertise in how state government really works. They do not have the time.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York at New Paltz

The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era *by Coral Bell. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977. 278 pp. $12.50.*

This book will interest those who believe it is possible to write a dispassionate survey of Henry Kissinger's role in American foreign policy without stressing his wiretapping of close associates, his presumed egomania or paranoia, his harsh treatment of U.S. allies, or his duplicity in negotiations. It is an interesting attempt to portray the much maligned detente as an "American diplomatic strategy" for a "triangular balance of power" with the Soviet Union and China. Bell anticipates criticism of her deemphasis on SALT or German Ostpolitik, but chooses instead to argue that "detente is a mode of management of adversary power" based on reduction of tensions. Some readers will want a more systematic analysis of the limits of that conceptual approach in an era when nonstate actors, resource diplomacy, and economic issues have become more important.

In chapters on Southeast Asia, Europe, Cyprus, Portugal and Southern Africa, Australia, and the Middle East, the author finds Kissinger's ideas and techniques largely acceptable, often admirable. Aware of skeptics' reactions to each of these case histories, Bell is consistent in her praise of Kissinger's *modus operandi*, principally because she argues that the secretary of state understood the dangers of excessive expectations from detente better than his detractors. "Detente does not mean that the power contest has ended; it only proposes a mode by which it may be made less dangerous and pointed in a more creative direction" (p. 222).

Unlike some other long-time foreign observers of U.S. foreign policy, Bell does discuss the moral implications of detente: she correctly cites Helsinki as evidence of the West's desire to ameliorate conditions in the East, "given the existing realities of power" in the absence of a willingness to use "direct military or political pressure" to break Soviet hegemony in 1953, 1956, 1968, or thereafter (pp. 240–241).

Understandably, Bell laments the reintroduction of "messianism" in U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration. Lacking both space and time for a full comparison of the Kissinger and post-Kissinger eras, she concludes on a note of cautious optimism, a tone much revered by the policymakers of whom she writes so flatteringly, yet intelligently. The true test will come five or more years from now when the "triangular

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balance of power" Kissinger strove to achieve will either be closer to reality or a historical curiosity. For the present, scholars and policymakers will find this work a useful summary of the main thrusts and parries of U.S. foreign policy during a turbulent period whose domestic scars are still fresh.

LINDA B. MILLER
Wellesley College
Harvard University

Trudeau *by George Radwanski. New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1978. 372 pp. $14.95.*

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, prime minister of Canada, is probably the most interesting Canadian politician of the twentieth century. An intellectual anxious to preserve his privacy even in public life, reluctant to bend in the face of political necessity, often unhappy in casual encounters with strangers even when they are valuable party workers, it is a wonder that he ever attained his high office in the first place. Like Jimmy Carter, he did so partly because he was relatively unknown to the general public until his sudden emergence as a national figure between 1965 and 1968. He offered the chance of relief from the old politicians of whom the public were so sick by that time.

George Radwanski has undertaken a study in depth of this unusual statesman. He stresses the man himself rather than the events with which he has been associated. It is an undertaking for which Mr. Radwanski has many qualifications. He holds two degrees from McGill University, one in political science and philosophy, one in law. As a journalist with the *Montreal Gazette* he covered the three Trudeau election campaigns of 1968, 1972, and 1974. Since 1975 he has been Ottawa editor and national affairs columnist for the *Financial Times* of London. For this book he has had the advantage of eight one-hour interviews with tape recorder with Mr. Trudeau himself as well as having done the usual research into speeches and writings of his subject. He has also interviewed numerous persons who might be expected to throw light on Mr. Trudeau's personality and methods. He has written a book reflecting close and thoughtful study of its subject.

Freshness is added by many quotations from those interviewed, a merit however that detracts from smoothness of narrative. Mr. Trudeau in particular seems to have been very informal in his talks, the texts of which, incidentally, were not shown to the prime minister after the interviews. Purists may also wince a bit at the journalistic looseness of the author's prose. He is not above beginning sentences with verbs or turning nouns into verbs ("hosting"). *Time* left its mark on Canada.

But stylistic blemishes are as nothing against the balance and fairness of Radwanski's presentation. This book is no apology for Trudeau but a careful attempt to understand him in his strengths and weaknesses. It is a portrait with the warts left on. It gives the impression of a statesman of very high ability but somewhat cold and insensitive personality who detests the hurly burly of parliamentary life and all the compromises of conventional politics. But when aroused, as by his near defeat in 1972 and possibly by the formation of a separatist government in Quebec, he can play the political game to good effect.

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For he is competitive if not politically ambitious. If René Lévesque had not come to power in Quebec, Trudeau might have been willing to retire from politics. But he has dedicated himself to the preservation of the confederation and feels (probably rightly) that he is the statesman best fitted to achieve that end.

Mr. Radwanski calls Trudeau "a leader unfulfilled." Twice (1968 and 1974) he has aroused great expectations among the electorate and twice been entrusted by them with great power. On neither occasion has he satisfied the expectations he had aroused. Moreover, by abruptly adopting controls on incomes and prices in 1975, a year after he had excoriated the Tory leader for advocating them in the 1974 election, and without sufficient preparation of public opinion for the reversal of policy, he lost the support of important groups among the electorate. They no longer believed what he said. As this review is being written (February 1979) Mr. Trudeau and the Liberals face a difficult election. By-election results and opinion polls hold little encouragement for them. It is their ill luck that while their leader's strength is in his passionate commitment to national unity, the voters seem to be more concerned about their economic welfare.

But whether he wins or loses, Pierre Trudeau will certainly rank as one of the most considerable figures among the first fifteen prime ministers who have ruled Canada. This gives Mr. Radwanski's book more than passing importance.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College, Columbia University

Eurocommunism: The Italian Case *edited by Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 196pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $4.95.*

Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism? *by Annie Kriegel. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 131pp. $12.00*

From Stalinism to Eurocommunism *by Ernest Mandel. New York, Schocken Books, 1978. 223pp. $5.95.*

During the last few years Eurocommunism has represented one of the few "growth industries" in political science. It has stimulated a host of new courses, research projects, and publications. These books represent an initial attempt to respond to this upsurge of interest. However, researchers engaged in ongoing studies will be happy to know that there is still a lot of ground to be covered. These three books provide less than a complete answer to the questions what is Eurocommunism, and how does it manifest itself in concrete everyday terms?

The best of the lot is Ernest Mandel's analysis of Eurocommunism's implications for Marxist strategy. The book brings together five essays that he wrote for the journal *Inprecor* and five others especially written for this volume. Together, they provide us with a Trotskyite critique of Eurocommunism.

The author traces the historical origins of Eurocommunism to three forces: Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country"; the theory and practice of the united and popular

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fronts; and the "attrition" strategy of Karl Kautsky who foresaw the peaceful takeover of power by the proletariat. All three are, according to Mandel, contrary to the international revolutionary strategy that the working class must pursue to gain power and to consolidate the victory of socialism on a worldwide basis.

The abandonment of a revolutionary strategy explains why "an entire generation of Eurocommunist cadres . . . have learned nothing except how to prepare for routine elections and immediate wage struggles" (p. 21). In Mandel's view the Eurocommunist parties of Italy, Spain, France, etc. have been transformed into the "agents of their own bourgeoisie" (p. 29) rather than operating as the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. Thus, they see their primary goal as rescuing capitalism from its own demise (see Berlinguer's policy of economic austerity) and shoring up shaky parliamentary regimes. For Mandel both of these efforts are self-defeating because capitalism will tolerate them only as long as they remain useful for its own purpose—that is, to keep the workers in line and dampen the forces for revolution.

Despite these negative connotations for revolution in the West, the author admits that the upsurge of Eurocommunist thinking has had a profoundly positive impact on Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the Eurocommunists have correctly identified in the appropriation by the state apparatus of "the social surplus product . . . outside any control by the producers" (p. 73) the structural source for the Stalinist bureaucratic suffocation of democratic forces. It follows that Moscow is less than enthusiastic about Eurocommunism because it threatens to undermine the foundations of the Stalinist ideology. It is therefore ludicrous to think that Eurocommunists are tools of the Soviet Union or pose the problem of a "Finlandization" of their countries. Mandel presents two reasons for this view: the Eurocommunists have dropped all demands for a breakup of NATO as a precondition for participation in a national government; and they have all stated that they "favor the strengthening and not weakening of the national defense of 'their' bourgeoisie" (p. 31). Despite these assurances, Mandel predicts that in the end the bourgeoisie will not tolerate the Eurocommunists in power. The only solution to the problem of political power posed by the Eurocommunists is their final suppression by the bourgeois state or being swept aside by the revolutionary stirrings of the working class. Mandel insists that revolution is possible in Europe, especially in southern Europe.

In contrast to Mandel, the other two books under review approach the problem of Eurocommunism from a non-Marxist point of view. Annie Kriegel did her writing during the heat of the 1978 French electoral campaign which is clearly reflected in her attempt to interpret what Eurocommunism (and thus PCF [French Communist Party] participation in a national government) would mean for France and other countries caught in the same predicament. However, since the expected Communist-Socialist victory did not materialize, the Kriegel work has lost some of its immediate attraction for American readers.

Her hypothesis is that Eurocommunism does not represent either a distinct political strategy or an independent regional force. It is best conceived as a "temptation" to move away from Stalinism rather than a transformation that has already occurred. In Kriegel's view the Eurocommunists are trying "to bring themselves up to date by the pressures of their environment, to modernize their programs, and to become more capable, in turn, to influence their environment" (p. xii). Nevertheless, the Communists remain wedded to

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their antidemocratic Leninist internal structure, their antagonism toward the socioeconomic and political status quo, and their ties to the Soviet Union. It is the author's opinion that if the Communist parties of France, Italy, and Spain were truly committed to democracy, they would turn their parties inside out.

On the whole, the Kriegel book is interesting for scholars of French politics in that it provides a good guide to the positions that have animated intellectual and political discussions in France, but its usefulness stops at the French border. When Kriegel attempts to generalize about the impact of Eurocommunism on other countries, her analysis is surprisingly shallow—for example, her characterization of Italy as a state in which "there *is* no power anymore" (p. 86). The point is that if the Communists were to come to power there would be *no* power to wield. One might ask what has happened to the police, army, trade unions, financial and economic enterprises, state bureaucracy, and party organizations?

The book edited by Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori is disappointing in many respects. In 1977 the American Enterprise Insititute and the Hoover Institution lost the opportunity to provide a thorough case study of the genesis and development of Eurocommunist thinking and practice in Italy. Instead, the "Conference on Italy and Eurocommunism" from which this book is derived was managed as a media event. The material concentrates on the strategy of coalition formation in Italy since 1960 rather than on Eurocommunism.

The book is divided into four parts which are supposed to provide an overall view of Italian politics. The opening section presents a discussion of American foreign policy toward the "opening to the left" in the 1960s by a proponent (Roger Hilsman) and an opponent (William E. Knight) of the policy. This is followed by an essay on the origins of the center-left by Angelo M. Codevilla, who boldly advances the thesis that the Christian Democrats somehow learned about corruption only after the creation of a government with the Socialists: the initiation of the center-left "coincided with a quantum leap in the corruption of Italian politics" (p. 41). Evidence to support this point is conveniently omitted in the footnotes.

The second section dealing with the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the most valuable part of the book. Here Sani and La Palombara provide us with useful information on the trends that led to the PCI's dramatic electoral gains in 1976 and the prospects for the future.

The following section presents short pieces by a Communist deputy, Lucio Libertini, a Christian Democrat parliamentarian, Massimo DeCarolis, and the U.S. correspondent for the conservative Rome daily *Il Tempo*, Marino DeMedici, on each individual's reflections on Italian affairs and suggestion of how to overcome the problems of the day. There is little of substance, but the views provide the basis for drawing certain conclusions about the life expectancy of the historic compromise.

Finally, the last portion of the book is dedicated to two essays by Giovanni Sartori and Henry Kissinger. Sartori reflects on the developments in Italian politics during the past twenty years and the risks involved in permitting the Communists to approach power. In light of the recent demise of the Andreotti government, the fatalism displayed by Sartori over the possibility of reversing the process once it goes into effect may have already been belied by the facts.

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Kissinger's essay advances the proposition that Eurocommunism merely represents another variant of the Communist strategy of penetration and subversion of Western political systems and that this strategy must be repulsed if we want to prevent the extension of Soviet hegemony into Western Europe. Despite the evidence marshaled in support of this thesis, one remains puzzeled by the impact of one mistake in dates on his analysis. Kissinger states that the PCI left the Italian government in 1948 after having lost the elections. The truth of the matter is that the Communists were thrown out of the government in 1947 as a prelude to the first parliamentary elections. It is doubtful whether the change in dates would change Kissinger's mind on the PCI strategy, but it does add to the readers' overall uneasiness that both the conference and the book were quickly thrown together without too much regard for detail or accuracy.

ROBERT LEONARDI
DePaul University

Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1970–74 *by Philip Norton. London, Temple Smith, 1978. 331 pp. $12.00.*

Edward Heath's ministry is rapidly assuming a place in the experience of the British Conservative party as critical as the ministry of Sir Robert Peel 140 years ago. Few months pass without the publication of another study of Conservative politics in the early 1970s, whereas good books on, for example, Churchill's equally long peacetime ministry are much harder to find. What has riveted attention on the Heath and Peel ministries is their contentiousness rather than their accomplishments. Heath's success in carrying Britain into the European Economic Community (EEC) may begin to amount in substance to the achievement of Peel in adjusting the government of Britain to the requirements of an industrialized economy. But the Conservative party was then and is now preoccupied in defining itself with reference to the tearing internal dissensions that both men provoked.

Philip Norton has conducted a workmanlike examination of the explosion of backbench dissent within the parliamentary party, particularly during the middle years of Heath's ministry. After thirty years of comparative docility, the temper of the parliamentary party deteriorated quickly after Heath's victory in the general election of 1970. In the first full session of the new Parliament, in 1971–72, Conservative backbenchers voted against the government in one out of every three divisions. Most, but by no means all, of this divided Conservative voting occurred over the EEC bill. Though in the 1972–73 session the total number of occasions on which Conservative backbenchers voted against their government declined somewhat, the dissension involved more members of Parliament (M.P.) and a wider range of issues. Contention over the entry into Europe had undoubtedly helped to break the ice of Conservative parliamentary cohesion. Enoch Powell also helped by lending his mind, voice, and fire—though not organizational leadership—to the rebelliousness.

Still, through patient analysis, Dr. Norton discovered that the primary blame lay squarely upon the shoulders of Edward Heath. With his eyes set on the goals he wished to accomplish, paying little attention to the whips and junior ministers and sometimes even

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his cabinet, treating backbenchers, in the words of one, as "nincompoops to be manipulated at will" (p. 241), Heath rammed his measures through the House of Commons, making concessions only when obliged to do so by impending or actual defeat. He did not communicate with backbenchers either socially or intellectually; and what Julian Critchley described as the Spanish Republican in him disdained employing the arts of patronage to ease the offense. In all this, Heath behaved like Sir Robert Peel, but with an added, bitter twist of ruthless contempt that Heath imbibed from his experience as chief whip in the mid-fifties.

The consequences of this cumulative, galling offense are still being felt, and hence are impossible as yet to assess. Health drove previously diverse groups of right-wing opinion—on foreign, home, or economic policy—into cohesion. But their anger subsided once they succeeded in driving him out of the leadership. Mrs. Thatcher may use her sympathy with these forces to reduce them to manageable proportions. There is a constitutional consequence of the Conservative rebellion that is likely to prove longer lasting. Heath's willingness to make concessions only when subjected to parliamentary defeats, and then to remain in office rather than resign, weakened the very dominance of the government in the division lobbies of Parliament that he was so willing to assert. The minority Labor governments since 1974 have felt obliged to deepen that precedent, and hence to allow Parliament to regain a little of the power that the executive had absorbed over the previous generation.

PETER MARSH
Syracuse University

Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918 *by William L. Miller. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 242 pp. $18.95.*

William L. Miller ingeniously uses computerized data to discover what motivated the British electorate from 1918 until the present. Although this analysis can be considered as an expansion of the pioneering study by David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, it uses a significantly different perspective which gives a more realistic picture as to what the elector actually did in the voting booth and why. Instead of treating the electorate as a whole, Miller breaks it down into its various constituencies, each with its own socioeconomic characteristics and its own partisan division. We have thus the material for determining what was the actual alignment of political and economic force within each constituency and upon what issues they divided.

Although this treatment can yield expected results, there can be surprising observations. Class, especially as reflected in the percentage of employers and managers among the economically active males, consistently has been the most reliable indicator of voting behavior. The class characteristics of the constituency have much more influence on partisanship, however, than the class characteristics of the individual. "The partisanship of individuals is influenced more by where they live," writes the author, "than what they do" (p. 65). Caution must thus be used in projecting how the diminished class polarization, revealed by previous studies, will actually be translated in electoral results.

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This frame of reference is also valuable because the party choice facing the voter was not the same in each constituency and varied over time. The role—or lack of one—of a minor party (in England, the Labour party in the first years of this period and later the Liberal party) was a factor not only in determining voters' choice in a particular election but also in influencing voters' future political orientation. Despite this fact, a Liberal candidature had, throughout most of this period, a much smaller negative effect on Conservative success than is usually assumed by observers and candidates.

Other variables besides class are used for this analysis. Religion, for example, cannot be dismissed as an electoral force because the nonconformist ethic still carries a great deal of weight, as is shown, on social issues. Moreover, nonconformist characteristics in a constituency tended to help Labour's prospects while religiosity (number of clergy per capita) had a negative effect.

This valuable concentration of electoral insights should prove useful to both the students and practitioners of British politics. One can only guess what the latter will find most valuable. Since immigration will probably become an increasingly important issue, their attention will be drawn to any correlation between it and voting behavior. Although the rise in immigration was similar in both the West Midlands and the Southeast, the Conservative party made striking, if not permanent, gains only in the former because the issue was raised there by their candidates and leaders, especially Enoch Powell. The politicians may also note that, despite normal expectations, local unemployment had relatively little impact upon voting behavior. Finally, in an age when ethnic nationalism has emerged as a significant political force in the United Kingdom, the Scottish and Welsh variations from the regular patterns of electoral behavior will probably be gone over with a fine-toothed comb.

The examples given above are only a small sample of the correlations and perceptions of this enlightening work on modern British elections.

HARRY LAZAR
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The British Experience 1945–75 *by Peter Calvocoressi. New York, Pantheon Books, 1978. 253 pp. $8.95.*

Britain is an altogether more attractive country to live in today than it was at the end of World War II, or even in the late fifties. Restaurants are better and more varied. There are more mainline railway trains, and they keep to time better. Road improvements have cut journey times, often by more than half. The Clean Air Act of 1956, together with the increased consumption of oil, has put an end to those dreadful, Dickensian London fogs—which were in fact smogs—and enabled buildings like St. Paul's and the National Gallery to be cleaned successfully for the first time. The middle classes at long last heat their homes properly. Manual workers drive cars, and take holidays on the Costa Brava and Majorca. London's musical and theatrical life is the richest in the world. Forced to compete with commercial television, the BBC has enormously improved the variety and quality of its output. Not least, those rigid barriers of class that so exercised writers in the

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1930s are rapidly crumbling. Social mobility is greater than ever before; fewer and fewer Britons think of themselves as belonging to a social class at all.

The country is, by any measure, better off. The paradox is that almost everybody thinks it is worse off. There are, presumably, two reasons for this. The first is the loss of empire. Britain in 1945 was a great world power, an equal ally (more or less) of the United States and the Soviet Union—a country that assumed that, whenever new weapons systems were needed, it could build and develop them entirely on its own. Although the days of British rule on the Indian subcontinent were already numbered in 1945, British rule in Africa seemed secure until the end of the century at least, and the commonwealth had real meaning as a political unit; Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa had all declared war on Germany, almost automatically, in 1939. Today, only thirty years later, the imperial age is over. Britain has no colonies that are worth having; the commonwealth exists, but only in a very attenuated form. Britain, as has so often been pointed out, is now just another middle-rank power. British news appears in American newspapers, if at all, round about page 33.

The other reason why almost everyone thinks Britain is worse off is, of course, because of its relative economic decline. British workers are better off; German and French workers are much, much better off. Britain's economy has grown more slowly than those of her continental and Far Eastern competitors; Britain's share of world trade has declined steadily. In 1955–56 Britain's political leaders thought they could afford to ignore the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. By the 1960s they were desperately trying to adhere to the treaty. In 1975 they were urging the British people to vote in favor of Europe in Britain's first-ever national referendum.

These, then, are the great themes of British history in the past thirty years: the growth of material prosperity and the crumbling of class barriers; the end of empire; and the causes and consequences of Britain's relative economic decline. There are probably two ways in which they could be treated. One would be to offer the kind of detailed, analytic, narrative treatment provided by Charles Loch Mowat in his classic *Britain Between the Wars*, drawing on every imaginable kind of source and buttressing every argument with documents and statistical tables. The other would be to approach the subject in a more literary manner, offering the reader one man's reflections on the events—and, more important, the trends—of his time. It is sad to have to report that Peter Calvocoressi, a considerable scholar, as several of his earlier works have shown, has adopted neither of these courses in *The British Experience*, nor shown us how the subject might be treated in some other way. The book consists largely of a recitation of facts, without its being at all clear by what criteria they have been chosen. And the author's reflections on his facts, while always sensible and humane, are never either original or particularly illuminating. Nor is the book useful for reference. It contains no footnotes, no bibliography, and no statistical tables. (The author does not draw on public opinion poll data at all.) It does not even contain an index. Truth to tell, *The British Experience* reads rather as though the author committed himself to the project and then got bored with it. Boredom is likely to be most readers' response too.

ANTHONY KING
University of Essex

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China's Role in World Affairs *by Michael B. Yahuda. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 298 pp. $18.50.*

Post-Mao China's increasing international activity, as manifested in its bold, new, foreign economic policy and its military adventure in Vietnam, no longer sustains an interpretation of China as a largely self-contained and somewhat aloof international actor. Nonetheless, precisely such an idea is the leitmotif of Professor Yahuda's survey of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to the present. The shortcomings of this book, however, lie not in its failure to predict the recent sharp turns in China's foreign policy (an unreasonable demand), but in the peculiar self-limiting set of issues that Yahuda chooses to address. Rather than examining China's actual foreign policy behavior and the complex set of domestic and foreign variables that produce it, Professor Yahuda focuses on changing Chinese concepts about their proper role in world affairs. He covers the evolution of China from a dependent ally of the Soviet Union in the 1950s through its Cultural Revolution incarnation as a kind of revolutionary fortress to the post-1971 duality of emergent great power and simultaneously developing socialist member of the Third World.

Within this framework interesting insights into Chinese foreign policy might have emerged through a comparison of Chinese self-definitions and verbal behavior with other indicators of the PRC's international activity such as trade, cultural diplomacy, and so forth. But Yahuda limits himself largely to an exposition of Chinese conceptions of their world role utilizing the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders as his principal sources. Given his basically uncritical attitude, the result is a kind of "Mao knew best" version of Chinese foreign policy. The few places where he examines alternate conceptions of China's world role (for example, Liu Shao-ch'i's apparent preference for a modified alliance with the USSR rather than a Maoist style break with Soviet revisionism) are among the more interesting parts of a very bland book. To be fair, Yahuda is surely correct in stressing the importance of Mao's ideas and perceptions. His discussion of Mao's mid-1950s disillusionment with the Soviet model sheds light on the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

What has been China's role in world affairs? Yahuda suggests that China has not been an ordinary great power driven by narrowly conceived national interests, but rather has served at times as a revolutionary model and a spokesman for broader interests. The implication to be drawn is that China has less need of the world than the world has of China. Such a thesis is probably not meant to be subjected to empirical verification, and is best accepted as an affirmation of the author's own outlook.

In a book that so heavily emphasizes Mao Tse-tung's contribution to the shaping of Chinese foreign policy conceptions from 1949 through the present, it is a little surprising to see so little attention devoted to assessing the prospects for change in Chinese policy after Mao. Particularly for one who appears to accept Mao's Maximalist pretensions that "La revolution c'est moi," the question should arise as to what follows the death of the great man. In other words, what will become of China's foreign policy now that the font of authoritative conceptions of China's world role is gone?

It is not too early to offer a preliminary answer to this question. The panoply of strategic concerns, developmental objectives, domestic political conflicts, external fac-

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tors, and so forth that Yahuda eschews for the high ground of ideas is playing an ever more obvious role in Chinese foreign policy. Unfortunately, then, *China's Role in World Affairs* serves as a kind of coda to an outmoded approach in the study of China's foreign policy.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
Columbia University

The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945 *by Saburō Ienaga. New York, Pantheon Books, 1978. 316 pp. $10.00.*

It is good to have a superb English translation of this important book. Originally published in Japan in 1968, the book has justifiably been regarded as a landmark study of Japan at war.

The title, to be sure, is rather misleading. The Pacific War usually refers to Japan's conflict with the United States and the British Empire during the period 1941–1945, and World War II to the global warfare spanning between 1939 and 1945. Ienaga confounds conventional chronology by going back to 1931 and treating the next fourteen years as a unit. But he has his reasons for doing so. As he states, everything from the Mukden Incident (18 September 1931) onward through Japan's unconditional surrender are "inseparable, all part of the same war" (p. xiii). This is a myopic view, to say the least, looking at world events from a narrowly Japanese perspective. Because the author so facilely lumps together 1931 and 1937 and then with 1939, 1940, 1941, and beyond, the reader gets no sense of structural changes in international politics throughout the 1930s, or of domestic developments in other countries that had bearings on Japanese policy. For an understanding of these extrinsic forces, one must turn to other studies such as the invaluable *Taiheiyō sensō e no michi* (The Road to the Pacific War; 1962–63) which has been partially translated into English.

The book's deficiencies in a conventional sense, however, are also its unique strength. Rather than aiming at presenting a multinational perspective on the war, it describes Japan at war as interpreted by a historian who lived through the period. Born in 1913, Ienaga is typical of those for whom the years 1931–1945 were a "valley of darkness," where political oppression, military rule, and cultural deprivation characterized national life. The story has been told in vivid detail by an American historian (Thomas R. H. Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, 1978), but Ienaga brings to it an additional flavor born of a sense of personal involvement in the drama. Talking of Japanese atrocities committed against prisoners of war, he says, "To write about these depraved acts by Japanese fills me with shame and remorse" (p. 190). Such a personalized statement reflects the frank impressionistic approach the author takes. He fiercely denounces the Japanese leadership, both civilian and military, for the disaster they brought to their country, and severely castigates many of his fellow intellectuals for having supported the war efforts. The book thus provides an important counterweight to many studies of Japan at war whose stylistic lack of color has often masked a subjective bias in defense of Japanese militarism and imperialism.

This is not to say, however, that this volume is without serious problems. After noting

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that in Japan, unlike Germany, there were "no concentration camps or mass killings," Ienaga offers a rather feeble and questionable explanation that "this may only mean that oppression was actually greater in Japan" since "[every] aspect of life was so regimented and controlled that no one could plan a treacherous act worthy of the death penalty!" (p. 114). And yet he goes on to state, "Gestures of opposition, including within the military, were too numerous to recount" (p. 119). The book devotes almost equal space to descriptions of wartime opposition as to wartime oppression. Ienaga clearly wants to record heroic acts of resistance by Japanese "who resolutely refused to change their political beliefs or to kotow to the authorities" (p. 203). But such acts are not fitted into his overall interpretation that the "weak appreciation of civil rights was one cause of the Pacific War" (p. 115). Actually, the fact that some Japanese did not abandon their political beliefs would seem to indicate the durability of those beliefs, and suggest that even those who temporarily compromised with the war machine may not have entirely given up their views. Moreover, if, as the author writes, the "authoritarian hierarchical structure of the military was a microcosm of Japanese society" (p. 125), the military's known inefficiency and ineptness must also have reflected lack of rigid regimentation in the society at large.

One may, in other words, construct a different narrative on the basis of the rich factual material Ienaga presents. Still, this is a spirited account of wartime Japan, one that no amount of objective scholarship can truly supplant. The English translation by Frank Baldwin is almost flawless (with the exception of a few careless errors such as the rendering of Chandra Bose as "Changar Bose" on p. 146), and conveys the vivid style of the original. Together with Havens's book noted above, this volume should provide an excellent addition to the growing literature on wartime society and culture in various countries.

AKIRA IRIYE
The University of Chicago

U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The Next Decade *edited by Franklin B. Weinstein. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1978. 318 pp. Cloth, $14.00; paper, $7.00.*

For thirty years Japan has depended for its security entirely upon the United States. But East Asia, and the world, have changed dramatically since the Japanese-American Security Treaty was signed in 1951, and especially in the last decade.

Communist insurgents have toppled pro-Western governments in Southeast Asia. Political alignments have shifted; the United States has now established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The American commitment to Taiwan and to South Korea has come into question. And Japan and the United States have fallen out over economic matters.

Plainly the ties between the winners and losers of the Pacific war of 1941 to 1945 stand in need of reappraisal. Such a reappraisal is the purpose of *U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia*, an excellent collection of essays prepared originally for one in a series of conferences sponsored by the Stanford University Project on United States-Japan Relations.

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The book has two cardinal virtues. First, the essays are concise, stimulating, and interrelated, none of which is guaranteed, especially where there are several authors. Second, some of the contributors are Japanese. Their inclusion provides a useful corrective to what Daniel I. Okimoto, in his essay contrasting Japanese and American approaches to security, calls "the appalling American ignorance about Japanese ways of thinking" (p. 28).

The twelve chapters do not present a unanimity of views on every subject. There is particular disagreement about the appropriate American policy toward South Korea. Selig S. Harrison calls for the steady withdrawal of American military forces from the Korean peninsula to encourage reconciliation between the northern and southern Korean states. Others are less sanguine about the consequences of withdrawal and the prospects for reconciliation.

There is, however, full agreement on one thing; namely that the Security Treaty ought to remain in force, despite (and because of) the changes that three decades have brought. As James Morley notes, there is less opposition to the treaty in Japan now than at any time in the past, in part because the end of the Vietnam War has made the United States less unpopular. China now looks favorably on the treaty as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, so it no longer blocks friendship between Japan and the People's Republic.

The Soviet Union remains a threat. Japan has no strategic depth, as Makoto Moi points out, and so to meet that threat must rely either on forward defense or deterrence. The first is acceptable neither to Japan nor to the other countries of the region. As for the second, Japan could not, as Henry Rowen shows, easily equip itself with a nuclear arsenal capable of surviving a Soviet attack, and therefore effective in deterring one. This compels reliance on the American nuclear arsenal, which remains, as Morton Halperin argues, a credible deterrent for Japan's purposes.

There is agreement on another theme, which several of the authors mention in passing. The Security Treaty is necessary, but not sufficient, to protect Japan's security. For Japan "national security," as Morley says, "is a broader concern than military defense" (p. 56). It includes as well "the ability of the industrial system to secure markets, materials, technology, and capital required for production" (p. 54). A Japanese official is quoted as making the point neatly: "With or without a nuclear deterrent there is no national security without oil" (p. 76).

What can Japan do to assure supplies of oil, and other raw materials, and access to markets and opportunities for foreign investment? The answer is far from clear. But the question is one that future books on Japan's security will undoubtedly address.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Harvard University

Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India *by Myron Weiner. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978. 383 pp. $22.50.*

Ethnicity is not, and never has been, a static phenomenon. Consequently, the politics of ethnicity must be analyzed dynamically. Myron Weiner's insightful new book makes this necessity all the more clear. Migration involves not simply the movement of ethnic groups, but also the creation of new interethnic patterns; out of those patterns evolve

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new political relationships, some based on reciprocity, others based on competition and even conflict. Thus *Sons of the Soil* is of value not simply to the ethnic or India specialist but to any analyst attempting to comprehend the causes and repercussions of changing patterns of intergroup politics.

The term "sons of the soil" is used in India to refer to local inhabitants, and ethnicity in Indian politics thus becomes saliently mixed with nativism. The very currency of the term suggests how important communally defined migration has become in contemporary Indian politics, for local communities are mobilizing in order to stem the influx of outsiders, and they are utilizing often a new ethnic consciousness to fuel that mobilization. As Weiner makes clear at several points, though it does not structure his analysis as perhaps as much as it should, the rise of such nativist ethnic mobilizations is due to the reorganization of India's political economy, especially in the last decade, in such a way that the gap between economically developing and economically stagnating regions is widening. This unbalanced development in turn promotes selective labor migrations and ultimately new patterns of often competitive ethnic interaction. In countries such as Italy, Britain, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union similarly skewed economic developmental patterns have had the effect of promoting ethnically specific migrations and of restructuring interethnic politics in areas that are deemed crucial to central government policymakers. Myron Weiner himself is associated with MIT's Migration and Development Study Group, and his collaboration with scholars such as Wayne Cornelius and Martin Slater, who work on Mexico and France respectively, is a very positive move toward a comparative analysis of political economy.

The study is itself comparative within the Indian context. This has allowed Weiner to draw important distinctions between various ethnic groups' levels of ethnic awareness and mobilization resources. In addition, such comparative research has led Weiner to note that nativist-migrant communal relationships are not always structured asymmetrically in a way that puts the incoming group on the bottom of the economic-political stratification system. One of the legacies of British colonial divide-and-rule policies is the advantaged position enjoyed by certain groups, particularly in access to government posts, deliberately recruited from outside the region. Today it is the local communities that are using a greater ethnic consciousness in order to mobilize and press for such rewarding jobs. Thus the study warns us against presuming that ethnically defined labor migrations inevitably stratify resultant plural communities in one manner only.

Students of the politics of plural societies need to think more systematically about the politics of economic planning (or "latent planning"). Likewise, the students of development policy need to direct more specific attention to the ethnic ramifications of certain economic strategies. This study by Myron Weiner will be of value to both.

CYNTHIA H. ENLOE
Clark University

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Bentham's Theory of the Modern State *by Nancy L. Rosenblum. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978. 169 pp. $15.00.*

The discrepancy between the tone, style, and thought of the commentator and the theorist being commented upon in this study is striking. Bentham is literal, prolix, and analytic; Rosenblum on Bentham is allusive, succinct, and synthetic. This encounter between two very different minds could easily have yielded another polemical critique of Bentham, so common in the literature. Instead, Rosenblum has produced a remarkably sympathetic portrait of Bentham's political thought. Although Rosenblum's book lacks the historical sweep of Elie Halévy's *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* or the philosophical acuity of David Lyons's *In the Interest of the Governed*, no commentator has provided a more perceptive and imaginative study of Bentham's political thought than Rosenblum.

Rosenblum's aim is to show that "Bentham's political thought forms a theory of the modern state" (p. 151). The state ideally exhibits a higher rationality that stands above the conflicting interests of individuals, and for Bentham this "higher rationality" is utility. But Rosenblum also stresses the modernity of Bentham's concept of the state: no theorist has been "as preoccupied with modernization or political development" (p. 2). The requisites of modernization for Bentham are primarily a legal system based on the desires of individuals and a bureaucratized public service to oversee a legislative process that takes place in a diverse and changing society.

Rosenblum convincingly demonstrates that the idea of the modern state is at the core of Bentham's thought, and that the principle of utility, his social psychology, his notions of sovereignty and law, and his general view of the nature of politics cohere when seen from a statist perspective. Some topics that have preoccupied scholars of utilitarianism receive little attention here, but by the time Rosenblum has finished, one doubts whether they have the significance that they have been traditionally accorded. How can the principle of utility be justified? The many technical discussions of this problem seem to be somewhat beside the point after Rosenblum has explained the presuppositions of political consensus underlying Bentham's notion of utility and his negative use of utility in combating aristocratic and legalistic rhetoric. Nor does Rosenblum confine herself to only a few central works of Bentham. By selecting just the right text from Bentham's massive and chaotic corpus, Rosenblum demonstrates a thorough understanding of all of it that has been published. Yet she does not hesitate to lavish attention on an important work, even one that has not previously been thought so: *Official Aptitude Maximized*, for example, in Rosenblum's hands proves a surprisingly rich source (p. 128). Finally, from this book about Bentham we learn quite a lot about other theorists—particularly Locke (pp. 28–32; 44–46), Helvetius (pp. 29–32; 36–39), and Burke (pp. 128–38).

The author of a review essay on Rosenblum's study would find much to discuss at length. The comparison between Bentham's legislator and the classical idea of the legislator not only illuminates Bentham's thought, but also could inspire a larger study of the theme of the lawgiver in political thought (pp. 21–25). A technical distinction between intention and motive (rather tediously drawn by Bentham) becomes for Rosenblum a vehicle for a suggestive account of political responsibility and legalistic politics (pp. 34–36). Her analysis of Bentham's social psychology might very well be a

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model for a general understanding of the soul of utilitarian political theory (p. 27). Bentham's departures from the command theory of law are carefully delineated by Rosenblum lays out with clarity and ingenuity the motives of legislators and the whole rationale of Bentham's view of government.

This book is not the definitive study of Bentham's thought, perhaps not even of Bentham's concept of the state. No one can write that until publication of the new edition of the *Collected Works* is complete many years from now. Until then Bowring's edition (inadequate but not as hopeless as is often assumed) and the overwhelming collection of boxes of manuscripts at University College, London (which Rosenblum seems to have neglected) will have to do. A final word on Bentham would also need to be more explicitly and systematically critical than Rosenblum is here. Her criticisms are often penetrating, but they appear in a rather oblique form. Furthermore, one must eventually come to terms with some technical philosophical issues, not only in Bentham's moral philosophy but more importantly in his theory of language. If Rosenblum's study is not definitive, it nonetheless offers a major contribution to scholarship on Bentham.

DENNIS F. THOMPSON
Princeton University

Right and Wrong *by Charles Fried. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978. 226 pp. $15.00.*

This book is another venture in the theory of individual rights given prominence recently by Harvard philosophers Rawls and Nozick. It is unlikely to get as much attention as their works, however, because it is less comprehensive, political, and partisan. It is not emphatically liberal or conservative owing partly to its omissions and partly to its moderation.

Fried's arguments seek only to justify "our" intuitions (cf. p. 118). They therefore may not persuade those who do not share those intuitions or are determined to ignore them. This book is part of a particular tradition. It refers and responds to recent works by English and American professional analytic philosophers, not for instance to the *Nicomachean Ethics* or *Beyond Good and Evil*. In the relentlessly academic manner of the tradition he follows, Fried does not deal with ephemeral actual matters such as Hiroshima or the Eichmann trial, but prefers timeless hypothetical examples, such as whether to explode a fat man lodged in the only exit from a cave one is trapped in (pp. 23–4, 43, and 51). (I do not believe that this example is intended on the order of Plato's cave as an image for the human situation in general.)

Fried follows Rawls in invoking Kant's name and wishing to defend categorical imperatives and inviolable rights rather than utility. One is tempted to call Fried's a watered down Kantianism, for the moral postulates of the soul, God, and immortality are absent. It might be fairer to call it fleshed out, for whereas Kant's respect is for free and rational beings, Fried's is for human beings as bodies with sexuality and preferences for those close to them. Fried derives both form and content of morality directly from respect for persons without using a state of nature or offering an account of respect.

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Fried's primary intention often seems to be to limit morality, to prevent its becoming obsessive and taking over all of our lives. He strives for this result by making morality a matter of intention rather than consequence; by emphasizing personal responsibility and accordingly sharply distinguishing what we do ourselves from what we merely fail to prevent others from doing; by concentrating on prohibitions (particularly against physically harming or lying to innocent people) rather than duties, even though his scheme allows equally for both; by denying that positive duties are categorical like prohibitions; by assigning broad duties to institutions; by resisting the tendency to view the long-term situation of society as a continuing catastrophe that justifies drafting us all as full-time soldiers of morality; and by defending rights to lead our own lives, satisfy our wants, prefer our family (one of the most intriguing arguments) and friends, and fill limited roles such as being a lawyer or doctor loyal only to his chosen clients or patients.

Most of *Right and Wrong* is devoted to rights and the patterns constituted by their exercise called "roles." (It therefore can hardly satisfy Solzhenitsyn's recent Harvard clarion call "to defend not so much human rights as obligations.") Categorical rights may not be weighed against other goods or consequences. Fried therefore attacks the recent economic analysis of rights, which views them as preferences. Instead of the "bewildering menu" of positive rights invoked in public discourse (p. 109), he offers one right to a fair share of society's resources. It has natural limits and entails weighing and balance, unlike the inviolable negative rights not to be wronged. This distinction can protect us against the current tendency, manifest in international declarations, to dilute essential negative rights, for example, against torture, by listing them along with a plethora of supposed positive rights, for example, to paid vacations, in a manner that seems to permit balancing one against another.

Fried's book avoids being clearly partisan partly because it is only partial. Not only like Rawls does he not express a view on the ownership of the means of production (p. 180 n.), but he does not offer a formula for distribution, even though it is the citizen's duty to come to a conviction as to what are fair shares (p. 129). He does not explain why he does not, whether because he has not yet worked it out, because he wishes to appeal to those who differ on distribution, or because to do so is somehow inappropriate to his theory. There is a hint that fair shares may be best determined by compromise among differing views (p. 129). To raise and leave open the question of distribution suggests that resources naturally belong to the political community and not to individuals. Fried does, however, discuss fair contributions, which are constrained by negative rights so that an individual cannot be compelled to contribute bodily organs, talents, or efforts. This claim is sharply contrary to Rawls's insistence that we regard natural talents as a common asset and deny that even a man's character is his own. Discussing fair contributions at all after fair shares implies that after all people's rights to their property are sufficiently prior that they have to contribute before there is anything to distribute. It is not clear therefore why, given that Fried follows Locke rather than Rawls in teaching a right to one's body or person and therefore to one's labor, he does not extend that right one step further to the fruits of one's labor.

Fried does not claim to offer a political theory (p. 118). But his work is not so abstract or focused on the individual as to ignore politics. Since "institutions are implicated in the concept of human nature" (p. 129), the one primary positive right, to a fair share,

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and the corresponding duty to provide it apply only to fellow citizens through their political community. Fried does not explain why the political community has a status able to limit these natural rights and duties, nor does he completely deny that one has some such duty to foreigners (p. 42). One recalls Locke's replacement of the natural duty of the individual to preserve all mankind by the duty of civil society to preserve its members (*Second Treatise* 6–8, 11, 128–9, 134–5, and 159).

NATHAN TARCOV
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REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

City Government Finances in 1976–77 *prepared by the Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 116 pp. $2.30.*

County Government Finances in 1976–77 *prepared by the Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 74 pp. $1.75.*

National Party Platforms, vol. 1: 1840–1956 and vol. II: 1960–1976, rev. ed. *compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson. Champaign, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1978. 1,035 pp. $35.00 the set.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28: 1913 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 629 pp. $25.00.*

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Correspondence

Stability, Security, and Continuity

To the Editor:

An error occurred in my review of Barry's *Stability, Security, and Continuity: Mr. Justice Burton and Decision-Making in the Supreme Court 1945–1958,* which was printed in the Winter 1978–79 issue of *PSQ*. There appeared on page 697 the following sentence: "This kind of talk requires explanation; the explanation offered is . . ." This incorrectly implies that the explanation that follows is Professor Barry's. In fact, the explanation was my own:

David N. Atkinson
University of Missouri, Kansas City

Patterns of Ethnic Succession

To the Editor:

In my article "Patterns of Ethnic Succession," which you were kind enough to publish in your Spring 1979 issue, the first footnote reads:

> We were dimly aware at this time of the work of the Viennese Marxist theorist Max Muller who tried to accommodate the reality of ethnicity in Central Europe to Marxist doctrine.

The Indian sun must have got to me. Muller, of course, was the philologist and Orientalist who did his work at Oxford. The reference should have been to Otto Bauer, the brilliant social democratic theorist.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate

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

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

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